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This research investigates the constitutional practice in Indonesia through
the Indonesian Constitutional Court (ICC). It has played a significant role in
safeguarding the Indonesian constitution, indeed has acted more supreme than
the constitution itself, through the approach known as the Ultra Petita. This issue
requires a research and recommendation for law reform in the ICC. This topic
has been analysed and compared from different angles, including other country
experiences, ASEAN countries, and the ICC essential role in autonomous
provinces.
The research applies several approaches. Firstly the comparative
constitutional approach analyses the text of the constitution and how it is
interpreted judicially. Supporting this approach, the researcher also uses the
black-letter and socio legal approach, and observed personally the operations of
the ICC in Indonesia, understand how the ICC operates and produces
judgments.
The research has found that the ICC judges have been given authority to
expand their jurisdictions by the constitutional system, which implies that some
judgments have potentially violated the constitution itself. For the time being,
regulations do not prevent ICC judges in making the Ultra Petita, because of the
articles in the Constitution arranging the ICC. The nine members of the ICC have
also had difficulty in managing its.
The research concludes that the ICC needs change, particularly through
the amendment the constitution, namely; 1. The prohibition of judging beyond its
jurisdictions, such as Ultra Petita; 2. Centralizing the judicial review of regulations
under ICC jurisdictions instead of spreading in several states organ; 3.Creating
the mechanism of asking for constitutional opinion; 4. Adding more judges, 5.
Arranging all election mechanism, and 5. The supervising state organ.
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1CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction
The law and constitutional reform which began in 1998 have significantly
changed Indonesian constitutional law. The researchers of constitutional law
should be grateful because since the reformation era, law studies especially
constitutional law, have rapidly developed. Furthermore, the development of
constitutional law studies in Indonesia has continued in line with the amendment
of the 1945 Constitution. During the period of 1999-2002 the amendment was
carefully discussed for 2 years and 11 months, and then endorsed in four stages
of the annual session of the MPR (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002).1
Indonesia has adopted new principles in constitutional law, chiefly the
principle of separation of powers, checks and balances, as well as protecting
minority rights.2 These principles have in part replaced the previous principle of
parliamentary supremacy. Implementing the new principles requires specific
judicial institutions operated by judges, to control as well as safeguard the
political decisions, which are normally based upon the principle of the rule of
majority. The function of the judicial review of legislation product is one of the
main reasons for solidly embedding the Indonesian Constitutional Court (ICC) in
the 1945 Constitution,3 to prevent abuse of power by parliament.
The ICC’s jurisdictions are regulated in the constitution and also in several
ICC acts.4 Those jurisdictions are; namely
a) testing a law against the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia;
____________
1The essential points of the amendment are: Firstly, amendment of the basic norms of statehood,
particularly the assertion that the sovereignty is in the hands of the people carried out according to
the 1945 constitution. Secondly is the amendment in the institutional state organs, creating the new
organs and abolishing the organs inconsistent with the spirit of reformation. Thirdly is the
amendment on the relationship among state organs, and lastly is the adoption of human rights
principles. Mahfud MD, Konstitusi dan Hukum dalam Kontroversi Isu [Constitution and Law in the
Controversial Issues]. (Rajawali Pers 2009) 187. See also Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional
Change and Democracy in Indonesia (Cambridge University Press 2013) 246-258.2Gary F Bell, ‘Minority Rights and Regionalism in Indonesia-Will Constitutional Recognition Lead to
Disintegration and Discrimination,’ (2001) 5 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law
784.3On 13August 2003 the Act No. 24 of 2003 on the Indonesian Constitutional Court was validated,
and, this date is therefore the birth of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia.4The ICC jurisdictions are also stipulated in the Act No. 24 of 2003 on the Indonesian Constitutional
Court.
2b) deciding disputes of the state institutions’ authorities, granted by the
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945;
c) dissolution of political parties; and
d) deciding disputes over election results.
The ICC is also obliged to examine alleged violations of law committed by
the President and/or Vice President, which have been proposed by the House of
Representatives. This obligation, known as impeachment, is incorporated in the
Constitution.5
With those jurisdictions, the ICC has been publicly expected to play an
essential role as the state organ implementing law reform.6 However, the
existence of the ICC has not always protected the constitution from implemented
law reform, as the ICC has often tended to obstruct and expand its judgments
outside of its authorities, as regulated by the 1945 Constitution and several acts.
This style of expanded jurisdiction is commonly known in Indonesia as the
Ultra Petita. In certain cases the ICC not only reviews an article or a clause in an
act, but also can invalidate and annul acts. In the last ten years, there has been
at least ten cases identified as the Ultra Petita,7 posing serious threats to the
implementation of democratic values and also the rule of law – if the ICC can
demolish acts with the Ultra Petita mechanism.
Such uncertainty can happen at any time, and Ultra Petita judgements
have a serious effect on Indonesia’s legal reform. Ultra Petita supporters claim
that in the context of searching justice values the judges have to progressively
decide a case beyond a legal text, instead of concentrating on text meaning.8
Additionally, Mahfud MD has argued strongly that Ultra Petita is
parliament’s domain as the positive legislator, and not in domain of the ICC, as
____________
5See also the 1945 Constitution, in Article 7A and 7B.6See also Timothy Lindsey, ‘The IMF and Insolvency Law Reform in Indonesia’ (1998) 34 (3)
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 119-124.7See also ICC Judgment No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 on the Electrical Power; Judgment No.
05/PUU-IV/2006 on Judicial Commission; Judgment No. 10/PUU-VI/2008 on the Domicile
Requirement for Candidates of DPD; Judgment No. 102/PUU-VII/2009 on the Presidential Election;
Judgment No.30/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Mineral and Coal Mining; Judgment No. 32/PUU-VIII/2010
on the Mineral and Coal Mining; Judgment No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Case of Children Outside
of Marriage; Judgment No. 006/PUU-IV/2006 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.8Indonesia has developed the legal theory known as the Progressive Law, asserting law is not only
in the text of several regulations, but judges have to deeply explore the justice, instead of
concentrating only to the text. See also Satjipto Rahardjo, Membedah Hukum Progresif [Exploring
the Progressive Law] (Penerbit Buku Kompas 2006).
3the negative legislator.9 Contradicting Mahfud MD, Jimly, formerly the ICC head
judge, has defended the necessity for Ultra Petita in the ICC, arguing that the ICC
can make the Ultra Petita if the clause or article in an act is the heart of an act.10
During his period as the head of ICC, Jimly was well-known for invalidating
several acts.
DPR members have contradicted Jimly. The effects can be seen after the
judgement that the parliament neither redrafted the affected acts, nor brought
them back to the sessions. The parliament members can argue that their efforts
will be useless, since the ICC can annul them again. In the national legislation
agenda, the acts affected by the ICC have increased gradually every year
because the DPR hesitated to revise, but have tried to amend the ICC
jurisdictions.11
Regarding the expanded jurisdiction of the ICC, Butt and Lindsey state
that the ICC has acted beyond its power, trespassing upon other state organ
jurisdictions, such as the Supreme Court. Several judgments have defined them
as conditionally constitutional,12 judgments not regulated in the constitution or the
ICC acts. Mietzner has asserted that the ICC judges, playing judicial activism,
have frequently created controversial judgments.13
Butt and Lindsey have not specified in which kind, or in which part of state
organ jurisdiction the ICC has interfered. Even Ultra Petita, broadly discussed
regarding the existence of ICC in Indonesia, is little touched. So the current
research goes beyond Butt and Lindsay’s discussion on expanded jurisdiction,
exploring in detail in which state organ jurisdictions the ICC has interfered.
____________
9Moh. Mahfud MD, ‘Rambu Pembatas Dan Perluasan Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi [Barrier
Signs and Expansion Authority of the Constitutional Court]’ (2009) 4 (16) Jurnal Hukum 441-462.10Jimly Asshiddiqie, ‘Larangan Ultra Petita MK itu Keliru [Forbidding Ultra Petita is Wrong],’
accessed 10 May 2015 <http://news.okezone.com/read/2011/06/16/339/469179/jimly-larangan-
ultra-petita-mk-itu-keliru>11Leo Tukan, ‘Kewenangan MK Dipangkas Karena DPR Terancam [The ICC Jurisdictions Be Cut
Because the DPR Threatened],’ accessed 21 May 2015
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4e012e5c5a8f3/merasa-terancam-dpr-batasi-
kewenangan-mk>12Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey. The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart
Publishing, 2012) 130-139; See also Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, ‘Economic Reform When The
Constitution Matters: Indonesia's Constitutional Court and Article 33, (2008) 44(2) Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies 239-262; See also Susi Dwi Harijanti, and Tim Lindsey, ‘Indonesia:
General Elections Test the Amended Constitution and the New Constitutional Court,’ (2006) 4
International Journal of Constitutional Law 138; See also Simon Butt, Corruption and Law in
Indonesia (Routledge 2011).13Marcus Mietzner, ‘Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The
Role of the Constitutional Court,’ (2010) 10 (3) Journal of East Asian Studies 397-424.
4The number of judges in the ICC (nine) has also created a significant
debate. The overloaded cases, most importantly in the election season, were not
in accordance with the capacity of judges,14 leading to rushed judgments without
deep consideration. A judge can disagree with the majority of the members of the
assembly, and the opinion is included as an integral part of the court judgment
(called a dissenting opinion). The debate on this matter is whether the dissent
needs to be combined within a judgment, or would be better placed somewhere
else.
The transition processes of jurisdictions have created other problems.
Before the amendment, the Supreme Court (SC) had the judicial power to review
all regulations. But after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the SC’s
jurisdictions in reviewing regulations have been limited. This transition process
has not been smooth, with the SC reluctant to hand over the jurisdictions. Several
ICC judgments have not been fully obeyed by the SC.15
The ICC can be said to be a legal transplant from the success story of
other countries, thus learning from other countries experience is needed so as to
understand theory on the constitutional court, so that the constitutional court does
not diverge from its basic principles.
As a country located in the South East Asian region, Indonesia needs also
to examine constitutional practice in that area so as to enrich its own
constitutional reform. All countries in ASEAN have modified their constitutional
practice with parliament, the Supreme Court, constitutional tribunal, and
constitutional court - all places to review and examine the regulations, and, in
extreme circumstance, to even annul or invalidate an act. Three main models of
constitutional practice have been identified in ASEAN: the Westminster Model,
the Socialist Model, and the Mixed Model, all of which are briefly explored in this
research.
____________
14In a year the ICC have received more than 152 cases. This number can be increased in election
years. Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Inilah Jumlah Perkara Masuk ke MK [This is the Number of the
Constitutional Court Cases], accessed 21 May 2015,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=3532#.VV2zxkZ8u1k>15ICC Judgment No. 039/PHPU.C1-II/2009; Judgement No. 4/PUU-V/2007, General Practitioner. In
this judgement ICC stated that the Articles 29 Clause (1); Article 36, Article 37 (2), Article 73 (1),
(2), (3), Article 75 (1), Article 76, Article 77, Article 78, and Article 79 (a) the Act Number 29 of 2004
on General Practitioner is invalid and against the Constitution. In contrast, the SC still uses those
articles as the legal sources.
5The amendment of the 1945 Constitution has also had consequences at
provincial level with legal delegation of autonomy rights, but with legal constraints
upon those rights. This causes a regulation clash between central and local
government, for instance, in Aceh Province (the author’s home province). With
the Act of Governing Aceh, following to the MoU Helsinki, Aceh Province has
gained a special legal autonomous status, including rights to explore its natural
resources. In fact, the rights are apparently not fully owned by Aceh, because
central and local government do not yet agree on the revenue sharing
mechanism, and the central government is unwilling to share the value of
percentages as stated in the Act. As the guardian of the constitution the ICC
should reinforce the general norms, but has remained silent in this situation.
1.2. The Basic Theory of Separation of Powers
Montesquieu is the constitutional law scholar known widely since the
18th century for his theory of Separation of powers. It derived from his concern to
fight the absolutism of King Louis XIV in France. His theory was closely
influenced by British philosopher John Locke in 1748, published in Two Treaties
of Government.16 It is important to the prosperous working of the government that
the person assigned with power in any of the three organs (executive, judiciary
and legislature) shall not intrude upon the other organs, or encroach upon their
powers.17 Holding state’s authority in a person or a group will potentially produce
a dictatorship, the governmental authorities must share and distribute in three
different state organs. Every organ has to be independent from the others.18
Montesquieu’s principle of separation of powers has received criticisms
amongst legal scholars. They claim that it is hard to draw a clear line to separate
the powers. Thus, in reality there is no pure separation of powers.19 His opinion
has been seen as a resistance to the absolute power at that time, Montesquieu
also did not elaborate clearly upon how the powers control each other to prevent
____________
16John Locke, Two Treatises of Government Student Edition (Mac Master University, 1823) 167-
169.17Martin H Redish, and Elizabeth J. Cisar, ‘If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory,’ (1991) Duke Law Journal 458.18Charles De Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Digireads.com Publishing, 2004) 30.19See also Greg Weiner, Separation of Powers, (The Encyclopaedia of Political Thought 2015)
6overlapping. Resulting from this argument, the Montesquieu theory had great
effect upon the development of administrative law throughout the world.
A clear example of this doctrine is found in the American constitutional
system. The Congress has legislative powers; the President has executive
power; and the Supreme Court and its subordinate courts have the judicial
powers. Although America has preserved separation of power in their
constitution, these powers are not complete - the theory separated the executive
from legislature, and yet enabled the Supreme Court to declare invalid an act of
the legislature.20
Indonesian legal scholar Sunny stated that there are two types of
separation of powers: material meaning, and formal meaning. In the first, the
material meaning is a separation of powers expressly retained in tasks (functions)
which are characteristic of the state showing the separation in three parts - the
legislative, executive, and judicative.21 In the second, the formal meaning is if the
separation is not maintained by the firm. In the Indonesian context, separation of
powers in the material meaning has not been implemented, but rather the formal
meaning. In other words, Indonesia has a distribution power without stressing the
separation of powers.22
During the authoritarian era, before reform in 1998, the separation of
power in formal and material meaning did not work well. The power was
centralised mainly in the hand of president as executive, with parliament and
judicial power under presidential control. In 1998 the authoritarian regime fell, and
Indonesia amended its constitution, not only separating the powers amongst
state organs, but also distributing the power as well, with the principle of checks
and balances.
The judiciary power was distributed in two state organs, namely the ICC
and the SC. Their positions are equal in the constitution, but in practice they have
disrespected each other - chiefly, in implementing one another’s judgments. An
____________
20Jeffrey A. Segal, ‘Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts,’
(1997) American Political Science Review 28-44. See also Maurice Vile John Crawley,
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Liberty Fund Inc 1998)21Ismail Sunny, Pembagian Kekuasaan Negara [Separation State Power], (Aksara Baru 1985), hlm.
4. Yamin stated that Indonesian’s Constitution is not clearly stating the principle of separation
power. M. Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [Proclamation and Constitution of
Republic of Indonesia], (Ghalia Indonesia 1982), 341.22Ismail Sunny, ibid.
7annulled act by the ICC can be reactivated by the Supreme Court. And so, it
seems that the constitution still needs to be amended in order to clarify their
respective powers.
1.3. The Simple Model of Judicial Review
Judicial review is best approached through the constitutional
interpretation model pronounced by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury’s case, the
oldest model of constitutional interpretation in the American constitutional
system.23 The systems of constitutional interpretation have imperfections. For the
provisions of the constitution to be accomplished by unbiased means is unsure at
best. Studies conducted by political scientists, such as the classic works of
Glendon Schubert and Harold Spaeth, have examined the different political
approaches and standards of justices, which are closely connected to their voting
performance in cases of disagreement.24
Elements of progressive opinions by Judge Hugo Black interact with
those of Marshall to give clearness and coherence in performance. The
constitutional principle that there is no essential inconsistency between the
practice of judicial review and the values of democratic government applied in the
American constitutional system, rather than a parliamentary system such as
United Kingdom.25
A parliamentary system is one in which the acts by the national
legislature inhabit an equal foothold with the other devices of Britain’s unwritten
constitution, derived from legal documents such as Magna Carta (1215)26 and the
Bill of Rights (1689).27 Parliament is supreme because the assembly can amend
the constitution at will. America’s constitutional system set the boundary of all
state organs - the constitution being supreme, rather than the legislature.
____________
23William E. Nelson, Marbury v Madison: The Origins of Judicial Review (University of Kansas
2000) 1-10.24Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices
(Northwestern University Press 1965) 155.  See also Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy
Making: Explanation and Prediction (WH Freeman 1979); Jeffrey A.Segal and Harold J. Spaeth,
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge University Press 1993)25John Mabry Mathews, the American Constitutional System (McGraw-Hill 1940) 50.26Ellis Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American
Tradition of Rule of Law. (University of Missouri Press 1993)27Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Yale University Press 1998).
8The relation between constitutional power and judicial review leads to
two significant opinions. Firstly, the constitution and guidelines are considered as
the supreme law,28 and rules personified in legislation are inferior. If a bill passed
by Congress clashes with the constitution, the inferior rules should give way to
the superior ones. There would have to be a constitutional review, rather than
judicial review. Secondly, Chief Justice Marshall’s point of view in Marbury’s case
was that the constitutional purpose is interpreted in the courts with justices,
implementing rules to facts in order to resolve cases.29
The traditional approach to constitutional interpretation is personified by
what is commonly called “strict construction”.30 It means understanding
constitutional provisions plainly, so that government is allowed to prepare nothing
more than what is obviously indicated in the text.
Judicial review is a reasonable concern of exercising judicial power, and
the autonomous superiority of the American constitutional system is restricted by
their constitutional personality. The traditional concept of constitutional
interpretation needs some supplementary conditions, connecting justice to the
constitutional law being applied. These are the appropriate texts of the
constitution, arranging the standards for assessing procedures positioned by
Congress and the President or others. The standard for assessing
constitutionality has to be the text of the constitution itself, commonly called the
“original intent”,31 which is not on what the justices would prefer the constitution to
mean.
1.4. Kelsen’s Theory on the Constitutional Court
There are two main discussions in this section. Firstly, a brief
explanation of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, and, secondly, the importance of the
constitutional court. Hans Kelsen is a legal scholar famously known for his Pure
Theory of Law - a milestone in the improvement of modern jurisprudence.32 The
____________
28Charles A Beard, the Supreme Court and the Constitution (Courier Dover Publications 2012) 15.29Craig R Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation Power of Government (Cengage Learning 2012) 77.30Sotirios A Barber and James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions
(Oxford University Press 2007) 27.31Jack N. Rakove, ed. Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over Original Intent (Northeastern
University Press 1990) 459-462.32Hans Kelsen [1881-1973] was legal adviser to Austria's last emperor and its first republican
government, the founder and permanent advisor of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Austria,
9Pure Theory of Law sees law as a structure of norms created by the state, relying
upon the legitimacy of a generally accepted Basic Norm (Grundnorm),
particularly, the supremacy of the constitution. It discards any ideas derived from
metaphysics, politics, ethics, sociology, or the natural sciences.
Opening with the old-fashioned reception of Roman law, traditional
jurisprudence has preserved a twin structure of: subjective law (the rights of a
person), and objective law (the system of norms).33 This dual system is a useful
tool positioning the law in the service of politics, mainly by leaders or the ruling
political parties. The Pure Theory of Law abolishes this dualism by replacing it
with a unitary system of objective positive law, shielded from political
manipulation, and is conceivably the most important jurisprudential development
of the twentieth century.
Kelsen claimed that the Pure Theory of Law is concerned with the part of
knowledge dealing with law, but does not strictly own the subject matter of law;
which endeavours to free the science of law from all foreign fundamentals. A
theory of law should contract with law as it is actually arranged, and not as it
ought to be. Legal theory is knowledge and not wishes; knowledge of what the
law is, not of what the law ought to be. A theory of law must be distinguished from
law itself, and should be uniform, appropriate to all periods, and to all places.34
Kelsen maintained that legal theory is not concerned with the success of
legal norms. A norm is a proposition in theoretical form, and the mission of legal
theory is to illuminate the relations between the highest and all lower norms, not
to say whether the highest norm itself is good or bad. Those are parts of political
science, ethics, or religion.35 Kelsen disputed the presence of sovereign as a
personal object, and also rejects the existence of the state as an entity different
from law. State is neither more, nor less than the law - which is an object of
normative juristic information in its ideal feature.
Regarding the separation of powers, Kelsen stated that legislative,
executive and judicial processes are all norm producing agencies. For Kelsen the
____________
and the author of Austria's Constitution, which was enacted in 1920, abolished during the
Anschluss, and restored in 1945. < http://www.geni.com/people/Dr-Jur-Hans-
Kelsen/6000000002765697327>33Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press 1967) 3-23.34Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (The Lawbook Exchange 1945) 58-64.35Ibid, 20.
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difference between functional and practical law is relative, with procedure
assuming greater significance. The state is nothing but a legal structure,
observed as a system of human conduct and an order of compulsion. There is no
distinction between physical and juristic persons. All legal personality presumes
its validity from a greater norm. Therefore, the concept of person is merely a step
in the process of concretisation. Kelsen’s theory has widely influenced legal
science, covering the concepts of state; sovereignty; private and public law; legal
personality; right and duty; and international law. The conclusion is that state and
law are identical, but it does not mean that every legal order is a state.
The constitutional court was officially introduced in Austria on 25
January 1919, and became the first constitutional court in the world. A year after,
in 1920, Kelsen was appointed to be the judge of the Constitutional Court, in
place of his teacher, Edmund Berntzik, who had died shortly before.36 The
jurisdictions of Austria’s Constitutional Court derive from the constitution in more
than ten articles.37 The main purposes of the court was to mediate a conflict of
competency; and also a possible clash between the central institution and the
Laender (province/federal state), which could lead to a destruction of political
rights. Kelsen believed in constitutional authority as an essential tool for
harmonising relations between the centre and the regions within the Federal
State.38
Thus, the constitutional court not only engaged itself with protection of
citizens, but also with state provisions, the freedom to vote, as well as the public
law.39 The constitutional court became the essential mechanism for protecting
citizens' rights; verifying the constitutionality of the acts and decrees, coming from
member states, or Laender; and keeping equilibrium between the higher and the
lower government system.
In regard to the constitutional court, Kelsen announced the ex officio
procedure. The constitutional court was to be recognised as objective protector of
____________
36Sara Lagi, ‘Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929),’ (2012) 9(16) Co-
herencia 273-295.37See Austrian Federal Constitutional Law, Article 137-147. In those Articles explain clearly the
position and jurisdiction in the Austrian legal systems.38Gerhard Schmitz, ‘The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Austria 1918-1929,’ (2003) 2 Ratio
Juris 240-256.39Sara Lagi (n36).
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the constitution, a principle to which Kelsen was committed.40 For Kelsen,
constitutional and administrative jurisdiction signified two of the more important
institutions introduced into the new Austria, indispensable to conserving the
balance between the federation and the regions, and preserving the essential
unity of the state. Kelsen provided a significant reflection on the meaning and
value of constitutional, and administrative jurisdiction. Kelsen noted also that the
Federal Constitution was rapidly enacted by the Constituent National Assembly,
in order to prevent the Laender from taking a drawn-out decision-making process
to appreciate the constitution by agreement, and thus transform Austria into a
confederation. Kelsen inferred the Austrian Constitution as the law of a unitary
state transformed into a federal state.41
1.5. Critical Review of Constitutional Court as the Guardian of
Constitution
A basic principle of a constitutional court is to guard a state’s
constitution. For this reason, constitutional court is widely known as “the guardian
of constitution”, which has attracted criticism as a quasi-guardian,42 instead of a
real guardian.43 Dahl specified that there is necessarily an opposite ratio between
the power of the quasi-guardian, and the authority of the people and its
legislatures. The scope of rights and interests subject to last verdict by the quasi-
guardian limits the democratic process.44 This shows the important problem of
the lawfulness of quasi-guardians such as constitutional courts, when exercising
the supremacy to annul democratically enacted acts on the basis of judges’ own
understanding of constitutional rights.
An inconsistency faced by constitutional courts is their legitimacy,
considering themselves as negative legislators, an abstract/concentrated
(Kelsenian) system of judicial review, especially as guards of minorities and
minority rights. The legality of constitutional judicial review has proceeded on the
____________
40See also Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1992).41Sara Lagi (n36).42By ‘quasi guardians’ Dahl means the official charged with the protection of fundamental rights and
interests who are not themselves democratically controlled – such as the judges endowed with the
power to declare legislation unconstitutional. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale
University Press 1989)188.43Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts, (Springer 2014) 45-90.44Robert A. Dahl (n42)
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basis of the nature of constitutionalism,45 an intentionally counter-majoritarian
means. Judicial review is usually reinforced by an objectivist theory, according to
which the correct meaning of rights is objectively obvious by human reason.
According to Michael Moore:
When a moral realist judge today invalidates the expression of majority
will that a statute presumptively represents, he does so in the name of
something beyond his power to change and beyond the power of a
societal consensus to change. His justification for judicial review is
straightforward, and so is his mode of practising it: he will seek to
discover the true nature of the rights referred to by building the best
theory he can muster about the nature of equality, the nature of liberty,
etc.46
From this standpoint, an extra-majoritarian institution is essential,
ensuring that the performance of chosen branches of government conforms to
the constitutional restrictions. According to Alec Stone Sweet, a principle of the
new constitutionalism is that regimes are not democratically legitimate if they do
not constrain majority rule through rights and review.47 The understanding of
majoritarian politics with respect for rights balances parliamentary rule against the
supremacy of the constitutional court to overturn legislation. In this context, public
may disagree on the meaning of any specific right, even though they may all
agree about the value of a right, when stated in its abstract, and necessarily
unclear constitutional form.
In Indonesia, the presence of Indonesian Constitutional Court (ICC) has
led to a long debate around the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution. The
arbitrary interpretation of the constitution indicates that the position of the ICC is
equally supreme to the 1945 Constitution itself. In several cases, there are no
differences between the position of the 1945 Constitution and that of the ICC,
implying that the ICC is no longer the guardian of the 1945 Constitution because
the guardian and the guarded have melted down into one unity. According to the
principle of constitution supremacy defined by Hans Kelsen, the guardian is
____________
45Jeffrey Jowell QC, ‘Of Vires and Vacumm: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review,’ in
Christopher Forsyth, ed, Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart publishing, 2000) 327-339.46Michael S.Moore, ‘Law as a Functional Kind’, in Robert P.George, ed, Natural Law Theory;
Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press 1992) 229.47Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Court’, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo, ed, The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 828.
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supposed to submit to, and is placed below the guarded because the highest
norms are in the constitution.48
The guardian of the constitution functions to be performed accordingly
both in the form of law and in the implementation of its mandates and obligations.
The ICC functions as the interpreter of the constitution, performed through its
making and issuing of decisions based on the authorities. Judgments should
represent legal considerations and arguments; and the constitution provisions
should be interpreted and executed in the form of law, and in any other forms
according to the authorities and obligation granted to the ICC.49
The existence of the ICC has placed the 1945 Constitution as the
supreme law that has to be implemented with high consistency. The ICC holds
the court in an open way by summoning various parties for judicial hearing; it
encourages people and the community to be involved, or at least to be interested
in following how a constitution provision should be interpreted. The parties
involved in the ICC are also allowed to air their thoughts regarding the law
interpretation, although in the end all decision belongs to the ICC’s judges.
The positive reform of ICC has encouraged the development of
administrative law theory.50 In the past, administrative law only focused on the
political activities within the institutions of parliament and the Presidential
administration, and its discussions were merely about issues of governmental
institutions, the relationship between them, and human rights. After the reform,
the current issues of the constitution start to touch some wider aspects, involving
more parties who are not restricted to the legal experts.
1.6. Research Methodology
The two main methods used in research methodology are the qualitative
and the quantitative. The qualitative method is employed traditionally in social
sciences and in market research. This research will mainly use the qualitative
____________
48Hans Kelsen (n40) 123-129.49See also Martin H. Redish, and Matthew B. Arnould, ‘Judicial Review, Constitutional
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a Controlled Activism Alternative,’ (2012)
64 Florida Law Review 1485.50Taufi Qurrohman Syahuri, ‘Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Perselisihan Hasil
Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Berdasarkan Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 2003
[Constitutional Court Judgment on the Dispute Election of the Counted Vote based on the Act
Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court],’ (2009) 2 (1) Jurnal Konstitusi 14.
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research method, to emphasize law and social issues - in particular, the
constitutional court judgments. A researcher explores his capability to be an
interviewer or observer in collecting data regarding his research.
Related research methods are comparative law research, discourse
analysis, empirical research, and case studies.51 The researcher also conducts
empirical research and observation over the process of law review in Indonesia’s
legal system.
1.6.1. Research Aims
The research aims addressed in this study are as follows:
• To reconsider the limit of judges’ interpretation, particularly in Ultra Petita
cases.
• To analyse the case law of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, and its role
in law reform.
• To compare other countries' approach to law reform and the role of
constitutional courts.
• To propose future improvements in the Indonesia Constitutional Court through
amendment of the constitution.
• To seek the future mechanism for protecting a special autonomy province in
the constitution.
The research questions in this study are as follows:
• How does the ICC address Ultra Petita issue in law reform?
• How does the ICC learn from other country experience of judicial review?
• How does the ICC safeguard the rights of a special autonomy province, such
as Aceh?
• What is the future role for the ICC in implementing law reform?
1.6.2. Research Method Approach
This research requires the understanding of other constitutional courts.
For comparison, this research selects the supreme judicial institutions in Europe,
____________
51 See also Jay Campbell Sanderson and Kim Kelly, A Practical Guide to Legal Research
(Thomson Reuters 2014)
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America, and ASEAN countries. A comparative approach provides a valuable
analytical framework to explain conflicts between legal concepts and particular
provisions; and attempts to identify possible common solutions.
The comparative approach addresses both the needs of legal
practitioners to gain a better knowledge of foreign legal systems, and allows the
states to develop suitable legislation to meet the requirements of the international
community in the changing political world order. The approach has provided a
distinctive understanding of how law develops and works in different cultures.
Innovative methodologies in the comparative approach have placed it at the
forefront of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, combining such disciplines as
history; sociology; and anthropology with legal analysis and jurisprudence.
The research uses comparative constitutional studies method to
evaluate other countries’ constitutional documents; trace patterns of convergence
alongside persisting divergence in constitutional jurisprudence across polities;
and relate constitutional courts to the wider international legal context.52
Comparative constitutional law can assist law reform, providing a tool of
construction to understand legal rules, or to contribute towards the systematic
unification and harmonisation of law.53 It can evaluate an approach to a legal
problem in terms of a jurisdiction’s cultural, economic, political and legal
background; and is a valued tool for legal examination of national legal systems.
Two supporting legal approaches are used. Firstly, “black letter law”
refers to the basic standard elements or principles of law, which are generally
known and are free from doubt or dispute. It describes the basic principles of law
accepted by a majority of judges in most states. For example, it can be the
standard elements for a contract, or the technical definition of assault. This
research method examines legal texts, including case law. When people use this
term, the implication is that the law in question is accepted, and not open to
argument. On the other hand, with other types of laws, they may be widely open
to interpretation.54
____________
52Ran Hirschl, ‘From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies,’ (2013)
11 (1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1-12.53Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz and Tony Weir, Introduction to Comparative Law, (Clarendon Press
Oxford 1998) 15-31.54Joseph M. Perillo, ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter
Text and a Review,’ (1994) 63 Fordham Law Review 281.
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Since lawyers often question, challenge, and reinterpret the law as part
of their work, it is important to distinguish black letter law from other types of law.
The legal community may delegate whether a law is uncontroversial. The older a
law is and more frequently it has been upheld in court and in legal treatises, the
more likely it is to be generally accepted. Changing societies call for changing
laws and differing interpretations on existing legal precedent. Black letter law is
used to support various interpretations of the law. This method of research is an
essentially descriptive analysis of a large number of technical and co-ordinate
legal rules from main sources.55
The ICC judgements are primary source material for black letter law.
There are some ten Ultra Petita judgments, explored through the black letter law
method. Secondly, the socio-legal approach is defined as a law wider social and
political structure. The separation between the sociology of law and socio-legal
studies underlines the development of the social scientific studies of law.56 Socio-
legal researchers are alert to different approaches in sociology, and the role of
methodological debate. Sociologists and social anthropologists increasingly,
recognise the need to address and understand the content of law.57 What binds
the socio-legal community is an approach to the study of legal phenomena
informed by research in other disciplines. Traditionally, socio-legal scholars
bridge the divide between law and sociology; social policy; and economics.
1.6.3. Sources
The sources of legal study in this research come from Indonesian and
English based materials. Indonesian sources include a number of ICC judgments
(as the primary data). The ICC has never formally published their judgments in
any languages other than Indonesian with perspectives from Indonesian books,
law reports, journals, newspapers, electronic media, and so forth. English
language material is still needed, specifically when comparing practices in other
countries.
____________
55Lawteacher, Writing Law Dissertation, accessed 26 May 2014,
<http://www.lawteacher.net/dissertation_help/writing-law-dissertation-methodology.php>56See also Stefan Larsson, ‘Karl Renner and (Intellectual) Property—How Cognitive Theory Can
Enrich a Sociolegal Analysis of Contemporary Copyright,’ (2014) 48 (1) Law & Society Review 3-
33.57Ibid.
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The sources in this research have been divided into three types; namely,
(1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) tertiary. The primary sources comprise58
a. law reports, such as case judgments ;
b. statute material; and
c. new statutes.
Secondary sources comprise
a. text books, such as case books;
b. legal journals, editorial notes/case notes, academic articles, weeklies, and
professional journals; and
c. internet materials.
Tertiary data provides overviews of topics by synthesizing information
gathered from other resources. Tertiary resources often provide data in a
convenient form, and help a general overview of a subject, but rarely contain
original material.
Table 1: The sources collecting and processing
1.6.4. Ethics
Ethics is a way of thinking through every aspect and stage of research.
Chiefly, be fair and respectful, efficient and also aim towards high scientific and
ethical standards. This research involves neither human subject nor other living
things, but uses the text materials, court judgements, books, journals, and so
forth.
____________
58Phillip H. Kenny, Studying Law (London Butterworths 1998) 66-82.
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1.6.5. Field Work
From June to October, 2013, the researcher undertook field work to the
ICC in the capital city of Jakarta. I observed directly how the ICC operates; the
way of the ICC judges examining the witnesses; hearing expert opinions; reading
judgment;59 and so forth. This helped understand the judgement making process,
from registering cases, attending a session, and its final judgement. The ICC is
the final arbiter, with no further appeal.
The ICC building is modern with good access to allow the public to
attend the session. Recent and previous judgements are distributed and can be
downloaded easily through the website after the judges have read their
judgement. The ICC also has a modern library, with collections both physically
and electronically of the judgements, journals, books, and so forth. The public are
welcome to the facility, once registered. However, the numbering process of the
cases available on the website can be confusing, chronological order, or the type
cases (such as judicial review, election disputes, state organ dispute, and
dissolution political party). The researcher also used other resources, such as
local or international media, following law discussion, and accessing online law
materials not found in the ICC.
In the ICC, the public are not allowed to use electronical devices, distract
the session, threaten the judges, bring a weapon, and so forth. The ICC provides
a teleconference facility in each province, which is important as Indonesia
consists of thousands of islands, but the facilities sometimes suffer from weather
conditions, and poor IT connectivity.
1.7. Conceptual Framework
This research started because of a gap in knowledge in the Indonesian
constitutional system.60 The constitution is supposed to be positioned as the
____________
59The process of a judgment has relatively depended on the case. The ICC does not have a clear
regulation on the time frame of a case. Based on the previous cases, so far, the shortest process of
a judgment was 11 days. See also the ICC Judgment No.101/PUU-X/2012 on the Presidential
Election. The longest process of a judgment was 309 days. See also the ICC Judgment
No.10/PUU-X/2012 on the Mineral and Coal. See also Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian
Undang-Undang [The Procedural Law on the Judicial Review] (Konstitusi Press 2006) 28.60Jans Maringka, ‘Empowering the Prosecution Service in the Constitutional System of the Republik
of Indonesia’, (2015) 3 (6) International Journal 1064-1070. The implementation of constitutional
system has also had a significant challenge in European Community. See also Brian Libgober, ‘Can
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supreme law - protecting and guaranteeing the rights of citizens, but the opposite
has happened. The constitution is broadly interpreted in the name of justice but
sometimes is not accepted as the supreme law.
Table 2: The gap of knowledge happening in Indonesia constitutional
system
The ICC is one state organ having constitutional power to interpret the
constitution. The ICC has often applied the judges’ perspective only, cases
commonly known as the Ultra Petita.
Table 3: The process of Ultra Petita cases
____________
the EU Be a Constitutional System without Universal Access to Judicial Review?’ (2015) 36
Michigan Journal of International Law 353-353.
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Table 2 shows the working of the Indonesian constitutional system. The
1945 Constitution creates four significant state organs playing important roles.
The President and DPR/Parliament are given the specific authorities to legislate
acts. Indonesian citizens as individuals or represented, they have the
constitutional rights to object an act through the ICC. This is commonly called the
“judicial review” procedure. After several sessions, the ICC can make procedural
judgments, or the surprising one known as the Ultra Petita, positioning above the
1945 Constitution itself.
Table 4: The research steps
Table 3 describes the stages of this research. Selected Ultra Petita
cases are tested through literature review, grand theories, and other country
experiences.
1.8. The Original Contribution to Knowledge
The original doctoral contribution to knowledge is a key question in
gaining PhD level. Doctorate originality has a variety of definitions and
explanations.61 Different law schools may have their own style when defining
“doctorate originality”.62 This research uses the approach of Winter:
____________
61The research conducted by Clarke has had significant finding that either Ph.D candidates or
examiners have different interpretation in understanding the concepts of originality in the Ph.D.
Gillian Clarke and Ingrid Lunt, ‘The Concept of ‘Originality’ in the Ph.D : How Is It Interpreted by
Examiners?’ (2014) 39 (7) Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 803-820.62Gail J. Hupper, ‘Academic Doctorate in Law: A Vehicle for Legal Transplants,’ (2008) 58 Journal
of Legal Education 413.
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1. a report of work which others would want to read;
2. tell a compelling story articulately, whilst pre-empting inevitable critiques;
3. carry the reader into complex realms, and inform and educate him/her; and
4. be sufficiently speculative or original to command respectful peer attention.63
The main original doctoral contribution to knowledge is the discussion of
the Ultra Petita,64 defined as a decision of a court which grants more than what is
asked for, expanding the court jurisdiction even beyond the constitution itself. Ten
cases have been identified as Ultra Petita, which have had serious impact on
legal reform, with parliament abandoning the affected acts, invalidated acts
increase every year, with serious threat to democracy as well as the rule of law.
Ultra Petita cases have been caused by the absolute power of judges, poor
quality of legislation, and lack of judiciary training.
A second doctoral original area is the issue of special autonomy in
Indonesia, focusing on the Aceh Province case study, explored in Chapter 8.
Indonesia has faced a serious problem in the implementation of the autonomic
regulations, with frequent regulation clashes between central government and
provincial level. Central government has given power for provincial level to self-
govern, but has been reluctant to reduce its central power. The ICC judges have
played a significant role in solving and preventing clashes, but have no power to
stop this in future because of the Indonesian constitutional system.
A third doctoral original contribution is comparative research on
constitutional court and judicial review in other countries, specially EU countries,
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The
justification is because Indonesian constitutional systems have tended to adopt
legal transplants from those countries.
Transplantation can create problems, for instance, in the number of
judges. Austria, with some 8.5 million population65 has a constitutional court with
twenty judges, including six substitute judges, who rotate their judiciary duty
____________
63Richard Winter, Morwenna Griffiths, and Kath Green, ‘The Academic Qualities of Practice: What
Are the Criteria for a Practice-Based PhD?’ (2000) 25 (1) Studies in Higher Education 36.64Even some researchers concerning on the ICC discussion have not really captured this important
idea. See also Simon Butt (n12).65Migration, ‘Geography and Population,’ accessed 26 August 2015,
<http://www.migration.gv.at/en/living-and-working-in-austria/austria-at-a-glance/geography-and-
population.html>
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depending up caseload. In Indonesia, with about a 237.6 million population66
have only nine constitutional court judges, making it hard for the judges to
produce a high quality judgement, especially in election disputes (when they
have a tight timetable to announce the winner).
Another comparative approach uses the Southeast Asia countries
(ASEAN), because Indonesia is located in this region and plays a significant role
in multilateral relationships. We focus on the constitutional practice in this region,
in Chapter 3.
The ICC was chosen as the research topic for two reasons. Firstly, the
researcher has been involved in comparative constitutional law, particularly the
ICC since it was professionally established in 2003. As a university lecturer in
constitutional law, he updates on the latest developments in the ICC, following
the recent judgments; debate on crucial issues; judgment examination;
conducting research; and so forth.
Secondly, the ICC has been expected by the public to give a justice that
cannot be achieved in the ordinary court. The ICC has become the favourite court
because its daily practice is different from ordinary court, being rather based on
the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution. ICC judgments can breakthrough a
static act, but create a long debate over flexibility interpretation. Thus, the ICC
role has potential as topic for future research development.
1.9. Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 (Comparative Case Studies), discusses the comparative
judicial review experience of several countries - the American model of judicial
review, the Kelsenian model in Europe, and the South Africa model of
constitutional court.
Chapter 3 (Constitutional Practice in the Southeast Asian [ASEAN]
Countries) describes constitutional implementation in ASEAN countries, under
the Westminster model, the Socialist model, and the Mixed model.
____________
66Badan Pusat Statistik, ‘Jumlah dan Distribusi Penduduk [Amount and Population Distribution],’
accessed 26 August 2015, < http://sp2010.bps.go.id/>
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Chapter 4 (Operation of Indonesian Constitutional Court) explains the
ICC constitutional authority process; the need for supervision; election authority;
and potential abuse of power.
Chapter 5 (Indonesian Constitutional Court Role In Law Reform)
discusses the procedures of selecting judges, the ICC under five presidents, the
ICC role in law reform in Indonesia, and role being related to negative and
positive legislator.
Chapter 6 (Ultra Petita) explains Ultra Petita and its future challenges,
analyses ten Ultra Petita Cases, the causes of Ultra Petita, discusses the impact
of constitutional court judgment, and arrangement of Ultra Petita in ICC
ordinance.
Chapter 7 (Judicial Review) explains the background of judicial review in
the Indonesian legal system, both before and after constitutional amendment.
Chapter 8 (Special Autonomy In Aceh) describes the potential conflict of
regulation between central government and provincial level; looks at the various
types of autonomy in Indonesia; discusses the special autonomy for the Aceh
Province; examines the potential conflict of regulation between central
government and provincial level; and considers the ICC involvement in Aceh
Province, in solving election disputes, and determining disputes over the
authorities of state institutions.
Chapter 9 (Conclusion) returns to the original research questions, and
offers some recommendations for future of the ICC.
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CHAPTER 2 - CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES
2.1. Introduction
Reviewing an act through judiciary process can be classified into two
procedures: judicial review, or courts that have a duty to review the law itself (see
Table 5). Some countries do not involve their court in reviewing their laws, but
undertake an executive review or parliament review. This chapter will focus on
judicial review.
The Supreme Court as the single highest court deals not only with
appeals, but also reviews an act against the constitution. This system has been
practiced in United State since 1803 in the Marbury vs Madison case, and is
widely known as the American model of judicial review. In this model, the
Supreme Court has dispersed as well as decentralized judicial review mechanism
among courts in the states and the Federal Supreme Court.
Following success in America some countries, including Indonesia, have
officially adopted this model, with some modifications. For over 58 years,1 the
Indonesian constitutional system implemented this model under its authoritarian
regime;2 which positioned the Supreme Court as the judicial review power. In this
period, the Supreme Court remained silent on the issue of law review because of
political interference in the judicial system.
The second classification is forming a specific court to review a law
considered to be against the constitution, known as the Kelsenian model in
Europe, and claimed as a prototype model of judicial review in the European
continent.3 This model concentrates on the Constitutional Court, and is the
pioneer of judicial review mechanism in Europe. The Austrian model has
____________
1From 1945 to 2003 Indonesian’s judicial review system adopted the American model of judicial
review under its Supreme Court. Zainal AM Husein, Judicial Review di Mahkamah Agung RI: Tiga
Dekade Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-Undangan [The Judicial Review in the Supreme Court;
Three Decades of Judicial Review of the Regulations] (Rajawali Pers 2009) 21-27.2See also Thomas B Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes:
Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2009)3Alec Stone has asserted that the Austrian practice is important for Western Europe, and the
Kelsen idea on constitutional court is recognized recently in the design of the European model of
constitutional review, in opposition to the American model. Alec Stone, the Birth of Judicial Politics
in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 1992)
228.
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developed several variants, such as in Germany with Bundes-
Verfassungsgerichtshof (Federal Constitutional Court), and the South African
Constitutional Court.4 This will be discussed in the subchapter on South African
model of Constitutional Court. The development of Austrian occurred quickly, with
some Asian countries,5 amending their constitution to transplant the idea of
constitutional court with modifications. After amending the 1945 Constitution,
Indonesia included the constitutional court. The ICC does not have authority to
review all regulations under the constitution, but has to share power to review the
regulations with the Supreme Court. The ICC only reviews an act against the
constitution, while the Supreme Court deals with the regulations below an act.
(see Table 5 diagram).
Table 5: Diagram Process of Reviewing Law in General
____________
4C. G. Van der Merwe and J. E. Du Plessis, Introduction to the Law of South Africa (Kluwer Law
International 2004) 71-72.5Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies Constitutional Court in Asian Cases
(Cambridge University Press 2003) 247.
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2.2. American Model of Judicial Review
Before the constitutional court was developed world wide, constitutional
review or judicial review (an act reviewed by judge) was practiced by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and implemented following the case of
Marbury vs Madison. Since that time, constitutional review and judicial review has
given rights to judges and to interpret the constitution, and has been accepted as
a necessity in modern democratic countries throughout the world.
In the American model, the Supreme Court is the guardian of the
constitution. Under the Marshall doctrine, judicial review is conducted by all
ordinary courts, through a procedure called a “decentralized” or “dispersed”
review. Such review, as a stand-alone case, is included in cases examined by the
judge, commonly referred to as the decentralized model.
This constitutional review can be categorized as a posteriori review, and
the judgment is binding upon the parties involved (inter parties). The exception is
the principle of stare decisis,6 which requires the court to follow a previous
judgment. The Supreme Court provides for the unity of the system as a whole
(uniformity of jurisdiction). In essence, a judgment on the unconstitutionality of an
act is declaratory and retrospective.
Judicial review by the Supreme Court of the United States differs from the
same tradition in Austria. In the US common law tradition, the role of the judge is
important, in accordance with the principle of precedent, and is usually called
judge-made law.
When John Marshall initiated the practice of constitutional review of an act
by the Supreme Court, previously the judges at all levels in the United States had
inherited the tradition of reviewing an act considered contrary to the ideals of
justice. The amount of legislation, in the common law system is less than the
tradition of civil law in continental Europe which has parliamentary institutions
producing written rules, such as acts, decrees, provisions, and so forth.7
Therefore, the application of judicial review or constitutional review systems does
____________
6Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent. Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue
has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Accessed 26 February 2015
<www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis>. See also Knight, Jack, and Lee Epstein, ‘The Norm of
Stare Decisis’ (1996) American Journal of Political Science 1018-1035.7Wolfgang C. Müller and Ulrich Sieberer, Procedure and Rules in Legislatures (Oxford University
Press 2014) 323.
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not require a new institution, the Supreme Court acting as the Guardian or
Protector of the Constitution.
The court in reviewing laws is obligated to be free from political interest,
but not challenging popular input into constitutional evolution. The courts have to
play a positive long-standing part in preserving constitutions.8
The modern constitution-makers operate in a different context from the
framers of the American Constitution. Most other nations have different and
stronger rules with which to embrace courts’ political responsibility. Any political
reaction motivated by this development in judicial power may take a different form
than in the United States, and interest groups are less likely to compete over
activities overseas than in the United States. The constitutional courts could be
responsible either ex ante9 or post facto.10 Ex ante controls stay appointment
instruments; post facto controls contain amendments and a legislative dominate
of judicial decisions.11 Furthermore a political liability, whether ex ante or post
facto, could be either weak or strong.12
The US Supreme Court is weakly accountable both ex ante and post
facto. Validation of presidential appointments by the Senate needs only majority
agreement, and allows factions to have a real voice in appointments, making the
Supreme Court an alluring target for interest group capture. Parties which care
about the sense of the constitution have no options, except struggling over
appointments. Supreme courts judgments can be more eagerly overruled, or if
judicial actions replicate the wishes of a dominant one.
____________
8Owen M. Fiss, ‘The Right Degree of Independence,’ in Irwin P. Skotzky, ed., Transition to
Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary (Westview Press 1993) 55.9The term ex-ante is a phrase meaning before the event. Ex-ante is used most commonly in the
commercial world, where results of a particular action, or series of actions, are forecast in advance
(or intended). Accessed 27 February 2015 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex-ante>.10An ex post facto law is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of
actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law.
Accessed 27 February 2015 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_post_facto_law>11Miguel Schor, ‘Squaring the Circle: Democratizing Judicial Review and the Counter-Constitutional
Difficulty’ (2007) 16 Minnesota Journal of International Law 61.12There are other procedures of general control, such as impeachment or parliamentary control
over prerogative, however they have largely dropped into neglect both in the United States and
overseas as they have weakened judicial freedom. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer,
‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint’ (2002) 77 New York
University Law Review 962.
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2.3. A Comparative Analysis of the European Model and the American
Model of Judicial Review
Legal academicians in Europe have considered the effects of American
constitutionalism in the nineteenth century.13 American constitutional concepts
were debated in the German National Assembly in Frankfurt in 1848.14 The
Frankfurt Constitution suffered political defeat, but became an important text for
German democratic constitutional improvement.15 Whilst the optimism of
America’s model dominated the debates on judicial review in Frankfurt, scholars
argued that conservative courts in the United States had derailed needed social
legislation.16
Hans Kelsen faced problems in theorising on how judicial review might fit
into mainland Europe’s constitutional and political background. The civil law
courts lacked an organ with authority for constitutional interpretation because
those courts were operated on a daily basis by civil servants, ideologically
accustomed to being passive to legislatures.17 A specialized constitutional court
could have an independent authoritative voice,18 equal with the legislature. After
the Second World War governments in Western Europe not only controlled
constitutions, but also the political systems. The success of judicial review in
Europe centred, therefore, upon filling both legislators of the judiciary and justice
power; and upon a pan-European association of legal intellectuals, who preferred
installing American judicial review onto the region.19
Kelsen rejected the American idea, that depending on legislatures in
positive law making. However the authority to declare regulation unconstitutional
was also a form of law-making, though a negative one.20 The supremacy of
constitutional courts could, therefore, be constrained by carefully drafting
____________
13Helmut Steinberger, ‘Historic Influences of American Constitutionalism upon German
Constitutional Development: Federalism and Judicial Review’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 189.14Ibid, 194-201.15See also Helmut Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional
Development. (Columbia University Press, 1990)16Alec Stone (n 3) 37-40.17John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the
Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press, 2007) 49-52.18Kelsen was anxious that diffuse review as implemented in the United States would carriage too
great a risk of non-uniformity. Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of legislation: A Comparative study of
the Austrian and the American Constitution’ (1942) 4 (2) Journal of Politics 183-200.19Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why It May Not Matter’
(2003) Michigan Law Review 2766.20Ibid, 2766-68.
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constitutions to eliminate from justice capability in the general principles,
particularly, equality, justice, and liberty. Kelsen claimed that in the field of
constitutional justice, such principles can play a dangerous role.21 Judicial review
was essential to influence horizontal and vertical separation of powers, but the
courts would gain too much influence if they had a wide-ranging authority to
create rights.
Kelsen’s approach to limit the power of courts to interpret rights was
disallowed in post-war Europe, with Germany and other continental democracies
committed to uphold a comprehensive set of judicially enforceable rights.22 His
heritage is detectable in the structures of the political court model of judicial
review, adopted by the democracies of Western Europe after the war. Those
structures are: firstly, the judicial review mechanism focussed into the one
constitutional court; secondly, the judicial review has not required a case or
controversy, but can renew legislation conceptually; and thirdly, is the
appointment requiring a legislative super-majority.23
Legal scholars have argued the comparative merits of concentrated
versus diffuse review,24 but these differences are less than imagined, since both
supreme courts and constitutional courts have done an allowable job of
effectuating rights and moving political criticism. By accepting super-majority
appointment dealings, the political court model of judicial review has abridged the
power of parties to sway constitutional interpretation, so that actions will turn on
deals brokered between diverse political parties.25 Whilst never perfect, a super-
majority selection process has worked by delivering uneven balance between
different parties and districts.26 Majoritarian democracies have inclined to be
more discordant than those requiring a higher degree of agreement.27
____________
21Alec Stone Sweet (n19)22See also Philip Michael Hett Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (Routledge
2014)123.23Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University
Press 2000) 46-49.24See also Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States:
Paradoxes and Contrasts’ (2004) 2 (2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 197-198.25Christine Landfreid, ‘The Selection Process of Constitutional Court Judges in Germany’ in Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical
Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press 2006) 196.26Lisa Hilbink, ‘Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism’ (2006) 65 Maryland
Law Review 15.27Ibid, 300-08.
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The value of agreement is explained by how super-majoritarian choosing
procedures have prohibited the divisive political choosing battles familiar in the
United States.28 Europe did not answer the problem modelled by Lochner—that
peoples are sometimes frustrated by judicial judgements—but it did better the
malicious significances of Lochner-type judgments by dampening the supremacy
of parties to form judicial activities.
2.4. The Kelsenian Model in Europe
The Kelsenian model in Europe has been transplanted around the world.
Those countries have modified the model of constitutional court work.29 The
judges in the ICC have been given the power to independently interpret the
constitution, creating long debate on the theory of the constitutional system and
administrative law. Theories of legal norms distinguish the abstract from private
concrete legal norms, and structure the hierarchy, so that a national legal system
can be developed with the constitutional framework. Law interpretation now has a
central position because all legal activities are around the norms and provisions
of the law and constitution, applied in a real event (imputation). Interpretation is
more crucial when the reflection or understanding of a constitution norm is
employed to determine other norms. Both norms should be understood in
background, objective, and interpretation for the purpose of implementation.
In the European Union (EU) sixteen member states have constitutional
courts.30 Other countries have a court with similar function as the guardian of the
constitution, but with slightly different terminology (Constitutional Tribunal in both
Spain and Poland, the Constitutional Council in France). This discussion will
focus on those with constitutional courts. The European Court of Justice (ECJ),
____________
28Another aspect playing a part in reducing the authority of parties is that amendments in
Europe usually need only a super-majority in parliament so that constitutional court
Judgment can be more readily dominated than in the United States. See Donald S.Lutz, Principles
of Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press 2006) 171.29The Austrian constitution regulates specifically 16 Articles relating to the Constitutional Court and
the articles have more detail clauses. So, constitutionally the Austrian’s constitutional court have
more well-prepared.  In contrast, in Indonesian constitution shortly regulates 3 Articles regarding
the constitutional court. These articles are too simple and short in the facing of complexity of
Indonesian constitutional cases. See also the Austrian Federal Constitutional Laws and the 1945
Constitution of Indonesia.
30Those countries consist of 1. Austria; 2. Belgium; 3. Bulgaria; 4. Croatia; 5. Czech Republic; 6.
Germany; 7. Hungary; 8. Italy; 9. Latvia; 10. Lithuania; 11. Luxembourg; 12. Malta; 13. Portugal; 14.
Romania; 15. Slovakia; and 16. Slovenia.
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as well as the European Court of Human Rights, also influence constitutional
courts in EU countries.31
It is not easy for the constitutional courts in EU countries to coexist with
several EU laws. The jurisdiction of the constitutional court in Europe has
changed after the establishment of the Europe Union. The constitutional court
decision is no longer binding since the constitutional court judgment can be
reviewed by the European Court of Justice, which has to be respected
unconditionally.32
The country has sovereignty to uphold their constitution via the
constitutional court, but have to fully obey the EU laws. In maintaining harmony
the EU judiciary system has made some doctrines for better understanding and
legal certainty. Owing to this fact the EU will briefly be explored.
2.4.1. Italian Constitutional Doctrine
In avoiding a contradiction between EU laws and Italy’s regulations,33 the
Italian Constitutional Court has inferred such a doctrine from Article 117 (1) of the
Italian Constitution, which stipulates that
Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in
compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from
Community law and international obligations.34
The article states that Italy agrees to limitations on sovereignty subject to
definite conditions and mutuality, and has been constantly interpreted by both
political forces and judges, as the constitutional basis for European integration.
The so-called “Italian constitutional doctrine”35 is very authentic to the Kelsenian
model. Consequently, a national statute contradicting EC laws also indirectly
opposes the Italian Constitution, connecting the country Italy to the international
____________
31Keyaerts has recommended that the role of EU Courts as the regulatory watchdog is necessary.
David Keyaerts, ’Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs. Does the European Court of Justice Bark or
Bite?’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan, and Werner Vandenbruwaene, ed., The Role of
Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013) 289.32Matej Avbelj and Jan KomÃirek, (ed)., Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and
Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012) 1-37.33See also Oreste Pollicino, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice: a
Progressive Overlapping between the Supranational and the Domestic Dimensions,’ in Monica
Claes, Maartje de Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning, (ed), Constitutional
Conversations in Europe-Actors, Topics and Procedures, (Intersentia 2012) 101-124.34See also Italian Constitution Article 117 (1).35Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts & Democratic Values: A European Perspective
(Yale University Press 2009) 125.
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environment. This protects the dominance of EC laws in Italy, and preserves the
supremacy of the Italian Constitutional Court inside the Italian system. If a judge
settled that a national statute dishonoured EC laws, the judge would have to refer
the question to the Italian Constitutional Court, not establish the statute on his or
her own opinion. In this situation, the court not only confirmed that EC law
principles can be engaged as standards for review of internal legislation, but also
specifies implementation of the interpretation. The Italian Constitutional Court has
seemed agreeable to these requests, and has encouraged scholarly discussion.
In contributing to a much more open judicial space, the constitutional court has
endorsed a method, which from both a European and national angle, may seem
quite unfamiliar.36
Several national constitutional and supreme courts have hesitated to
clash on EU matters,37 and the ECJ does not appear to be completely persuaded
to leave its autonomous style of adjudication, and instead create genuine and
open relationships with national debaters.38 In this framework, the primary
exchange towards negotiation clearly articulated by the Italian Constitutional
Court approaches as evidence of EU faithfulness.
The new method of the Italian Constitutional Court is even more
outstanding when seen against its past judgements. It can also be categorised as
one of the critical speakers regarding the ECJ, since some of the most essential
constitutive doctrines of the Community legal structure were derived exactly in
reply to the locations developing from Italian constitutional adjudication.39 Before
____________
36Marta Cartabia, “Taking Dialogue Seriously” The Renewed Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the
Time of Constitutional Activism in the European Union. No. 12. Jean Monnet Chair, 2007. Pp. 35-
38. Accessed 26 February 2015. <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/071201.html>37Well-expressed in this regard are some of the most recent statements by Constitutional Courts of
the new member states. Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Solange, chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central
Europe—Democracy—European Union’ (2008) 14 (1) European Law Journal 1-35.38The necessity to turn to a more broad, analytic and familiar style has been claimed by Weiler. See
also Joseph. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice’, in G. de Burca and J. H. H. Weiler,
Ed., The European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2001) 225.39Predominantly the important cases on the sovereignty doctrine are both responses to previous
more restrictive pronouncements by the Italian Constitutional Court. With its Internal Primacy
Doctrine furthermore ECJ states that one of the main tasks of national court including constitutional
court is to enforce EC rules over conflicting national legislation. Helle Porsdam, From Civil to
Human Rights: Dialogues on Law and Humanities in the United States and Europe (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2009) 73-74. See also Alexander Murray, ‘Enforced Disappearance and Relatives’
Rights before the Inter-American and European Human Rights Courts,’ (2013) 2 (1) International
Human Rights Law Review 57-81.
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assuming that the constitutional court has included Article 234 EC40 and 35 EU41
as advantaged channels for judicial collaboration with the ECJ, an investigation
of its recent statements in light of present EU judicial construction may be
beneficial. The constitutional court rather than controlling EU national agreement
has missed an important chance to establish a serious discussion with the ECJ.
As a consequence of Italian constitutional doctrine, EC laws are the only
kind of legal foundation that may adjust domestic constitutional law, with the
distinguished exception of both essential human rights, and the supreme
institutional values. EC law has supremacy over national law, and may even
adapt constitutional norms. A fortiori, it yields binding impacts concerning national
and provincial legislation. Of course, a dualist style has carried diverse
conclusions, differing from those which develop from a vision based upon the
agreement of the legal order.
2.4.2. Simmenthal Doctrine
The Simmenthal doctrine follows the case of the Simmenthal Company
vs. Italian Minister of Finance in 1978 that the precedence of Community law
applies to a subsequent national law.42 The doctrine can be seen as the opposite
of Italian constitutional doctrine. Although some member states have adopted the
EU law in their constitution, if a contradiction happened, the national court has to
review their decision based upon EU laws. In preventing the clash amongst
regulations, this doctrine has been adopted widely by EU member states. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has arranged the basics for a devolved system
of judicial review. It stated that a national court should implement the provisions
of Community law, and is under a responsibility to provide full influence to those
____________
40Article 234 EC Stated that The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions of the Community and of the ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. Visit the complete article at
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E234:EN:HTML>41Article 35 EU stated that 1. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have
jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this article, to give preliminary rulings on the
validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of
conventions established under this title and on the validity and interpretation of the measures
implementing them. Visit the complete article at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12002M035>42<www.cvce.eu/obj/judgment_of_the_court_of_justice_simmenthal_case_106_77_9_march_1978-
en-82c8d76f-b272-4e8f-99e1-7940acbbc090.html> Accessed 17 February 2015.
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provisions. It is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting
aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.43
This doctrine was adopted by Indonesia in the mechanism of the ICC. It
positioned the 1945 Constitution as the supreme law, including the cases
produced during the existence of the ICC. Every person under the 1945
Constitution has to fully obey ICC judgments, although, in real life it is hard to
implement because ICC judgments differ from ordinary judgments.
2.4.3. Clear-Act Doctrine
The ECJ has announced a concession to the responsibility of national
courts of last option to ask a preliminary question. The national courts need not
request a preliminary ruling when there is no sensible doubt about the meaning
of the important EC laws.44 If the question being inspected by the national court is
the same as one already judged by the ECJ, then there is no necessity to refer,
as the answer is clear from ECJ precedents.45
The ECJ collaborates with the courts of the EU member states, and the
regular courts have to guarantee the application of European Union legislation;
and also to avoid deviating from EU laws. The regular courts or national courts in
the EU member states may discuss with the ECJ to clarify interpretation of EU
law, whether their country’s legislation process is against EU laws, and they are
ruling on the right track. The reply from ECJ takes the form of a judgement, or
well-structured order. The ECJ’s judgments bind coherently other national courts.
References for preliminary rulings, therefore, have substantial benefit for any
European citizen. The process gives a chance for an EU citizen to seek
clarification of EU rules, which might affect them personally. The reference can
____________
43The national legal systems have numerous techniques to coexist with the European Convention
on Human Rights. See also those techniques in Jorg Polakiewicz, ‘ The Status of the Convention in
National Law,’ in Robert Blackmun and Jorg Polakiewiz, ed., Fundamental Rights in Europe: The
European Convention on Human Rights and Its Member States, 1950-2000 (Oxford University
Press 2001) 31-53. See also Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., A Europe of Rights: The
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008)44In this context, the court has to respect international treaties, or if they disagree, can make
reservation. This reservation procedure is only for non EU countries unwilling to ratify international
law. See also Benedetto Conforti, International Law And The Role Of Domestic Legal Systems
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 255.45The precedent, which may come from preliminary preference or judgements, in EU countries is
importance as the legal sources. Margaret McCown, ‘The European Parliament Before the Bench:
ECJ Precedent and EP Litigation Strategies’ (2003) 10 (6) Journal of European Public Policy 974-
995.
35
be prepared simply by a national court, the member states, and the European
Union’s institutions, which may take part in the proceedings before the ECJ.
These activities allow the ECJ to control EU members, whether or not
they have fulfilled their obligations under EU law. Before a case goes before the
ECJ, the Commission conducts a secretarial phase, in which the EU Member has
an opportunity to reply to the complaints against it. Should the ECJ discover a
duty not achieved, the state in question must end the contravention without
postponement. The ECJ, if the EU member has not complied, may enforce upon
it a fixed or periodic financial penalty.46
Application of clear-act doctrine has exposed surprising mistakes,
because of the way the constitutional court operates. Most importantly, its
implementation of the principles of review, usually engaged in domestic issues,
may go to the objection of the ECJ placing EC laws in detailed context and
interpreting those laws in light of purposes.47
2.5. The South African Model of Constitutional Court
The South African Constitutional Court has also influenced the ICC, as
can be seen in ICC judgments.48 Before amending the 1945 Constitution,
Indonesian parliament members visited the South African Constitutional Court to
observe directly how it operated and legal sources for its judgments.49 The uses
of external sources were not regulated in the Indonesian constitution, so in the
first period of ICC its judges occasionally used this mechanism.
The South African Constitutional Court may not only review the act
against the constitution, but also cases appealed from ordinary court. The
Constitutional Court is a Chief Justice, a Deputy Chief Justice, and nine other
justices. Material before the Constitutional Court must be received by at least
eight judges.50 The court hierarchy in South Africa is set out in Section 166 of the
____________
46Hjalte Rasmussen, ‘Remedying the Crumbling EC Judicial System’ (2000) 37 (5) Common Market
Law Review 1107-1110.47G. Federico Mancini and David T. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge
Facing the European Court’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 1-13.48ICC’s Judgement Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007 on the Narcotics.
49Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Hilangkan Periodisasi Masa Jabatan Hakim Konstitusi [Removing the ICC
Judges of Period Term],’ accessed 21 September 2015,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=2687#.VgBsASsYODQ>50See the Section 167(1) of the South Africa Constitution, as amended by Act 34 of 2001, the
Constitutional Court. See also Lynn Berat, ‘Constitutional Court of South Africa and Jurisdictional
Questions: In the Interest of Justice’ (2005) 3 International Journal Constitutional Law 39.
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution’).51 The courts
are (a) the Constitutional Court; (b) the Supreme Court of Appeal; (c) the High
Court of South Africa, and (d) the Magistrates’ Courts. The High Court contains
nine divisions, one for each of the nine provinces of South Africa. The High
Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court are known as
the Superior Courts. The Magistrates’ Courts run as courts of first instance in less
serious matters at the level of city or district, and High Courts run as courts of first
instance in serious matters at provincial level.
The first case handled by the Constitutional Court was about the
constitutionality of the death sentence,52 a sensitive human rights issue,53 where
the Court determined that the death sentence was unconstitutional. The case
showed the difficult connection between the Constitutional Court and the political
divisions of government, and also between the Court and other Superior Courts.54
Most matters coming before the Constitutional Court are referred on
appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal or the High Court, but some are kept
for the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Thus, the
constitution has clearly arranged the jurisdictions to
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial
sphere concerning the constitutional status, and the competence or
duties of these state organs;
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial bill,
but only in terms of section 79 or 121;
(c) decide on an application brought by members of the National
Assembly or a Provincial Council for an order declaring all or part of
an act unconstitutional in terms of section 80 or 122;
(d) decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the constitution;
(e) decide whether Parliament or the President has failed to comply with
a constitutional obligation;
(f) certify a provincial constitution in terms of section 144 of the final
constitution.55
____________
51South Africa Constitution Section 166. See also George E. Devenish, A Commentary on the
South African Constitution (Butterworth-Heinemann 1998).52The case was held on 15 February 1995 that become the first sitting of the Constitutional Court.
James L. Gibson, and Gregory A. Caldeira, ‘Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular
Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 65 (1) Journal of Politics 1-30.53 See also the section of Bill of Rights. Heinz Klug, The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual
Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010).54Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction
(Cambridge University Press, 2000) 18-23.55South African Constitution, Section 167(4).
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All other matters concerning constitutional issues will begin in a High
Court, unless the Constitutional Court grants direct access to itself. No order of
unconstitutionality given by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a
court with similar status is lawful until confirmed by the Constitutional Court,
which thus makes the final decision on the constitutionality of an Act of
Parliament, on a provincial act, or on the conduct of the President.56 Compared
with the Indonesian Constitutional Court, which often invalidates an act, the
South African Constitutional Court has to approve the validity of any order
invalidity of an Act of Parliament,57 a provincial Act or conduct of the President
‘made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status,
before that order has any force.58
The constitution established in post-apartheid South Africa is the only one
known with an express provision allowing the judges to use extra-systemic
evidence for interpreting the constitution.59 Section 39, of the 1996 Constitution,
states that the Constitutional Court when interpreting the Bill of Rights, should
uphold the principles that underlie an open and democratic society, and consider
international public law and foreign law.60 Section 39 also empowered the judges
to integrate extra-systemic legal information for interpreting the post-apartheid Bill
of Rights as an innovative hermeneutical technique. For this reason, South
African constitutional judgement has become interesting on a world-wide level
because the judges in Johannesburg have set the criteria and bounds of this
practice.61
Dugard identifies three reasons for adopting the provision into the
constitution.62 Firstly is the need for international legality after decades of
remoteness under the apartheid regime, which intentionally disregarded
international values on fundamental rights. Secondly is the search for an
international orientation to help interpret a new constitutional version, intended to
____________
56Willem Adolf Joubert and T. Johan Scott, The Law of South Africa (Butterworths 1981) 130.57Jackie Dugard, ‘Court of First Instance?: Towards a Pro-poor Jurisdiction for the South African
Constitutional Court’ (2006) 22 (2) South African Journal on Human Rights 261-263.58South African Constitution, Section 167(5).59Hoyt Webb, ‘Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative
Constitutional Law, (1998) 1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 205-283.60South African Constitution, Section 39.61Andrea Lollini, ‘South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning Patterns Based on
Foreign Law’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 55.62See also John Dugard, ‘International Law and the South African Constitution,’ (1997) 8 European
Journal of  International Law 77.
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reinforce the law of the 1910 South African Union, which allowed rights and
guarantees to non-white people. Lastly, judicial review in South Africa changes
the whole legal structure, introducing a pedagogical approach for participants of
the regular judiciary and the constitutional judges themselves. The constitutional
judges argue to explain constitutional procedural law, since judicial review,
previously strange to the South African system, required grounding and
agreement amongst the various legal actors.
2.6. Conclusion
Reviewing law through court process has two major aspects. The first
focuses on the Supreme Court as the single highest court. The second allows a
constitutional court for law review instead of centralising on the Supreme Court.
These classifications have emerged from several countries’ practice with their
judicial review, involving the judicial process to review laws.
Those aspects follow variant models. Positioning the Supreme Court as
the single highest court, is known as the American model of judicial review, with
the Supreme Court safeguarding the supremacy of constitution, and allowing
dispersed and decentralized mechanism amongst courts in the states. This
model has spread around the world, including Indonesia, which implemented this
model for 58 years during the authoritarian regime, modified to fit the Indonesian
legal system. During the ICC era since 2003, the Supreme Court authorities have
been reduced, being no longer authorized to review the acts, only regulations
under the acts.
The second aspect establishes a particular court for law review, replacing
the domination of the Supreme Court. This is known as the Kelsenian model in
Europe, concentrating on the constitutional court as the innovator of judicial
review. The Kelsenian model has been applied in Asia, where they have modified
their constitutions to transplant the idea of constitutional court, in reaction against
the American model of judicial review. Kelsen argued that judicial review in
America had no specific method for constitutional interpretation. The impact of
World War II also influenced the European approach to the governmental system,
with Kelsen rejecting the American model, and arguing that the constitution is the
supreme law holding political nature. The authorities declaring a regulation
unconstitutional are automatically creating law, as well as a new norm. For this
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reason, it has been essential to form specific constitutional courts, controlling
horizontal and vertical separation of powers.
Another variant of the Austrian model is the South Africa Constitutional
Court, reviewing the act against the constitution, and cases appealed from
ordinary court. Extra-systemic legal sources opened the South African
constitutional system to international law or imported laws. The extra-systemic
mechanism happened in the ICC, absorbing the international covenant whilst
reviewing death penalty issues.
In Indonesia both the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court still operate
in reviewing law. The Supreme Court has power to review regulations, the ICC to
review acts. This dualism has overlapped in some cases, and been criticised.
This modification moves away from the basic Kelsenian model, positioning the
constitutional court as the single court to review all kinds of regulations. Another
modification is using external resources for consideration of making judgment,
derived from the South Africa Constitutional Court.
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CHAPTER 3 – CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN
(ASEAN) COUNTRIES
3.1. Introduction
Southeast Asian countries are associated through the union known as
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), with ten country members;
namely, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar
(Burma), The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and was
established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok. The main aims of the Declaration were
cooperation in economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields;
and it also promoted regional peace and stability through respect for justice and
the rule of law; and loyalty to the values of the United Nations Charter.1 The
ratification and adoption of the ASEAN Charter is a landmark in the regional
organization’s development, codifying established practices of regional
cooperation, and creating a normative framework for the region.
Following the adoption of the Charter, ASEAN created a regional human
rights body, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR), and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). In 2004 it approved a Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region; and in 2007 the
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant
Workers. In November 2012, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was
agreed at the 21stASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.2
The Charter has not always been a success story. Its character as soft
law (informal and non-binding procedures of judgement making) has been
criticized.3 The Charter has a low implementation record for rule-based, more
legitimate, and therefore, more effective regional action. It has not raised the
Charter from a state-centric organization to a citizen-oriented association. The
request of ASEAN activists to form an ASEAN Court of Justice has not been
____________
1ASEAN, ‘History’, accessed 29 September 2015, <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-
asean/history>2Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia,’(2015) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian
Affairs 107-129.3Jean-Claude Piris and Walter Woon, Towards a Rules-Based Community: An ASEAN Legal
Service (Cambridge University Press 2015) 157-158.
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incorporated into the Charter,4 nor have sanctions on member countries failing to
obey obligations. Similarly, AICHR and ACWC have not installed mechanisms for
human rights victims to complain; neither does the AHRD.
A non-binding Charter has also influenced the ASEAN constitutional
system discussed in this chapter. Although some ASEAN countries (such as
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and so forth), have amended their constitution
several times, the ASEAN Charter has not yet been adjusted. This chapter
discusses constitutional practice in ASEAN countries, referring to three major
models: the Westminster Model, the Socialist Model, and the Mixed Model, to
explain on how constitutions protect citizen rights, and weakness in some issues,
particularly discrimination and absolute power of some state organs.
Table 6: ASEAN Map
Source: www.asean.org
3.2. ASEAN Constitutional Practice
ASEAN has had various models of constitutional practice, adopted from
the post-colonial era, and has been re-evaluating existing rules.5 Three models of
constitutional practice have been identified, the Westminster Model, the Socialist
____________
4See also Lasse Schuldt, ‘Southeast Asian Hesitation: ASEAN Countries and the International
Criminal Court,’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 75.5Shaik Mohd. Hussain, Noor Alam S. M., 'Coercive Consent: The Law in Some Asean Jurisdictions'
(1996) 43(1) Netherlands International Law Review 33.
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Model, and the Mixed Model. After the independence, the ASEAN countries have
tried to create their own identity through constitution. Some have formed their
constitution in a new format, whilst others have continued their previous colonial
system with some modifications of colonial rule legacy.6 For instance, Brunei
Darussalam is still maintaining its constitutional practice with the United Kingdom
in the mechanism of the Privy Council.7
Table 7: The Overview of ASEAN Governmental System 2015
Source: www.asean.org
3.2.1. Westminster Model
The Westminster Model of constitutional practice is followed in the former
British colonies of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam,8 whose legal
structures are based on British common law, statute laws and case law.
____________
6In Indonesia the Dutch Penal Act have still existed and practiced as the sources of criminal law.
Daniel S Lev, ‘Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State,’ (1985) 40 Indonesia 57-74.7JCPC, ‘The Role of the JCPC, accessed 1 October 2015, <https://www.jcpc.uk/about/role-of-the-
jcpc.html#Commonwealth>. See also Bachamiya Abdul Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of
1959: An Inside History (Brunei Press 2000).8Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (Routledge 2015)
96-99.
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Parliament law-making has been sovereign, such as in Malaysia. Singapore
positioned the President as the head of state instead of the king/queen. In Brunei
Darussalam, the centralised power holder was the Sultan, but Parliament still has
power to legislate.9 Legislation in those countries is similar to British acts and
regulations. Statutes form the basic source of law, with case law being resorted
to for explanatory purposes.
3.2.1.1. Malaysia
Malaysia has a federal constitutional elective monarchy. The head of state
is called the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, commonly referred to as the King, elected
for a five-year term by and from amongst the nine hereditary rulers of the Malay
states. Malaysia's constitution was set at independence in 1957, following the
Westminster Model. The bicameral parliament consists of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. They are called the Houses of Parliament. The
King as the Head of State is the third component of Parliament. As the ultimate
legislative body in Malaysia, the Parliament is responsible for passing, amending
and repealing acts of law.10 Malaysia’s constitution has no constitutional court,
with judicial review of an act under the authority of Houses of Parliament.
Parliament has prevented the Supreme Court to annul or review an act (federal
law) produced by the Parliament; but it can review or strike down some state laws
(produced by state parliament), because the state laws have been positioned
below the federal laws.11
The superiority of federal laws has created a serious public debate on
human rights issues, such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960. This
‘untouchable act’ meant to counter communist activity in Malaysia allows
detention without trial or criminal charges where national security is alleged to be
at risk. It has been used to capture thousands of persons including trade
unionists, student leaders, labour activists, political activists, religious groups,
academics, and NGO activists. The ISA has been criticised as an old-fashioned
____________
9Rhodes, Rod AW, and Patrick Weller. Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted:
Exploring political change (UNSW Press 2005) 2-5.10The Constitution of Malaysia, Article Number 39.11Dheraj Bhar, Judicial Review in Malaysia, 13 August 2014 <http://bsbharco.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Judicial_Review_in_Malaysia-BSB.pdf>
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tool used by the government to control public life and stifle open debate.12
Parliament amended the ISA Act, but was reluctant to repeal it, limiting periods of
detention to no more than two years.13
Other problems of Malaysian’s constitutional practice relate to ‘indigenous
race’, asserted in the Article 153 and 161a of the constitution.14 The Bumiputra
are defined as the indigenous race, whilst the non-Bumiputra (Chinese, Indians,
and other races) are subject to discrimination.15 Preferential treatment of the
Bumiputras is pursued in association with other objectives, such as economic
growth, officially attributed to concern about poverty among the Bumiputras. In no
other area of public policy has reverse discrimination been more acute than in
higher education.16 The non-Bumiputras have limited access to government
facilities such as education and procurement. The law imposes ratios between
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra, with Bumiputra getting more benefits than the
non-Bumiputra.
3.2.1.2. Brunei Darussalam
Brunei Darussalam is a monarchy with a constitutional sultanate
appointed by the Council of Succession.17 Under the 1959 Constitution, the
Sultan is the head of state, with full executive authority, advised by five councils –
the Religious Council, the Privy Council, the Council of Cabinet Ministers, the
Legislative Council, and the Council of Succession.
The national ideology, Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), invokes Islam and
Brunei’s history in support of the Sultan’s absolute power, and the paramountcy
of the Malays in Brunei.18 In September 2004, a Legislative Council was revived
and 21 members appointed, with no immediate timetable for election of the
____________
12Anthea Mulakala, ‘Will Malaysia Repeal its Internal Security Act?’ accessed 13 August 2014
<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/09/21/will-malaysia-repeal-its-internal-security-act/>13Laws of Malaysia, Act 82 Internal Security Act 1960, Chapter II Power of Preventive Detention.14The Constitution of Malaysia.15See also Rajeswary Ampalavanar and Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, The Indian Minority and
Political Change in Malaya, 1945-1957 (Oxford University Press 1981) 14.16Zafiris Tzannatos. 'Reverse Racial Discrimination In Higher Education in Malaysia: Has It
Reduced Inequality And At What Cost To The Poor?' (1991) 11(3) International Journal of
Educational Development 177.17CLGF, 'Brunei Darussalam,' accessed 4 November 2013. <http://www.clgf.org.uk/brunei-
darussalam>.18CommonwealthGovernance, 'Brunei Darussalam Judicial System,' accessed 15 August 2013.
<http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/countries/asia/brunei_darussalam/judicial-system/>.
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proposed 15 directly elected members. In September 2005, the Sultan dissolved
the existing Legislative Council and appointed 29 new members.
There are two parallel justice systems: one presided over by the Supreme
Court and the other by the Sharia courts. The Supreme Court comprises the
Court of Appeal and the High Court. Criminal cases that do not carry a death
sentence and fewer serious civil cases are conducted by the intermediate courts
before judges, or the subordinate courts before magistrates. Appeals are heard
by the Court of Appeal, which in criminal cases is the final court of appeal. In civil
cases appeals may be made to the Privy Council in the UK. Judges are
appointed by the Sultan for three-year terms.19
Brunei’s constitution does not have a judicial review mechanism. The
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is only to prosecute ordinary cases, not reviewing
acts. It is the Legislative Council that makes and reviews laws. This lack of
judicial review mechanism has been criticised because there is no space for
public debate about citizen rights. The Attorney General has stated that the
courts may review administrative actions, but an adversarial system of judicial
review is not suitable for Brunei Darussalam.20
The immunity of the royal family circle has created public debate, with a
widely known case of royal family corruption. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s brother
Prince Jefri allegedly embezzled billions of dollars from the Brunei Investment
Agency in 2000, but after private reconciliation with Sultan Bolkiah, the case was
closed.21 It was almost impossible to reach the royal family circle through the
Prevention of Corruption Act. Law scholars have argued that the act must have
the principle of equality before the law, and the absolute power of the Sultan
violates justice because executive, legislative, and judicative powers are
concentrate in one hand.
Education has emerged as a constitutional issue. The government does
not subsidise non-native language instruction.22 Ethnic Chinese Bruneians who
____________
19CommonwealthGovernance, 'Brunei Darussalam Judicial System,' accessed 15 August 2013.
<http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/countries/asia/brunei_darussalam/judicial-system/>.20The Attorney-General of Brunei Darussalam, Yang Berhormat, Dato Seri Paduka Haji Kifrawi Bin
Dato Paduka Haji Kili, in a Speech made at the Opening of the Legal Year, on 27 March 2007, last
accessed 7 April 2011, <http://www.agc.gov.bn/>21Joel Ng, Brunei Darussalam- Rule of Law for Human Rights in the ASEAN Region: A Base-line
Study (Human Rights Resource Centre 2011) 40.22Leo Suryadinata. 'Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or
Southeast Asians?' (1997) 1 Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians 13.
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want their children educated in the mother language, have to register them in
expensive private schools. Unlike Malaysia, affirmative action and positive
discrimination in educational policies to favour native Malays in Brunei are less
evident, because the Brunei constitution does not award special rights to the
Malays. A form of latent positive discrimination exists in the educational policies
of Brunei. Most ethnic Chinese have permanent residence status or are stateless.
Chinese who are not full citizens in Brunei are disregarded in education. This is a
hidden affirmative action policy which caps the ethnic Chinese university
enrolment numbers, particularly those from poor households.23
3.2.1.3. Singapore
Singapore has a unique global position. Its city-state status, multi-ethnic
society, and connection to the world, lead to original solutions to its challenges,
combining home-grown aspects with global trends.24
A written constitution, the text of which took effect on 9 August 1965, is
derived from the Constitution of the State of Singapore 1963, by which provisions
of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia are made applicable to Singapore by the
Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No. 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev. Ed.),
and the Republic of Singapore Independence Act. The Constitution has become
the supreme law in Singapore, and soft constitutional law has been used to build
a constitutional or national character based on a communitarian 'Asian' culture,
promoting social solidarity. It regulates behaviour of citizens into observing the
ground rules for interaction within a secular democracy, and securing racial and
religious concord.25
The Singapore Constitution does not explicitly include judicial review.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has implicitly been given jurisdiction to interpret
constitutional rights. The courts must use their authorities of judicial review to
guarantee that legislations accord with the rule of law and separation of powers;
and are also not inconsistent with the constitution. The Supreme Court has
internal limitations on judicial powers and will reduce jurisdiction where they do
____________
23Seng Piew Loo, 'Ethnicity and Educational Policies in Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam' (2010)
Education and Ethnicity: Comparative Perspectives 119-155.24Tarn How Tan, Singapore Perspectives 2010 (World Scientific Publishing Company 2010)1.25Li-ann Thio, 'Soft Constitutional Law in Non-Liberal Asian Constitutional Democracies' (2010) 8(4)
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1-30.
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not have the essential expertise, or where it is inappropriate for the courts to
intervene.26 Ultimately, the courts should not develop an adversarial relationship
with the Executive, but rather promote good administrative practices.
Most judicial review cases arise when, losing in the ordinary court, the
plaintiff appeals to the High Court, and finally to the Supreme Court. In the
Shopping-Centre-Toilet case, Ravi, as solicitor, was defending his client named
Tan Eng Hong, who was accused under 377A of Penal Code 2010, of male-male
sex in a shopping centre toilet. Ravi argued that the Penal Code was against the
human rights guaranteed within the constitution, and challenged the validity of the
Penal Code to the High Court. This case is not yet determined, but is expected to
fail. 27
The norm of “impartial treatment” stated in Article 154 of the Singapore
Constitution has not always been enforced easily. Chinese citizens, as the single
majority, have enjoyed favoured treatment over those with Indian, Malay, or other
backgrounds. Identity cards require stating a specified race is a must. In 2010,
the government announced the double-barrelled race identity card (IC) category,
permitting Singapore citizens with mixed parentage to embrace both races of
their parents in their IC, such a citizen with a Chinese father and Indian mother
can have ‘Chinese-Indian’ specified as their race. This embracing of mixed-raced
Singaporeans opens up the three race classifications (Chinese, Malay, and
Indian).28 Some job ads assert that the position is for a Chinese person, but may
include subtler boundaries.29 Separation along racial lines is a daily reality in
Singapore, although it prides itself on being a metropolitan non-racial nation. The
political and economic elite of the country is less egalitarian or multiracial than its
population, compounded by lack of legal certainty on matters of race, ethnicity,
____________
26Chan Ying Lin, ’Judicial Review in Singapore,’ 14 August 2014
<http://www.singaporelawreview.org/2013/09/judicial-review-in-singapore/>27Ng Yi-Sheng, ‘Singapore: AGC Warns of “Incrementalist Homosexual Agenda”, High Court
Reserves Judgment’, accessed 14 August 2014, <http://www.fridae.asia/gay-
news/2013/03/06/12259.singapore-agc-warns-of-incrementalist-homosexual-agenda-high-court-
reserves-judgment>28Amir Yusof, ‘Confessions of an Racial Minority,’ accessed 31 July 2015
<http://www.nanyangchronicle.ntu.edu.sg/2014/09/confessions-of-a-racial-minority/>29Internations, ‘Discrimination in Singapore,’ accessed 31 July 2015
<http://www.internations.org/singapore-expats/guide/16087-safety-security/discrimination-in-
singapore-16090>
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and religion. It is thus difficult to address publicly the problem of discrimination in
Singapore, for instance in the Sedition Act.30
3.2.2. Socialist Model
Socialism can be defined as a society where private property in the form of
capital has been eliminated and replaced by common ownership of the means of
production, permitting equality and fraternity in social relations.31 The single-party
model is the only real governing and planning body within the socialist legal
system. Once it decides a particular policy, it communicates its plans to all its
constituent organs, carried out by legislative, executive and judicial agencies.32
Southeast Asia has such a model in Vietnam and Laos. The domination of
military power in the government and political system is marked, occupying
parliament and judicial jurisdiction.
3.2.2.1. Vietnam
The current Constitution was adopted by the 8th National Assembly in
1992 and supplemented and amended in 2001 at the 10th National Assembly.33
The 1992 Constitution institutionalises basic viewpoints of the Communist Party
of Viet Nam on economic and political reforms, socialist goals, socialist
democracy, and citizens’ freedom rights. It comprises a preamble and seven
chapters, with 147 articles, stipulating the country’s political regime; economy
culture; education; science and technology systems; the fundamental rights and
duties of the citizens; national assembly; state president; government; people’s
councils and committees; people’s court; national day; flag; emblem; anthem; and
capital and constitution amendment.34
The Standing Committee of the National Assembly has the power to
interpret the constitution, the Laws of the National Assembly, and its
Ordinances;35 but in practice rarely exercises these powers.36 Legal
____________
30See also the Singapore Sedition Act, accessed 31 July 2015 <
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%221f6d9e4b-
1cf1-4575-9480-da4bdeff9ef4%22%20Status%3Apublished%20Depth%3A0;rec=0>31Christine Sypnowich, 'The Concept of Socialist Law (PhD Thesis in University of Oxford 1987).32Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Cavendish Publishing 1995) 185.33The Constitution of The Socialist Republic of Vietnam.34Vietnam Embassy in USA. 'Constitution and Political System,' accessed 21 October 2013.
<http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/vietnam/politics>35Article 91 of the Constitution 1992 of Vietnam
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interpretations tend mainly be interpretations made by executive organs, raising
serious concern on legal certainty, because the executive has intervened in the
judicative area.
An example is the case Nguyen Van Nhat v the People’s Committee of
Tien Phuoc District (District Government in Vietnam) in 1999.37 Using its
executive power, the People’s Committee of Tien Phuoc District claimed his land,
based on an act produced by the district. He appealed his case to the Supreme
People’s Court. After several sessions, the court declared the act conducted by
the People’s Committee of Tay Luong Commune illegal and cancelled. The land
use right of Mr. Nhat was then recovered. Based on that case, to prevent the
abuse of power by executive power, the Supreme People’s Court should be more
active in reviewing the legality of administrative decisions (acts).38 The Supreme
People’s Court has jurisdiction to review regulations. For a long time, it has
concentrated upon adjudication, whilst spending less time on instructing inferior
courts on how to apply the law and summarize adjudication experience.
Freedom of religion and belief is constituted in Article 24 of the Vietnam
Constitution.39 But government rules have forbidden those in unrecognized
religious groups to speak publicly about their beliefs, and yet some of them freely
practice religious training and services. Members of recognized religious
organizations have been legally permitted to express their beliefs, and they even
encourage other people to convert. The Hòa Hảo group has received this unfair
treatment. In July 2005, eight Cao Đài believers, known as Christian minority,
were imprisoned for up to 13 years, accused of crossing the border to circulate
documents against the government, inflaming protests, and creating public
disorder.40
____________
36Hoang Van Tu, ‘Legal Interpretation: Some Basic Theoretical And Practical Issues in Vietnam
Legislative Studies,’ accessed 5 October 2015, <http://www.nclp.org.vn/nghien-cuu-lap-phap/126-
thang-7-2008/nha-nuoc-va-phapluat/giai-thich-phap-luat-mot-van-111e-co-ban-ve-ly-luan-va-thuc-
tien-o-viet-nam>37Ngoc Linh, ‘On Hearing Some Administrative Cases In Relation To Land Management by
Procedures Of Supervision And Review,’ (2001) Democracy & Law 79-81.38Nguyen Van Quang, ‘Grounds for Judicial Review of Administrative Action: an Analysis of
Vietnamese Administrative Law’ (Nagoya University Centre for Asian Legal Exchange 2010) 48.39See also the Vietnam Constitution, Article 36, 39, & 94.40Sophie Quinn‐Judge, 'Giving Peace a Chance: National Reconciliation and a Neutral South
Vietnam, 1954–1964' (2013) 38(4) Peace Change 385.
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3.2.2.2. Laos
Laos is one of the few remaining communist states in the world.
Communist forces overthrew the monarchy in 1975, heralding years of isolation.
Laos began opening up to the world in the 1990s, but despite tentative reforms, it
remains poor and dependent on international donations.41
Laos is strongly involved two contradiction processes: reifying diversity
and homogenising. Pholsena inspects the personal history of local revolutionaries
and functionaries, to demonstrate the fluidity and plurality of identities, and how
they locate themselves in both cultural spheres as ethnic and persons. The
Hmong ethnic minority has faced unfair treatment from the government, because
they were closely associated to the US during the Vietnam War, and some are
still fighting. This ethnic group had a long history of confrontation and ambitions
of liberation from Lao regime control, and after the formation of the Lao People's
Democratic Republic in 1975 and collapse of the former regime, many Hmong
fled across the border of the country, to US,42 and in refugee camps in Thailand.
In present day Laos majority is not yet hegemonic, while the ethnic minorities
cannot be solely perceived as other. Normality (membership of the
nation/Majority), and deviancy (being an outcast of the nation/being an Ethnic
Minority), are still remain challenging issues.43
Lao People's Democratic Republic was proclaimed on 2nd December,
1975, abolishing the monarchy of Royal Lao Government. A new constitution was
unanimously endorsed by unicameral eighty-five-member Supreme People's
Assembly in 1991, exercising power according to a principle of democratic
centralism. According to the 1991 Constitution, the LPRP (Lao People's
Revolutionary Party) is responsible for broad policy, and the government
manages day-to-day administration, but in reality, the two are almost
indistinguishable. The constitution describes the LPRP as the "leading nucleus"
of the political system.
The president has the power to appoint or dismiss the prime minister and
the government, with the approval of the compliant National Assembly (the
legislature). Historically, the prime minister has tended to be more powerful than
____________
41 BBC. 'Laos Profile' 14 October 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15351898>42Franklin Ng, ed., Asian American Family Life and Community (Routledge 2014) 17843Vatthana Pholsena, Post-War Laos: The Politics of Culture, History and Identity (Institute of
Southeast Asia Studies 2006) 219.
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the president. Party factions are defined by personalities rather than ideological
differences, although factional disputes do occur on policy issues, such as
whether to lean towards Vietnam or to China, or the pace of economic reform.44
There is no constitutional court in Laos, and the judicial review process,
reviewing an act and amending the constitution, are controlled by the parliament
called the National Assembly under the constitution, the National Assembly has
fourteen rights and duties, including to prepare, adopt, or amend the constitution;
and to consider, adopt, amend, or abrogate laws.45
3.2.3 Mixed Model
The Mixed Model follows models from various countries. The countries
adopting the mixed model include Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar,
and Cambodia. Such transplantations may develop well, sometimes not as
expected.
3.2.3.1. Indonesia
Indonesia has a constitution called the Undang-Undang Dasar Republik
Indonesia 1945 (UUD 1945), or the 1945 Constitution. This constitution is the
supreme source of law in Indonesia since declaring its independence on 17
August 1945.46 The arrangement of Indonesia as a sovereign state is in Article 1
paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, creating a stable society based on legal
certainty, expediency and justice.47 The main contents of the sovereign state are
the separation of state power, the protection of human rights, and free judiciary.48
The bedrock of the 1945 Constitution is the philosophy called the
Pancasila,49 the ‘Five Moral Principles’ of Indonesian life and society, mutually
____________
44Galegroup. 'Laos: Constitution and institutions-2003,' accessed 7 November 2013.
<http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA103721204&v=2.1&u=anglia_itw&it=r&p=AONE&s
w=w&asid=7b497eee4d62c52f6f7906d8f7f1ef9f>45(The Constitution of Laos) ,Chapter 5: National Assembly, Article 52 and 53.46Denny Indrayana, 'Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-2002 an Evaluation of Constitution-
making in Transition' (PhD edn Faculty of Law the University of Melbourne 2005) 4-8.47Abu Daud Busro and Abu Bakar Busro, Azas-azas Hukum Tata Negara [The Principles of
Constitutional Law] (Ghalia Indonesia Jakarta 1985) 109.48Azyumardi Azra and Komaruddin Hidayat, Pendidikan Kewargaan, Demokrasi, Hak Asasi
Manusia dan Masyarakat Madani [Civic Education, Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society]
(Kencana Prenada Media Group 2008) 12.49Indonesia, ‘Lambang dan Bentuk Negara [the Coat of Arms],’ accessed 4 October
2015,<http://www.indonesia.go.id/in/sekilas-indonesia/lambang-dan-bentuk-negara/lambang-
negara>
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interlinked and inseparable. Those Five Moral Principles are; namely, 1) belief in
the one and only God; 2) just and civilised humanity; 3) the unity of Indonesia; 4)
democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of
deliberations amongst representatives; and 5) social justice for all of the people
of Indonesia. The principles are located in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution
with a consensus not to be changed.50 The consequences of those principles
have also affected the legislation procedures. All bills be passed to a certain level
must be examined referencing those principles.51
With the fall of Suharto and his New Order regime in 1998, the 1983
decree and 1985 law were rescinded, clearing the way to make the Constitution
more democratic. The amendment was done in four stages, at sessions of the
People's Consultative Assembly in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. As a result, the
primary Constitution has grown from 37 articles to 73, of which only 11% remain
unchanged from the original constitution. The most important changes were
1. limiting presidents to two terms of office;
2. establishing a Regional Representative Council (DPD), which together with
the People's Representative Council (DPR) makes up an entirely elected
People's Consultative Assembly;
3. purifying and empowering a presidential system of government, instead of a
semi-presidential one;
4. stipulating democratic, direct elections for the president, instead of the
president being elected by the People's Consultative Assembly;
5. reorganizing the mechanism of horizontal relation among state organs,
instead of giving the highest constitutional position to the People's Assembly;
6. abolishing the Supreme Advisory Council;
7. mandating direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair elections for the
House of Representatives and regional legislatures;
____________
50Tahir states that each countries have their own specific concept in term of the law-state; similarly
Indonesia can be identified as the Pancasila the law-state concept, because of the strong position
of the Pancasila in the 1945 Constitution. See also Tahir Azhary, Negara Hukum: Suatu Studi
Tentang Prinsip-Prinsipnya Dilihat Dari Segi Hukum Islam, Implementasinya Pada Periode Negara
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Bersama Dalam Masyarakat Yang Majemuk [Madinah Charter and the 1945 Constitution, A
Comparative Study About Basic Life Together In The Pluralistic Society] (Sinar Grafika 2012)51Jimmy Z Usfunan, ‘Pancasila as the Guidelines in the Legislation in Indonesia,’ (2015) 6 (1)
Academic Research International 272-280.
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8. establishing a constitutional court for guarding and defending the
constitutional system as set forth in the constitution;
9. establishing a Judicial Commission; and
10. the addition of ten new articles concerning human rights.
The establishment of a constitutional court is regarded as a successful
innovation in the Indonesia constitutional system. There are five jurisdictions of
the court, i.e. (i) constitutional review of law, (ii) disputes of constitutional
jurisdiction between state institutions, (iii) disputes on electoral results, (iv)
dissolution of political parties, and (v) impeachment of the president/vice
president. The existence of constitutional court reduced the Supreme Court’s
authority in reviewing acts, limiting it to regulations below the acts, such as
decree and any bylaws provided by provincial level.
3.2.3.2. Thailand
Since the takeover in 1932 by the military, Thailand has had seventeen
constitutions and charters. Ginsburg asserted that the latest 2007 Constitution is
the ‘Constitutional Afterlife,’ due to the fact that Thailand has several constitutions
which rise and disappear in the battle of political struggle between monarchies,
the military, and politicians.52 Since the 2007 Constitution, only half of the Senate
was chosen, and the other half was appointed. The executive branch was
weakened, and half as many MPs were needed to propose a no-confidence vote
when compared to the 1997 Constitution. The judiciary was strengthened, and
high-ranking judges became part of the appointment committees for the Senate,
the Election Commission, and other independent agencies. The new Constitution
was praised for the participative process involved in its drafting, its enshrinement
of human rights, and its significant advances in political reform. It was viewed as
successful in fostering democratic development, increasing political stability,
empowering and protecting citizens.53
____________
52Tom Ginsburg. 'Constitutional Afterlife: the Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical
Constitution' (2009) 7(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 83.53Wikipedia, 'Constitution of Thailand' accessed 18 October 2013.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Thailand>
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A significant amendment is the expanded use of constitutional court’s
authorities since 1997.54 The constitutional court, under the constitution 2007, is a
high court with jurisdiction over legal issues pertaining to the constitution—the
supreme law of the state. The consideration of cases follows an inquisitional
system, with the court empowered to seek facts and additional evidence. The
court has jurisdiction over the following cases:55
1. ruling on the constitutionality of draft acts, or draft organic laws, and draft
regulations of the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the National
Assembly, which have been approved but not yet published in the Royal
Gazette;
2. ruling on the constitutionality of the provision of any law on any case, both
found out by the Court itself and raised in objection by a party to a case; and
3. ruling on the authorities of constitutional agencies. The decision of the
constitutional court shall be deemed final and binding on the National
Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and other state organs.
The Constitution 2007 was designed to link loyalty to the King with
support for the constitution, with the slogan “Love the King, Care about the King.”
The Constitution 2007’s draft was accepted by 59.3% voters in the August 2007,
referendum.
The 2007 Constitution has been criticised, particularly on the citizenship
for the small group in north Thailand. The government has accepted registration
arrangements aimed at highland minorities, but statelessness have restricted
access for a significant number to education, land, employment, and health care;
and renders them vulnerable to exploitation. Registration arrangements have
reduced the number of ethnic minorities not been able to obtain citizenship, but
the requirements, such as literacy in the Thai language, have created an
unreasonable barrier for many, especially amongst the highland minorities of the
north.
Other problems are that women and girls from subgroups are vulnerable
to trafficking. Over two million Burmese have illegally sneaked across the border
____________
54 See also James Klein, A The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 1997: A Blueprint for
Participatory Democracy (The Asia Foundation San Francisco March, Working Paper Series ,
1998) 5-19.55The Kingdom of the Thailand, 'Judiciary and Legal System' accessed 21 October 2013.
<http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/inbrief/page.php?cid=6>; The Constitution of the Kingdom of the
Thailand, Chapter X, Part 2, The Constitutional Court .
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into Thailand,56 seeking a better living standard, without any migrant’s
documents. Illegal migration continues to restrict access for many to education,
land, employment, and health care; and renders them defenceless to
mistreatment.57
3.2.3.3. Philippines
Being a former Spanish colony, the Spanish legal system strongly
influenced Philippine law and judiciary system. The Spanish built the first
Philippine civic organisations to strengthen its nationality, one of which was called
the Conferencia de San Vicente de Paul, established in 1886 by Spanish priests;
with Margarita Roxas de Ayala—founder of the Casa Ayala, and scion of the
Zobel de Ayala family—its first President.58
Three previous constitutions governed the Philippines, namely, the 1935
Commonwealth Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, and the 1986 Freedom
Constitution. Two further constitutions were drafted and adopted during short-
lived war-time governments – by the revolutionary forces during the Philippine
Revolution, with Emilio Aguinaldo as President; and by the occupation forces
during the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II, with José
P. Laurel as President.
In 1986, following the People Power Revolution which ousted Ferdinand
E. Marcos as President, and following on her own inauguration, Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation 3, declaring a national policy to implement the
reforms mandated by the people – protecting their basic rights, adopting a
provisional constitution, and preparing for an orderly transition to a government
under a new constitution. President Aquino later issued Proclamation No.9,
creating a Constitutional Commission in the Philippines—popularly abbreviated
"ConCom"—to frame a new charter to supersed 1973 Constitution. Aquino
appointed 50 members to the commission, drawn from varied backgrounds,
which included several former congressmen, former Supreme Court Chief Justice
____________
56Alexandra Seltzer, ‘Human Trafficking: the Case of Burmese Refugees in Thailand,’ (2013) 37 (4)
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 279-293.57See also Jonathan Rigg, Challenging Southeast Asian Development: The Shadows of Success.
(Routledge 2015)58See also Prince Christian Cruz, ‘The Spanish Origins of Extractive Institutions in the Philippines,’
(2014) 54 (1) Australian Economic History Review 62-82.
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Roberto Concepción, Roman Catholic Bishop Teodoro Bacani, and Film Director
Lino Brocka.
The ConCom presented the draft constitution to President Aquino on 15
October 1986. On 11 February 1987, the new constitution was proclaimed,
ratified and made effective; with Aquino, her government, and the Services
pledging allegiance.59
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court of Republic Philippine
can review and validate acts, and other regulations. The jurisdictions are clearly
stated in the constitution, such as when the constitutionality, or validity, of any of
the following are in question: a treaty; international or executive agreement; law;
presidential decree; proclamation; order; instruction; ordinance; or regulation.60
The 1987 Constitution has problems with marginal rights for groups like
the Lumad, Igorot, Chinese, Moros, and other indigenous peoples. They face
land loss due to development schemes, failing poverty, government neglect, and
loss of culture. The Moros and the ethnic Chinese, have still to be distinguished
by the majority population, with negative labels broadcast by majority media.61
Moro Muslims, for years, have also suffered loss of their traditional lands
and educational system,62 and discriminate against Muslim, or other beliefs,
regarding language, religion, and culture. In spite of the recent conceding of a
form of autonomy for the Moro in parts of Mindanao, limitations remain on
education in their languages in communal schools; or in having their languages
as co-official, or working languages of administration.63
It has happened because of the slow pace and difficulties in implementing
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, established in 1997. Obstacles appear when
some officials and companies disrespect the law's requirements and ‘niceties',
such as free and informed consent for development projects.64
____________
59Wikipedia, 'Constitution of the Philippines,' accessed 16 October 2013.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippines>60The 1987 Constitution of Republic of Philippine, Section 5.61Minorityrights, ‘Philippines Overview,’ accessed 31 July 2015
<http://www.minorityrights.org/3462/philippines/philippines-overview.html>62 In educational system government imposes Christian curriculum for other beliefs, using
English and Tagalog for language instruction.63Robert Schreiter, ‘Peacebuilding in the Philippines: The Challenge of Mindanao,’ (2015) 27 (2)
New Theology Review 47-55.64Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Peasants, Culture and Indigenous Peoples (Springer 2013) 95-111.
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3.2.3.4. Myanmar
On 4 January, 1948, Myanmar (also called Burma) achieved
independence from Britain, and became a democracy based on the
parliamentary system. Unlike most other former British colonies, it did not
become a member of the Commonwealth. A bicameral parliament was formed,
comprising a Chamber of Deputies, and a Chamber of Nationalities. The
geographical area Burma today encompasses, can be traced to the Panglong
Agreement, which combined Burma proper (consisting of Lower Burma and
Upper Burma), and the Frontier Areas (administered separately by the British).
In 2008, Myanmar amended its constitution. On 10 May, in the first phase
of a two-stage referendum amid Cyclone Nargis, the Myanmar's army-drafted
constitution was overwhelmingly approved by 92.4% of the 22 million voters, with
an alleged voter turnout of 99%. It was the first national vote since the 1990
election. Multi-party elections in 2010 would end five decades of military rule, as
the new charter gave the military an automatic 25% of seats in parliament.65
Under the 2008 Constitution, the legislative power of the Union is shared
among the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the State and Region Hluttaws. The Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw consists of the People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw), who are elected
based on township as well as population; and the House of Nationalities
(Amyotha Hluttaw), with on an equal number of representatives elected from
Regions and States.
The People's Assembly consists of 440 representatives, with 110 being
military personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence
Services. The House of Nationalities consists of 224 representatives, with 56
being military personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence
Services.
In terms of the judicial review Myanmar has Constitutional Tribunal
instead of constitutional court. The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union is formed
with nine members - three members chosen by the President, three members
chosen by the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, three members chosen by the
____________
65Susanne Prager Nyein, 'Expanding military, shrinking citizenry and the new constitution in Burma'
(2009) 39 (4) Journal of Contemporary Asia 634-648.
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Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw, with one member from amongst the nine
members to be assigned as the Chairperson.66
The Constitutional Tribunal interprets the provisions under the
constitution, decides constitutional disputes in the Union, and reviews whether
the laws promulgated are in conformity with the constitution.67 As the country is
ruled by the military, the government has closed the public chance for judicial
review, and people have tended to keep silent for the sake of their security.
The constitution has yet to safeguard ethnicity issues. The Rohingya
ethnic group have encountered a serious unfair treatment from the government.68
They have declined to distinguish the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group,
negating their equal citizenship rights. Their freedom of movement has been
tightly constrained, access to medical treatment, suspensions on marriage
permits, educational services, and other public services.69 Any have been forced
to become refugees to other countries, across the border to Aceh Province,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and other neighbour countries.70
3.2.3.5. Cambodia
The governmental system of Cambodia is a Kingdom where the King
fulfils his functions according to the constitution and the principles of liberal multi-
party democracy. The Kingdom of Cambodia is an independent, sovereign,
peaceful, permanently neutral and non-aligned state.71 The King is the unitary
symbol. The government is led by Prime Minister elected by the King.
Cambodia is committed to accelerating the Legal and Judicial Reform
process. The Council for Legal and Judicial Reform, established in June 2002,
has the mission to initiate and encourage the process, and to implement legal
and judicial reform policy, and programmes, in accordance with the objectives of
the Supreme Council of State Reforms. Since the middle of 2005, the Council
____________
66The Myanmar Constitution 2008, sections 320, 321.67 The Myanmar Constitution 2008, sections 322.68Benjamin Zawacki. 'Defining Myanmar's" Rohingya Problem"' (2013) 20(3) Human Rights Brief
18-23.69Syeda Naushin Parnini, Mohammad Redzuan Othman and Amer Saifude Ghazali. 'The Rohingya
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Journal 133.70Eliane Coates, Rohingya Boat People: A Challenge for Southeast Asia (RSIS 2013) 1-3.71The Constitution of Laos, Article 1.
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has carried out its comprehensive action plan to implement the Cambodia Legal
and Judicial Reform Strategy.72
After the amendment to its constitution in 1993, Cambodia established a
new organ of the state, called the Constitutional Council.73 It is a supreme
institution, stipulated in the 1993 Constitution, to guarantee the respect of the
constitution; to interpret the constitution and the laws adopted by the National
Assembly, and completely reviewed by the Senate; and to examine and decide
on litigations related to the elections of the Members of the National Assembly,
and to the elections of the Senators.
When requested by the King, the President of the Senate, the President of
the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, one-fourth of the senators, one-tenth
of the National Assembly members, or by the court (for promulgated laws only) -
the Constitutional Council interprets the constitution and the laws in the
framework of the examination of the constitutionality. The Constitutional Council
is similar to a constitutional court, but does not have court function, because it is
only an additional state organ, attached after the amendment.
The constitution of 1993 has had little positive impact for the small
religious communities, such as the Cham-Muslim, Khmer Loeu (also known as
hill tribes), the Chinese ethnic community, the Vietnamese ethnic community, and
the Kampuchea Krom as the fifth Cambodian minority group.74 Because of
contention and indecision over who is—or can become—a citizen of Cambodia,
the Cambodian government has yet to approve even basic legislation on the
Cambodian citizenship matter.
3.3. Conclusion
The ASEAN region is geographically located in the mainland of the long
rivers which begin in highlands separating Southeast Asia from China and
northwest India. The ASEAN Charter is the milestone in the regional
organization’s improvement. The Charter has established the practices of
____________
72Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009-2013 for
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regional framework, creating a normative structure for the area, and stipulates
major targets in an envisaged process of enhanced regional integration.
However, the Charter character has no a binding power. With these
consequences, the ASEAN countries have option whether obeying or rejecting
the Charter norms within their constitutions. Some ASEAN members have faced
serious criticism on crucial issues, including human rights, migrants, and
discriminations.
The constitutional practice in the ASEAN countries can be divided in three
major models, the Westminster Model, the Socialist Model, and the Mixed Model.
The models have been inherited by the former colonial period, but those
countries have tried to generate their own adjustments over their constitution.
Most ASEAN countries are now undertaking regular renewal, stimulated and
greatly energised by the need to review, and re-examine existing rules. Those
countries have been made relevant to common and home-grown models and
value systems.
The Westminster Model is indicated from the role of parliament, and head
of state in law making. The legal constructions are therefore based on the British
common law system. The laws come from statute and case law, as implemented
in Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam. In certain points, they have
arranged some significant changes, such as placing the President as the head of
state in Singapore, and Sultan in Brunei Darussalam. Countries with this model,
have received criticisms, chiefly in the way of implementing the constitutional
system for their citizens. The common issues are related to discrimination and
racism, coming from the interpretation of general norms in their constitutions.
The second model is the Socialist Model, the domination of single-party
and military force in governmental system. In Socialist countries, private property
in the form of capital can be reduced and changed by mutual possession of the
means of production. Thus, it permits a large measure of equality and fraternity in
social relations. Once it agrees a specific procedure, it conveys its plans to all of
its essential organs; and this policy will be approved by its legislative, executive
and judicial agencies. The ASEAN members adopting this model are, namely,
Vietnam, and Laos. The supremacy of military power in the government and
political system occupies parliament jurisdiction.
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Lastly is the Mixed Model, adopted in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
Myanmar, and Cambodia. In this model, a country has tried to adopt other
country's experiences and resettle it into their own country. The adoption, at
some levels, can run well - although, sometimes, not as planned. This can be
seen in the formation of constitutional court. It has success story in Austria, but
there are no guarantee that the success will be the same for other countries.
Although most of countries in the Mixed Model have made crucial
changes in their constitution, the practice of being fully democratic is still
questioned. In order to be constitutionally solved, issues such as human rights,
corruption, and law enforcement are still in need of serious work to fulfil.
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CHAPTER 4 - CREATION AND OPERATION OF INDONESIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
4.1. Introduction
On 21 May 1998, the authoritarian regime of Soeharto who had ruled
Indonesian for 32 years fell. The transitional process from the authoritarian
regime to the democratic era had to be fulfilled, as soon as possible, including the
amendment of the 1945 Constitution.
The amendment aimed to elevate the Indonesian constitutional system to
democratic state, for various reasons for the amendment. Firstly, are the
demands of reformation, such as - eliminating military politic interventions, law
enforcement, human rights, eradicating corruptions, provincial autonomy,
independent press, and sustaining democratic life.1 Military interference in
several social conflicts has means human rights violation in some provinces in
Indonesia, as happened in Aceh. It had a devastating impact on the civilian
population, chiefly between 1989 and 2004 - when military actions were
conducted by the Indonesian authorities to conquer claims for autonomy
movement by Free Aceh Movement. Between 10,000 and 30,000 people were
killed during the conflict.2
Secondly is the imbalance of power distribution.3 During the authoritarian
era, the power was supremely held by the parliament, imposing whether or not
the president can continue to carry out his duty, or impeach the president in
tenure. The parliament held authority to legislate law, and there was no space for
judicial review at that time. The president had almost absolute power, able to
create law on behalf of the state, even without the legitimation of parliament.4
The 1945 Constitution was too short to answer the needs of modern
society, consisting of only 37 Articles in total and created multi-interpretations in
several articles, including the unlimited presidency period. The winning party at
____________
1MPR, ‘Training of Trainer (TOT) UUD 1945 [Training of Trainer the 1945 Constitution],’ accessed
16 September 2015, <www.mpr.go.id>2Amnesty, ‘Justice, Truth and Reparations for Victims of the Aceh Conflict, Ten Years on,’
accessed 16 September 2015,
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA2122672015ENGLISH.pdf>3 MPR (n1)4Tamir Moustafa, ‘Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes,’ (2014) 10 Annual Review of Law and
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that time, could not have their own chosen president. In 1999, the elected
parliament members began to gradually amend the 1945 Constitution, year by
year and finished in 2002. The constitutional system of Indonesia has changed
from distribution of power, to create checks and balances mechanism.5
Table 8: The Process of Amendment of the 1945 Constitution
Sources: MPR Republic of Indonesia
Table 9: The changes summary of the 1945 Constitution
YEARS CHANGES SUMMARY
First
Amendment
1999
In this year amended 9 articles; namely,
 7 articles rearranged the president’s powers and the
mechanisms of presidential election;
 2 articles rearranged the sharing power between
president and parliament in processing a bill to be an
act.
Second
Amendment
2000
In this year amended 5 chapters including its 25 articles;
namely,
 Chapter IXA on State Territory;
 Chapter X on Citizens and Residents;
 Chapter XA on Human Rights;
 Chapter XII on State Defence and Security;
 Chapter XV on National Flag, Language, Coat of Arms
and Anthem;
____________
5Abdul Rasyid Thalib, Wewenang Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Implementasinya Dalam Sistem
Ketata Negaraan Republik Indonesia [The Constitutional Court Jurisdictions and its Implementation
in State Administration of Republic of Indonesia] (Citra Aditya Bakti 2006) 34.
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Third
Amendment
2001
In this year amended 3 chapters including its 22 articles;
namely,
 Chapter VIIA on Regional Representative Council;
 Chapter VIIB on General Elections;
 Chapter VIIIA on Supreme Audit Board.
In this time also added the specific court later known as
the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
Fourth
Amendment
2002
In this year amended 2 chapters including its 13 articles;
namely,
 Chapter XIII Education
 Chapter XIV The National Economy And Social Welfare
The newly established state institution with legislative power is the DPD
(Regional Representative Council). Other state institutions having judicial power,
beside the Supreme Court, are the Indonesian Constitutional Court (ICC), and
the Judicial Commission.6 Various state agencies that have been created have
their own mission and functions in accordance with the 1945 Constitution, such
as the ICC, and the Judicial Commission, with authority to supervise judiciary
power.
The existence of the ICC is clearly stated in Article 24C of the 1945
Constitution,7 to ensure that the constitution, as the supreme law, can be
enforced as it should be. The ICC also ‘guides and guards’ the 1945 Constitution.
In carrying out this judicial function, the ICC is legally allowed to freely interpret
the 1945 Constitution.8 In order to ensure legal certainty, resolution to a dispute
must be submitted to an independent judiciary institution, and is carried out by
the ICC.9
Jimly states that the constitutional courts in many countries resolve
conflict amongst state institutions – as, in the process of change towards
democratic state, state institutional conflicts are unavoidable.10 Jimly further
____________
6Sri Soemantri, Prosedur Dan Sistem Perubahan Konstitusi [Procedures and Systems of
Constitutional Amendment] (Alumni 2006) 305.7The position of the ICC has clearly regulated in the Chapter IX on the Judicial Power, in the Article
24C, which is only consisted of 1 Article and 6 clauses. This number is too little if compared with the
significant role of the ICC in the law reform. In another country such as Austrian Constitutional
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See also The Austria Federal Constitution.8See also Bagir Manan and Susi Dwi Harijanti, Memahami Konstitusi: Makna dan Aktualisasi
[Understanding the Constitution: Meaning and Actualisation] (Rajawali Pers 2014) 173.9Bambang Sutiyoso and Sri Hastuti Puspitasari, Aspek-Aspek Perkembangan Kekuasaan
Kehakiman Di Indonesia [Aspects of Judicial Power Development in Indonesia] (UII Press 2005)
23.10Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Tata Negara [The Constitutional Law] (FHUII Press 2002) 127.
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confirms that in relation to the idea of checks and balances mechanism, dispute
settlement between equivalent state institutions should be regulated in a
mechanism. Before amendment the MPR was positioned as the highest state
organ, incarnation of people power with authorities to resolve state organ dispute,
but after amendment, these powers transferred to ICC.11
The ICC’s jurisdiction is not only set forth in Article 24C of the 1945
Constitution, but in the Act No. 24 of 2003 on the ICC; amended by the Act No. 4
Year 2014, and in the Second Amendment Act No. 24, 2003. The ICC’s
jurisdiction include, a) testing a law against the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia; b)
deciding disputes of the state institutions authorities granted by the Constitution
of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945; c) dissolution of political parties; and d)
deciding disputes over the election results. The ICC examines alleged violations
of law committed by the President and/or Vice President, known as
impeachment, and regulated in the 1945 Constitution.12
4.2. Constitutional Authority of the ICC
The ICC is the guardian and the final interpreter of the constitution, which
since 1945 has regulated the state based on the principles of democracy,13 and
protected the human rights guaranteed in the constitution. Therefore, the ICC has
a similar role as the protector of the citizen constitutional rights, as well as human
rights.14 The authority of the ICC embodies the principle of checks and
balances,15 and its existence is a progressive step towards correcting the
performance of inter-state institutions, and allowing political maturation of state
and nation.16
In carrying out duties and functions, the ICC is in harmony with the
inherent authorities in the 1945 Constitution. The authorities of the ICC are
____________
11Jimly Asshiddiqie, Merambah Jalan Pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi [Clearing-away of the
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Law Debate: Post the Constitutional Amendment] (Rajawali Pers 2011) 67-69.16Ni’matul Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia [Indonesian Constitutional Law] (Rajagrafindo
Persada 2012) 212.
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regulated under Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution, in conjunction with Article
10 of the Act No. 24 of 2003 on the ICC, in conjunction with Article 29 of the Act
No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power, as follow:
4.2.1. The Authority of Reviewing Law against the 1945 Constitution
These provisions are set forth in Article 24C Paragraph (1) of the 1945
Constitution; namely,
The Constitutional Court has authority to hear at the first and last with final
decision to test the laws against the 1945 Constitution.17
The judicial review of an act against the 1945 Constitution, is the most
frequently registered by ICC clerkships. The terminology of “judicial review” is
debated amongst Indonesian legal scholars, and “judicial review” in the
Netherlands, is called toetsingsrecht.18 Fatmawati, states that toetsingsrecht
means “the right to test”, whilst the judicial review means “a review by the
judiciary institution”. Thus, basically, these two words are similar in meaning,
which is: the authority to test or review.19 In judicial review system,20 the authority
of executing the court is held by the judge, making the two terms different. In the
case of authority of the judiciary institution, the Indonesian legal scholars are
accustomed to naming it “judicial review”.
The former ICC judge, Jimly stated that judicial review is an attempt at
testing laws conducted by the judicial institution, to test the laws established by
the legislative branch, executive, or judicative.21 The rights test can be formal
review or material review.22 He also claimed that the right of formal review is the
____________
17See also the 1945 Constitution, Article 24C Paragraph (1).18Indonesia was a part of Dutch colonial that has influenced the legal terminology. Toetsingsrecht in
Netherlands can be defined as right to examine whether a given system does not conflict with any
higher. Accessed 4 March 2015 < http://www.encyclo.nl/begrip/toetsingsrecht>19Fatmawati, Hak Menguji (toetsingsrecht) Yang Dimiliki Hakim Dalam Sistem Hukum Indonesia
[Rights to Review Owned by Judge in Indonesian Legal System] (Grafindo 2005) 5.20The idea of judicial review has been developed befor the independent, notwithstanding, at that
time there has no a specific institution to handle it. So, the judicial review mechanism has spread in
those three state power including legislative, judicative, and excecutive. See also Benny K.Harman,
Mempertimbangkan Mahkamah Konstitusi: Sejarah Pemikiran Pengujian Undang-Undang
Terhadap UUD [Considering the Constitutional Court: History of Thought in Reviewing an Act
against the Constitution] (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia 2013) 145-237.21Fatkhurahman, Dian Aminudin, and Sirajudin, Memahami Keberadaan Mahkamah Konstitusi Di
Indonesia [Understanding the Existence of Constitutional Court in Indonesia] (Citra Aditya Bakti
2004) 25.22Jimly Asshiddiqie, Perihal Undang-Undang di Indonesia [Concerning the Act in Indonesia]
(Mahkamah Konstitusi RI 2006) 149-158.
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authority to assess a legislative product, such as an act, whether it is incarnated
as it should be, or not.23
Sri furthermore insisted that formal review is concern procedural issues
relating to legality and institutional competence. He added that the right of judicial
review is an authority to investigate, and then judge, whether a legislation content
fits the rules or goes against the highest rules, and whether a particular rule is
entitled to issue a particular regulation.24 Saldi asserted that after the
Amendment, the legislation function radically shifted from parliament to the
judiciary and the ICC has played a significant role in legislation.25
In a different view, Maruar asserted that the formal review is a judicial
review against the 1945 Constitution, including discussion, approval,
promulgation, and implementation. Basically this test means an evaluation on the
basis of Article 20, Article 20A, Article 21, and Article 22A of the 1945
Constitution.26 Harun argued that judicial review is about the rights of law-making
authority, and whether or not the contents contradict with the highest laws.27 It is
further regulated in Article 4 Paragraph (2) of the ICC Regulation No. 6 of 2005
that
The charge material in the paragraph, and/ or parts of an act considered
to be contrary to the 1945 Constitution.28
4.2.2. Determining Disputes over the Authorities of State Institutions
Under Section 24C Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, one authority
of the ICC is determining disputes over the authorities of state institutions whose
powers are given by the 1945 Constitution. The meaning of “state institutions”
does not have a fixed meaning, because the constitution does not clearly explain
the issues in state institutions. It was before the amendment of the 1945
____________
23Jimly Asshiddiqie (n10) 5.24Sri Soemantri (n6) 11.25Saldi Isra, Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi: Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer Dalam Sistem
Presidensial Indonesia [Shifting the Legislation Function: A Legislation Model Strengthening
Parliamentary In Indonesia Presidential System] (RajaGrafindo Persada 2010) 9-10.26Maruar Siahaan, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [The Procedural Law of
Indonesian Constitutional Court], (Konpress 2005) 20.27Fatmawati (n19) 628See also the ICC Regulation No.6 of 2005 on The Procedural Guidance in Judicial Review. Article
4 Paragraph (2)
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Constitution, chiefly in 1978, the type of state institution was defined and
classified by the MPR.29
The state institution before amendment means a state institution receiving
direct authority from the 1945 Constitution. As the 1945 Constitution also
regulated state institutions and their authorities.30 The ICC in its regulation has
defined the meaning of state institutions:
The DPR (House of Representatives), the DPD (Regional Representative
Council), the President and/ or Vice President, The MPR (People
Consultative Assembly), The BPK (Supreme Audit Board), the Regional
Government, or other state institutions in which their authority is granted
by the 1945 Constitution.31
State institutions cannot be separated from one another as parts to
achieve their goals.32 A function can be held by a single entity and foremost
among these roles. There must be cooperation, putting forward the spirit of
brotherhood in serving the common good.33
4.2.3. Deciding over the Dissolution of a Political Party
Before the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the ruling party was able
to dissolve a political party.34 Before independence, the dissolution of a political
party had frequently happened in Indonesian political history as dissolution of the
Indische Partij (IP) in 1913. This situation continued until the reformation era in
2001.35 There was no mechanism arranging the dissolution of a political party
through the judicial process, making the existence of the ICC necessary. In the
____________
29See also The MPR Decree No. III of 1978 on the Status and Relationships of Work Procedures of
the highest state institution with / or Inter State Agency30Fatkhurahman, (n21) 35.31Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the ICC Regulation No. 8 of 2006 on Guidelines for the Proceedings in
the constitutional State Institutions Dispute.32C.S.T. Kansil, Hukum Tata Negara Republik Indonesia [The Constitutional Law of the Republic of
Indonesia], (Rineka Cipta 2000) 166.33Ibid, 167.34In the time of Soekarno and Soeharto with their absolute power the dissolution political party was
easily happened with political system instead of judiciary process. This was occurred chiefly on the
party having Islamic background. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia [The History
of Indonesian Moslem Party] (Lembaga Penjelidikan Islam, 1970)1-10. See also Lembaga Analisis
Informasi, Kontroversi Supersemar dalam Transisi Kekuasaan Soekarno-Soeharto [The
Controversies of the Supersemar in the Power Transition of Soekarno-Soeharto] (Gramedia
Pustaka Utama 2007).35Jimly Asshiddiqie, Kemerdekaan Berserikat, Pembubaran Partai Politik dan Mahkamah Konstitusi
[ndependence Association, Dissolution of Political Parties and Constitutional Court], (Konstitusi
Press 2005) 159-204.
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Indonesian political system, a political party can be defined as an organized
group with similar orientation, goals, and values. The purpose of this group is to
gain political power, and constitutionally seize political position in order to execute
their policies.36 The ICC power to dissolve a political party is governed by Article
24C of the 1945 Constitution Section (1).37
The 1945 Constitution does not clearly formulate the requirement or
prohibition for a political party to be dissolved. Now, the problem is, whether the
dissolution of political parties conflicts with human rights issues,38 because a
political party is related to the definition of assembly, association, and giving
opinion. In this situation, it can be argued that the 1945 Constitution itself may
have a conflict of norm.39
The ICC has several reasons to decide the necessity to dissolve a political
party, or not. Firstly is an ideological reason. In the Indonesia political system,
political parties are prohibited to embrace, to develop, and to disseminate the
teachings of communism/Marxism-Leninism,40 argues communism aims to create
a communist society through revolution all tools, including the state are used and
devoted for the sake of achieving communism.41
Secondly, Act No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties, amended by Act No. 2 of
2011, states that the principle of political parties should not contradict Pancasila,
and the 1945 Constitution.42 Mahfud argues that the Pancasila as the
philosophical base ideology has a stronger power because since a long debate in
1959, it has been accepted as the national ideology.43
____________
36Miriam Budiarjo, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik [Basics of Political Science], (Gramedia Pustaka Utama
2004) 160. See also Bintan Regen Saragih, Politik Hukum [Legal Politic]. (Utomo 2006) 13-16.37See also the 1945 Constitution, the Article 24C.38See also the 1945 Constitution, the Article 28E. It stated that everyone owns the right of freedom
of association, assembly, giving opinion and expression.39See the topic of conflict of norm by Kelsen. The misplaced of the highest norm can produce the
conflict of norm that lead to legal uncertainty. See also Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and
State (Russell & Russell 1961)157.40See the MPRS Decree No. XXV of 1966 on Dissolution of the Communist Party of Indonesia,
Statement For the Forbidden Organizations Around the Territory of the Republic of Indonesia for
the Indonesian Communist Party and banning for each activity to Develop or to Spread Ideology or
teachings of Communism / Marxism-Leninism.41Miriam Budiarjo (n36) 77.42The ideology of the Pancasila is one of the most important principal in creating political party as
well as other organisation. Regarding the Pancasila as the ideology can also be found in the Act
No.2 of 2008 on the Political Parties, Article 1, and also in the Act No.2 of 2011 on the Amendment
of the Act No.2 of 2008.43Moh. Mahfud, Konstitusi dan Hukum dalam Kontroversi Isu [Constitution and Law in the
Controversial Issues] (Rajawali Pers 2009) 5-9.
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Thirdly is the purposes reason. Article 10 of the Act No. 2 of 2008 on
Political Parties, states that the purposes of political parties are
1) to fulfil the ideals of the nation as mentioned in the 1945 Constitution;
2) to sustain and maintain the Unity of the Republic of Indonesia;
3) to develop the democracy of life based on Pancasila, by upholding the
sovereignty of the People of Indonesia; and
4) to fulfil prosperity for all society.44
Fourthly is activity reason. Under Article 40 of the Act No. 2 of 2008 on
Political Parties, political parties are prohibited from
1) performing activities against the 1945 Constitution;
2) performing harmful activities which are endangering to the unity of the
state; and
3) performing activities which are against the state policy in maintaining
friendship with other countries, as the effort to keep peace of the world.45
The reason for the dissolution of political parties is to stop stewardship
and activities of a political party, together with a reason to dissolve it.46 Before
the dissolution is decided by the Supreme Court authority, that political party
must be heard through the judicial process in the Supreme Court.47 In practice,
the Supreme Court has never received an appeal for dissolution from the
opposition of the political party nor from the government, because it is referred to
in the law of the ICC.
The government in the dissolution of political parties has to find
evidence48 of activities seeking opposed to the 1945 Constitution. When the
evidence is considered sufficient, then the government may apply to the ICC to
dissolve the political party, and the ICC judgment is implemented by the
government, by cancelling the registration.49 The ICC's judgement is announced
by the Government in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia at least 14
(fourteen) days after the judgement is received.50
____________
44The Act No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties, Article 10.45Fatkhurahman (n21) 46.46Ibid.47See also The ICC Regulation No. 12 of 2008 on Political Parties Proceedings Procedure.48Included in the evidence categories are namely; documents or writing, witness statement, expert
statement, statement by the parties, indication; and other means of evidence in the form of
information uttered, received, or stored electronically by way of optical instruments or similar
device. See also the Act No.24 of 2003 on the ICC, Article 36.49Fatkhurahman, (n21) 48.50Refly Harun, Zainal AM Husein, Bisariyadi, ed., Menjaga Denyut Konstitusi (Konstitusi Press
2004) 366.
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4.2.4. Deciding Disputes on the Result of General Election
The general election part of the ICC jurisdiction consists of members of
the DPR, the DPD, the President and/or Vice President, and the DPRD.51
However, the ICC has expanded the meaning of election. The Governor, the
Mayor, and also the district representative election have become included in the
meaning of the election. The critical discussion on the authority of handling
elections will be in sub-chapter 4.7 and in Chapters 5, 6 and 8.
Under principles of transparency, each action or policies performed by the
state should be known by its citizens. The general election is a political means for
citizens to select their representatives entrusted to manage the country, an
important instrument in the development of political order in a democratic
country.52 The general election has to be fair, free, direct, and confidential. Most
important, is the transparency of the government as the organizer of the general
elections.53
The 2004 election not only elected the members of the DPR, the DPD, but
also the President and/ or Vice President, and the DPRD. After long decades of
authoritarian regime, this was a new experience for Indonesians, and the Election
Commission.54
At least, two electoral systems have been used during these general
elections. Firstly is the proportional system,55 with open lists for the electing
members of the DPR, the DPRD, and Council at district/city level. Secondly is the
district system.56 This system has been used for electing members of the DPD.
The election of the governor/mayor has resulted in disputed elections of regional
heads, under the jurisdiction of the ICC to resolve the dispute.57
____________
51See also the 1945 Constitution, the Article 22E, the Clause 1-6.52Fatkhurahman (n21) 49.53See also the 1945 Constitution, the Article 22E, the Clause 1-6.54Ibid.55With the proportional representation system several members of parliament are to be elected per
constituency. Basically every political party presents a list of candidates and voters can select a list
that is they vote for a political party. Parties are assigned parliamentary seats proportionally to the
number of votes they get. Democracy-Building, ‘Election’, accessed 4 March 2015.
<http://www.democracy-building.info/voting-systems.html>56An electoral district system is a distinct territorial subdivision for holding a separate election for
one or more seats in a legislative body. Generally, only voters who reside within the geographical
bounds of an electoral district (constituents) are permitted to vote in an election held there.
Wikipedia, ‘Electoral District’, accessed 4 March 2015, <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_district>57See the Act No. 12 of 2008 on the Second Amendment of the Act No. 32 of 2004 on Regional
Government, the Article 236C stated that the handling of dispute counting on the local elections and
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Thus the ICC’s jurisdiction covers all elections held in Indonesia.
Application is filed within 72 hours from the date of the Election Commission
announcing the final result. The ICC will decide an election dispute within
fourteen days, and judgment is binding.58
4.2.5. The Power to Impeach the President and the Vice President
The ICC has jurisdiction over a petition concerning alleged violations by
the President and/or the Vice-President. Before impeachment by the MPR, the
ICC must examine, whether or not the President and/or the Vice-President has
performed an unlawful form of treason, corruption, bribery, other felonies, or
misconduct, and/or no longer qualifies as President or Vice President.59
The impeachment process through the judiciary mechanism is intended to
prevent impeachment by the political system, as previously happened.60 With the
judiciary mechanism, the opposition groups cannot easily build a motion of no
confidence for the president, but need clear evidence to prove that the president
has committed such crime as provided in the 1945 Constitution. 61
The inspection process for impeachment begins from the opinion of the
DPR, asking the ICC to examine prosecutes the President and/or Vice President
who is allegedly guilty. After the judiciary process, if the President and/ or Vice
President have been found guilty, the ICC will return the judgment to the MPR.62
Impeachment process can also begin with the proposal to the ICC from
the House of Representatives against the President and/or Vice President, who is
considered to no longer qualify as a President and/or Vice President. This
indicates that the process of impeachment of the President and/or Vice President
is legal. Prior to the reform era revoking the President mandate was conducted
by the General Assembly, as the highest state body.
____________
deputy head of the region by the Supreme Court transferred to the Constitutional Court not later
than 18 (eighteen) months from the promulgation of this Act.58See also the Act No.24 of 2003 on the ICC, Article 68 and 85.59See also the 1945 Constitution, Article 24C.60Eko Noer Kristiyanto, ‘Pemakzulan Presiden Republik Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945
[Impeachment of the President of the Republic of Indonesia after Amendment of the 1945
Constitution],’ Jurnal RechtsVinding 2, No. 3 (2013). P.331. See also Hamdan Zoelva, Pemakzulan
Presiden di Indonesia [Impeachment of the President in Indonesia]. (Sinar Grafika 2011) 9.61The crimes, which can be a reason for the impeachment, are unlawful form of treason, corruption,
bribery, other felonies, or misconduct. See Article 24C of 1945 Constitution. Article 10 Paragraph
(2) and also the ICC’s Act.62Regarding the inspection mechanism can be seen in the 1945 Constitution, Article 7B.
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Law enforcement efforts mandated by the 1945 Constitution are less
influential in the impeachment process. After the ICC’s adjudication of the DPR’s
proposal, its judgment is put to the General Assembly, an institutional mechanism
in charge of appointing and dismissing the President and/or Vice President.63
Impeachment has to meet the support of 2/3 of the floor members of
Parliament attending the plenary session, attended by at least 2/3 of the
Parliament. In 2014, the MPR members consisted of 692 persons,64 meaning that
to impeach the President and/or Vice President, 461 MPR members are required.
After the reformation era and the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, therefore,
it is now more difficult to impeach the President and Vice President.65
4.3. Constitutional Court Process
The daily operation of the ICC is presently run by three important
processes. First, is the role of Secretary General (SG),66 playing a significant role
in the smooth operation of the ICC’s daily duties, whether internally to the ICC, or
externally. Internally, the ICC has to make sure that a case process, from case
registering to the final judgment, will be well organised. Externally, it cooperates
with other state institutions. For instance, the ICC has had a joint research
agreement with several universities in Indonesia, been signed by the SG, who
represents the ICC President.
During June to October 2013, the researcher personally visited the ICC
in the capital city of Jakarta. The aim was to see how the ICC is operated on a
daily basis. It is interesting to know the circle of the judgement making process,
from registering cases, attending session, and final judgement. The ICC’s
judgement is the final arbiter, with no further appeal thereafter. The researcher
was also involved in several academic discussions, focus groups, and seminars -
such as attending a seminar about the specific watchdog organ for the ICC.
____________
63See alsot the 1945 Constitution, Article 7B.64Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, ‘Anggota MPR’ [MPR Members], accessed 2 March 2015.  <
https://www.mpr.go.id/profil/anggota/?periode=3&N=30>65Maruar Siahaan, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [The Procedural Law of
Indonesian Constitutional Court] (KONPress 2005) 50.66Ibid
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The SG has designed the ICC to be accessible to researchers or public.
The ICC website can be accessed easily for judgements, trial schedules, and
video conferences. With Indonesia consisting of thousands of islands, the
teleconference facilities in each province are helpful, but may not operate
correctly because of poor weather.
The ICC building has a modern design and has good free access for the
public to attend the session, and also in the distribution of recent and previous
judgements. Typically, the judgements can be downloaded easily through the
website, and the ICC has a library of contemporary design, containing collections
both physical and electronic of the judgements, journals, books, and so forth. The
public are welcome to access the facility, as long as they are registered. Usually
visitors increase during the election session, but the ICC limits public access -
forbidding electronic devices, distracting the session, threatening the judges,
bringing a weapon, and so forth.
Second, is the Registrar, with duty to ensure administrative procedure are
well-prepared.67 The Registrar has duties only for the internal ICC, such as
recording during the session, note taking, organising files, numbering
judgements, double-checking evidences, inviting parties, minutes of trial, and so
forth. The Registrars are highly experienced officers, having background in
judicial archive. Their expertise in quickly finding a previous case and judgments
is an advantage to the judges.
Registrars and the SG have been criticised mainly regarding the minutes
of the trial. Sometimes, the minutes are a blurred document which is difficult to
read. Usually, this situation has been found in the election cases. Another
complaint is about the trial schedule, which is not regularly updated on their
website, making it difficult for the media, or the applicant, to know the exact date
for the trial.
At this time, the person holding the SG position has not been replaced for
more than 12 years, although Indonesian administrative law only allows a person
to hold public position for no more than 5 years.68 There are no specific
____________
67Ibid.68See also Government Decree Number 13 of 2002 on the Appointment of Civil Servants on the
Structural Positions.
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requirements on how the SG must be selected. The SG and Registrar administer
the ICC namely,
a. planning; analysis and evaluation; general administration and
supervision of the administration of justice; as well as organizational
management and governance;
b. financial management and human resource development;
c. household management; archival and expeditions; as well as state
property;
d. implementation of public relations and cooperation; leadership and
administration protocols; as well as secretarial court reporting;
e. research and case studies; library management; management of
information and communication technology; and
f. the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.69
Thirdly is the proceedings process. The hearings in the ICC are
conducted open to the public. The ICC’s act states that
(1) The Constitutional Court examines, hears, and decides in a plenary
session of the Constitutional Court with nine (9) constitutional judges,
except in exceptional circumstances with seven (7) constitutional judges,
headed by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court.
(2) In the case of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court is unable to lead
the plenary session as described in paragraph (1), the trial is to be led by
the Vice Chairman of the Constitutional Court.
(3) In the case of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Constitutional Court
are absent at the same time, a plenary session is chaired by a temporary
chairman, elected from and by the members of the Constitutional Court.
(4) Prior to the plenary session as described in paragraph (1), the
Constitutional Court may establish a panel whose members consist of at
least three (3) constitutional judges examining the results discussed in the
plenary session for a decision to be taken.
(5) The decision of the Constitutional Court is pronounced in public session.
(6) When the provisions referred to in paragraph (5) are not met, it results in
the invalid decision of the Constitutional Court and has no legal force.70
The ICC has nine judges. If the ICC’s hearing is not held open to the
public, the ICC’s judgment regarding that case would not have legal power as
well as a final binding.71 ICC judgments have public impact, so that the public
presence in the ICC judiciary process is a must. As stated by Mohammad the
ICC must refer to several court principles in general; namely,
a) Ius Curia Novit (the court knows the law)
____________
69Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Tugas Pokok dan Fungsi’ [Main Duties and Fuctions], accessed 3 March
2015. <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilMK&id=5>70See also the Act No.24 of 2003 on the ICC, Article 28.71Ibid
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b) Hearings open to public
c) Independent and impartial
d) Fast, simple and inexpensive judiciary
e) The right to be heard in equal
f) The principle of presumption of validity72
The plaintiff applying claim in the ICC must be an Indonesian citizen. They
have certain legal entities considered to have their constitutional rights harmed
caused by the enactment of act passed by the government. The applicant may fill
his proposal to the ICC in writing, using a good and clear Indonesian language.73
A plaintiff in his petition has to describe the identity, position, and claim
reasons against the defendant. A plaintiff is considered to have impaired his
constitutional rights, and must prove the injustice which is required to be judged
by the ICC.74 The procedures are regulated in the ICC regulations, used as a
reference in conducting the trial.75
ICC judges should demonstrate good ethical code and conduct to the
parties present at hearings. Ethical behaviour is the attitude and behaviour based
on a maturity which is aligned with prevailing norms in society. The
implementation of a code of ethics, and a code of conduct, specifically for the ICC
judges themselves, can lead to a trust or distrust over the court judgment. The
judges are required to always behave with noble character,76 because the act as
law enforcement officers; owning ethical code as a set of moral standards or
principal of formal law. The facts reveal that the legal profession has not always
fully implemented the ethical code, and code of professional conduct. Thus, the
profession in general is considered negative in public vision.77
____________
72Mohammad Saleh, Prinsip-Prinsip Umum Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi [General Principles
of ICC Procedural La], (Fakultas Hukum Universitas Narotama Surabaya 2013) 2.73See also the Act No.24 of 2004 on the ICC, Article. 29.74See also the Act No.24 of 2004 on the ICC, Article. 31.75Those the ICC’s Regulation can be accessed through ICC website. Mahkamah Konstitusi,
‘Peraturan’ [The Regulations], accessed 3 March 2015. <
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Peraturan&id=6>76See also The Joint Decision of the Supreme Court Chairman and the Judicial Commission
Chairman of the the Republic of Indonesia No.047/KMA/SKB/IV/2009 & No.02/SKB/P.KY/IV/2009
on the Ethical Code and the Guidance of Judge Behaviour.77Wasingatu Zakiyah, ed., Menyingkap Tabir Mafia Peradilan [Revealing the Scene of Judicial
Mafia], (ICW 2002) 9.
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4.4. The ICC as the Final Arbiter
The ICC has a key role in the Indonesian legal system, resolving cases
linked with the implementation of state mechanism, as well as the political
system. Thus, a conflict, which might have happened between state and political
system, is to be managed legally through the judiciary process, one of the key
combinations of the existence of the ICC.
The ICC, which is commonly known in the European system, adheres to
the tradition of civil law in Austria, Germany and Italy. In America, it is integrated
into the authority of the Supreme Court, so that the Supreme Court is the one
called the Guardian of American Constitution.78
The ICC judgment creates legal norms that can negate the state’s law and
create a new legal situation.79 In making its decision, the ICC shall not include
content that is set. The ICC can only declare an act, or some of its contents void,
as contrary to certain parts of the 1945 Constitution. The ICC has shared a good
idea with regards to the regulations, as an alternative to a law or semi-cancelled
law. ICC judgments are not always implemented promptly, but can be
postponed.80 The judgment is issued for a specified period of time, in order to
meet a requirement in which the binding force of this decision will apply. Another
form of this decision is made by stating that one of the articles in the acts is not
binding, which is tested before there is a requirement to be met.
In another judgment, the ICC has made an important innovation with
creating a new norm, in the judicial review of the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the
Election. In this case the ICC declared that the words, phrases, and clauses in
the Act, or the entire contents of the Act do not have binding legal force. If there
are state officials or citizens who still use the article or act, their actions have no
legal basis.
Since the ICC's judgment is a binding and final decision, then it must be
based on philosophical values, and has a legal binding value certainty. The ICC
____________
78Achmad Ali, Menguak Tabir Hukum Suatu Kajian Filosofis & Sosiologis [Revealing the Legal
Scene, A Study on Philosophy and Sociology], (Toko Buku Gunung Agung 2002) 87.79Fista Prilia Sambuari, ‘Eksistensi Putusan Judicial Review Oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi [The
Existence Judicial Review Judgment by the ICC],’ (2013) 1(1) Lex Administratum 20.80See the ICC Judgment No. No. 016 / PUU-IV / 2006 on the the Corruption Eradication
Commission.
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has always upheld the values of justice, leading to justice and legal certainty, and
this is the main substance that ideally determines the decision of the ICC.81
4.5. The Discussion on the Need of Supervision for Constitutional Court
In the principle of checks and balances, every state organ has a
checking mechanism amongst them. The ICC has abolished the checking and
balancing mechanism with its judgment, cancelling the jurisdiction of the Judicial
Commission to watchdog ICC’s judges.82 The purpose of the Judicial
Commission (KY) is to support the judicial power. During the amendment of the
constitution in the MPR, Judicial Commission was to supervise the judges in the
Supreme Court.83 The development of constitutional law also implies the need to
watchdog the ICC’s judges, their role in protecting rights of citizen as the single
interpreter of the constitution. In terms of the need for supervising the ICC’s
judges, there are two points of view that can be strong reasons.
Firstly, on one hand, the constitution does not give a detailed
explanation of the judges which are referred to in the meaning of Article 24b
Clause (1) stated ... ‘to maintain and ensure the honour, dignity and behaviour of
judges’.84 On the other hand, in the Constitution Article 24 Clause (2) it is stated
that ‘The judicial power shall be implemented by a Supreme Court and judicial
bodies underneath it in the form of public courts, religious affairs courts, military
tribunals, and state administrative courts, and by a Constitutional Court’. In this
context, the word ‘judges’ mentioned in the constitution also means the ICC’s
judges.
Secondly, referring to the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution it is
stated that “The Constitutional Court shall be established at latest by 17 August
2003, and the Supreme Court shall undertake its functions before it is
established.”85 Thus, because the Supreme Court’s judges have taken on the role
as the ICC’s judges, or in other words the Supreme Court’s judges have acted as
____________
81Mariyadi Faqih, ‘Nilai-Nilai Filosofi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi yang Final dan Mengikat [The
Philosophical Values in the ICC Judgment, Final and Binding],’ (2010) 7 (3) Jurnal Konstitusi 114.82ICC’s Judgment No.005/PUU-IV/2006 on the Judicial Commission.83Mahkamah Konstitusi, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negarta
Republik Indonesia tahun 1945, Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan 1999-2002 [The
Comprehensive Text of the Amendment of 1945 Constitution] (Mahkamah konstitusi 2008) 413-
467.84Indonesian Constitution, Article 24 Clause (1).85Indonesian Constitution, Transitional Provisions Clause III.
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the ICC’s judges, therefore the ICC’s judges have also been included in the
meaning of ‘judges’ who need to be supervised.
The recent supervising mechanism for ICC’s judges is the Honorary
Council of Constitutional Court, which has two supervising bodies, namely, an
internal monitoring supervisor, and external monitoring supervisor. But this
arrangement has a crucial weakness, because it cannot supervise judges’
behaviour. The need of an independent agency supervising judges’ behaviour,
free from interference is necessary in order to uphold the honour, dignity and
behaviour of judges, in the interest of good and clean governance.
4.6. The Election Authority and its Potential of Abuse of Power
Under Act No.15 of 2011 on the General Election, the election of
provincial, district, governor, and mayoral election have been included in the
election regime. As stated in Article 1 Clause (4) that: ‘Governor and Vice-
Governor Election is the election to vote directly head of the province and also
his/her vice.86 The Act has been explicitly contradicted with the Article 22E
Clause (2) stating that General elections shall be conducted to elect the members
of the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, the
President and the Vice President, and the Regional House of Representatives.87
The implication is the delegation of authority regarding election disputes
from Supreme Court to the ICC, which has forced the ICC to share its focus
amongst jurisdictions given by the constitution, and judging in limited time for
solving provincial election disputes - that is no more than 14 days since the first
registration.
The elections task seemed a serious problem, with frequency of
elections Presidential, Governor, Mayor, DPD, DPR, DPRD/ DPRA, and DPRK.
Indonesia now consists of 34 provinces, 403 districts, and 98 cities.88 What would
happen if those provinces, districts, and cities make elections in same year,
having disputes that needed to be resolved quickly by the ICC? Off course, this
too implies overload for the ICC, and also brings the credibility of ICC judgment
into question.
____________
86The Act No.15 of 2011 on the General Election, Article 1 (2).87Indonesian Constitution, Article 22E.88Kementerian Dalam Negeri, ‘Profil Daerah’ [Region Profile], accessed 6 December 2014,
<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/pages/profil-daerah>
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In 2013, there were 178 provincial elections in Indonesia, of which more
than 90% were brought to the ICC. This means there were more than 160
provincial election disputes brought to ICC.89 If a year is 360 days, and excluding
holidays and weekend is roughly 300 days, we can say that every 2 days the ICC
has to judge 1 case of provincial election disputes. Arguing this fact, one of the
ICC’s judges stated that the delegation has made ICC looked like the election
litter.90 The ICC only has nine judges who have to handle a lot of provincial
election.
With these statistics, and this logic, quality judgement and judicial
fairness are almost impossible to achieve, creating vulnerability to the abusing of
power. The election cases had a short period of time to examine and decide the
cases. Consequently, the examination process, and the delivery of evidence, has
seemed hasty, with a short time in making legal considerations, and judges in a
hurry. Therefore, people are not satisfied with the legal reasoning and judgments
in the Provincial Election dispute.
Table 10: Provincial Election Case from 2013-2014
Source:www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPUD
____________
89Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Rekapitulasi Perkara Pengujian Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum [The
Recapitulation of the Election Disputes Cases]’, accessed 6 December 2014.
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPU>. See also Harus
Husein, Pemilu Indonesia, Fakta, Angka, Analisis, dan Studi Banding [Indonesian’s Election, Fact,
Figure, Analysis, and Comparative Studies], (Perludem 2013) 654.90Arief Hidayat, ‘MK Keranjang Sampah’ [the ICC is the Election Litter] accessed 9 September
2014,
<http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/5990/Arief-Hidayat-MK-Keranjang-Sampah>
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Besides other problems as a result of this delegation of authority,
another is that the ICC’s judgment is final and binding (first and last attempt). The
situation can be exploited by certain elements to take more advantages in the
ICC. In this circumstance, the ICC’s judges are vulnerable to abusing their power.
The President of the ICC judges was caught red-handed accepting bribes in an
election dispute cases in October 2013 (Akil’s case).91 This case can be caused
by lack of supervising body that monitoring judges behaviour.
After the Akil case, the ICC’s jurisdiction to handle provincial election
disputes was finally invalidated, and re-delegated to the Supreme Court. The ICC
returned to its previous jurisdiction mentioned in the Constitution Article 22E
Clause 2, to handle general election, chiefly the election of the members of the
House of Representatives; the Regional Representative Council; the President
and the Vice President; and the Regional House of Representatives.
The re-delegation has not solved the election problem. Responding to
the concern over Akil, the ICC President stated that the ICC judgement was valid
and legitimate, made by nine judges. The ICC President led a session in
decision-making and pronunciation of judgment. The voice of ICC judges
including president and vice-president in decision-making forum is equal.92
From my point of view, the ICC should review all its judgements during
Akil’s task as the ICC’s judge, to give back the rights of justice to the real winner
of the election dispute at that time. With this process, the injustice during Akil
could be revealed clearly to the public, and go far in healing public trust.
4.7. Conclusion
The ICC was established after the amendment of 1945 Constitution,
done for eliminating military interventions, law enforcement, human rights,
eradicating corruptions, provincial autonomy, independent press, sustaining
democratic life, and so forth. The changes have had great impact on the
Indonesian constitutional system.
____________
91Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), ‘KPK Sita Tiga Mobil Mewah Akil,’ accessed 10
September 2014
<http://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita-sub/1433-kpk-sita-tiga-mobil-mewah-akil>92Hamdan Zoelva, ‘MK Kecewa Tak Diundang Presiden’, accessed 10 September 2014
<http://www.antaranews.com/berita/399119/mk-kecewa-tak-diundang-presiden>
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As the state organ established after the amendment, the ICC has duties
and authorities to ensure the rights of Indonesian citizens before the constitution,
as the guardian and interpreter of the 1945 Constitution.
The ICC has several written powers stated in the constitution, such as
reviewing acts; determining disputes among institutions; deciding over the
dissolution of a political party; deciding over disputes on the result of general
election; and the power to impeach the president and the vice president. The ICC
has also unwritten powers which are not clearly mentioned, or not mentioned at
all in the constitution. The unwritten powers have been created by judges’
interpretation in specific circumstances.
Some powers have caused significant debate, such as with regards to
the dissolution of a political party. This power has been almost impossible to
implement after the amendment, because the rule of law system has been well
applied so far. Instead, the ICC is supposed to have a mechanism for solving
conflict inside the political party - happening quite frequently.
Another power is the handling of election disputes. This authority has a
short time limit in handling cases and numbers of justices’ are not sufficient. In
this situation, the ICC should choose a specific election, such as Presidential or
Parliamentary election, to produce a quality judgment. Lastly is the power to
impeach the President or his vice. This authority can be said to be a sleeping
power, to be very rare. This power seems to prevent the previous experience in
which the President was easily impeached through political process, instead of
judiciary process.
In its daily process, the ICC has two key role positions; the SG and
Registrar. The criticism is that the person holding the SG job has not been
changed for more than 12 years, since 2003 to 2015. The ‘unchangeble SG’ is
against the administrative law imposed in Indonesia. Also, there are no firm rule
on how the SG has to be nominated.
Cooperation with other institutions can be easily cancelled by the SG on
behalf ICC, without any consequences - as happened with several universities in
Indonesia. The teleconference facilities for the remote areas of Indonesia have
rarely functioned because there is no routine maintenance to face severe
weather conditions.
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The Registrars, who note-take during the session, have also received
public concern regarding their work. The minutes produced by the Registrars are
sometimes a blurred document which is hard to read, as frequently happened in
the election cases. Similarly, the website has late updates, making it difficult for
the media or an applicant to know the exact date for the session.
In supervision, the ICC has faced serious critics, since the ICC invalidate
the KY’s power to supervise ICC’s judges. This implies that the ICC’s judges are
untouchable, violating the basic principle of checks and balances in the 1945
Constitution. Every state institutions must have checks and balances, implies
which the need for a watchdog for the ICC including the judges. This is simply
because the ICC has a significant role in protecting rights of citizen as the single
interpreter.
Although ICC has final and binding judgment, some ICC judgments need
a serious concern and careful investigation, chiefly, the Akil’s cases. After being
found guilty on the bribery case, during handling a provincial election case, the
public have been questioning the previous Akil’s cases. There are assumptions
that during his role as the ICC judge, Akil gave victory for the wrong persons. In
contrast, the ICC so far seems reluctant to investigate the Akil’s cases.
Responding to this fact, the ICC should be appraising the ICC judgments
involving Akil. The review is important to inspect whether at a certain period of
time Akil made a verdict with the indication of bribery, or not. Therefore, it will
bring back public trust for the ICC in future. Also, this review also will give back
the rights of justice to the real winners of the election disputes, at that time, who
were unjustly taken by Akil. By this process, the injustice during Akil’s period can
be clearly discovered by the public, whilst finding new corruptors in the time of
Akil’s period. Also, this opinion would give many advantages for the ICC in the
process of healing public trust.
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CHAPTER 5 - INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ROLE
IN THE LAW REFORM
5.1. Introduction
Indonesia has become the 78th country in the world to establish
constitutional courts. The 13th August, 2003, was the day on which the
Act number 24 of 2003 was validated, and pronounced the birth of the
Constitutional Court of Indonesia. Following the validation of the Act,
proposing institutions the House of Representatives, the President, and
the Supreme Court, recruited their constitutional judge candidates. After
going through the selection phases as regulated by the mechanism that
applies in their respective institutions, the House of Representatives, the
President, and the Supreme Court nominate nine constitution judge
candidates to be proposed to the President, and then inaugurated as the
constitution judges.
The philosophical reason for establishing the ICC is for
supervising a law process. Act making is principally a parliamentary
process, related closely to political bargaining or the majority domination,
which potentially bring legal inconsistency to the 1945 Constitution. For
this reason, most Indonesian scholars are fully aware, that judges have to
be involved throughout the process of democracy and law reform - chiefly
to protect the constitution in general.
Therefore, the ICC has developed as one of main tools of
democratic reforms agents. It has sheltered the state of the country’s
other key political and judicial institutions. Whilst the ICC has pushed the
democratic reform agenda headlong, the government, parliament, and
other organs of the legal system have hindered further political
transformation.1 In observation of this fact, Horowitz has noted that in law,
as in life, what is mundane is often more essential than what is
____________
1Stephen Sherlock, ‘The Parliament in Indonesia's Decade of Democracy: People's Forum
or Chamber of Cronies,’ (2010) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections,
Institutions and Society 160-178.
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exceptional.2 In other words, the emphasis on constitutional judgement
should not be confused from the task of associating a country’s routine
political and legal organ practices.
Thus, one of the key actors in law reform through the judiciary
process is the judges. Constitutional judges possess broad powers to
govern, in conjunction with other state officials, by virtue of an explicit act
of delegation. In the terminology of delegation theory, constitutional courts
are the agents. These courts, when considered as functional solutions to
the mixed dilemmas of contracting and commitment, appear to conform,
paradigmatically, as it were, to the delegation theorist’s preferred logic of
institutional design.3
5.2. The Procedures of Selecting Judges
As one of the holders of judicial power, the ICC is required to be
an independent institution, free from the influence of other powers, as it
has been stated in Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the ICC
judges are required to be selected from the group of constitutional law
experts, who are outstanding persons in the field of state administration
and politics in Indonesia, as well as being independent from the political
practices, and its influences. It is commonly known, between the law and
politics it is difficult to draw a clear line, especially in the Indonesian legal
system.4 Therefore, in the context of being ICC judges, they have to
personally free themselves from any political interest.
The procedures for the election of ICC judges have been clearly
regulated in Article 24C Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution; namely,
"The Constitutional Court comprises of nine members of
constitutional judges assigned by the President, each three of
them are represented by the Supreme Court, the House of
Representatives, and by the President."
____________
2Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers,’ (2006) 17 (4)
Journal of Democracy 135.3Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy,’ (2002) 25 (1)
West European Politics 1.4Moh.Mahfud, Politik Hukum di Indonesia [The Politics of Law in Indonesia] (LP3S 1998).
7-14.
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It is further confirmed in the same chapter (4) of the constitution
stating that
(1) The Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Constitutional Court
judges are elected from and by the Constitutional Court.
(2) The constitutional judges must own un-despicable integrities and
personalities, being righteous statesmen who can control the
constitution and the statehood, and do not concurrently hold the
position of government officers.
(3) Matters pertaining the appointment and dismissal of constitutional
judges, procedural law and other provisions of the Constitutional
Court shall be regulated by law.
The legal basis for the appointment of ICC judges is further
stipulated in the act, namely Article 4 Paragraph (5) of the Act No. 24 of
2003 on the ICC, as amended by the Act No. 4 of 2014 as Article 4 of the
Act No. 24 of 2003 on the ICC, which stated that
(1) The Constitutional Court consists of nine (9) members of the
constitutional judges set by the Presidential Decree.
(2) The composition of the Constitutional Court shall consist of a
Chairman and member, a Vice Chairman and member, and seven
(7) members of the constitutional judges.
(3) The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are elected from and by the
constitutional judges for a term of three (3) years.
(4) Prior to the election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Constitutional Court as referred to in paragraph (3), the election
meeting is led by the oldest judges.
(5) The procedure of election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman as
referred to in paragraph (3) shall be regulated further by the
Constitutional Court.
Historically, it can be observed that the changing of the Act No. 24
of 2003 conducted twice and lastly with the passage of the Act No. 4 of
2014, cannot be separated from the internal problems. It has occurred
within the ICC, whereas there are some ICC judges violating the ethical
code of the judges, snagging into criminal cases.5 Therefore, the
government, in this case the President and the House of Representative,
has agreed to amend the ICC’s act by focusing on strengthening the
requirements procedures of ICC judges. This is confirmed in the preamble
considering; namely,
____________
5Zihan Syahayani, "Pembaharuan Hukum Dalam Sistem Seleksi Dan Pengawasan Hakim
Konstitusi [Legal Reform in the System Selection and Supervision Constitutional Justice],
(2014) 1 (1) Jurnal Mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum 4-5.
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To preserved the democracy and the laws of Indonesia and to restore
public confidence and trust toward the Constitutional Court as a state
institution performing the function of enforcing the Constitution, the
President has set the Government Regulation in Law No. 1 of 2013 on
the Second Amendment Act number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional
Court, particularly the provisions regarding the requirements and
procedures of selection, election, and proposing of candidate of
constitutional judges and the establishment of the chamber of honour
of constitutional judges.6
Article 15 Paragraph (1) of Act No. 4 of 2014 states the
requirements of the ICC judges are
a. owning un-despicable integrities and personalities
b. be righteous; and
c. statesmen who master constitution and statesmanship.7
The concept of the statesman was developed concurrently since
the development of state discussion, one of them was Plato’s view. He
said that to govern requires special abilities possessed only by the
statesman; who has the ability to organize the fair and good and the
interests of citizens.8
A statesman grammatically can be defined as a person having
knowledge and expertise of state administration, considerable field
experience, and a commitment to implement and oversee the state of life
in accordance with the constitution corridor. A statesman can also be
interpreted as a highly visionary person, long-term oriented, prioritizing the
welfare of society, able to apply egalitarian fairness and protection for all
components of the nation.9
In the context of the ICC, a statesman has a meaning as someone
who has been separated from the interests of individuals and political
____________
6Letter b of the Act No. 4 of 2014 on the Second Amendment of the Act No. 24 of 2003 on
the ICC.7Ibid, see also the Article 15.8Hamid Behzadi, ‘State and Ruler in Plato and Machiavelli,’ (1977) Pakistan Horizon 5-22.9Janedjri M Gaffar, Hakim Konstitusi dan Negarawan [The Constitutional Judge and the
Statemen], accessed 4 March 2015,
<http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=10544&coid=3&caid=21&gid=2>
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groups. The interests of the nation and the state are the main
orientation.10
The ICC judges consist of nine persons representing the three
branches of state power, namely, the President, the Parliament and the
Supreme Court. The three branches of power can choose three
candidates before the ICC judges are officially assigned by the President.
Those judges must pass through a due diligence review in the trial panel
of experts. Meanwhile, the expert panel is formed by the Judicial
Commission.11
At the time when the candidates of the ICC judges have declared
that they have passed the fit and proper test of the expert panel, they can
be declared as the ICC judges by the President as the head of state. The
nine ICC judges, who have been determined by the President, can further
define and specify the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the ICC.
The determination of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the
ICC is done as has been stipulated in the ICC Regulation No. 3 of 2013
on Procedures and Election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the ICC.
The Election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the ICC is organized
through plenary meeting of the judges’.12 Each of the representatives of
judges in the meeting has the right to elect and to being elected the
Chairman and Vice-chairman of the ICC.13
The decision making in the election of Chairman and Vice-
Chairman can be organized through a closed meeting.14 If a conclusion
cannot be reached, balloting is allowed, and the vote is from the judges
themselves.15
____________
10Janejri M.Gaffar, ‘Demokrasi dan Kepatutahan’ [Democracy and The Compliance],’
(2014) 91 Majalah Mahkamah Konstitusi 75.11The ICC judges must go through a fit and proper test conducted by the expert panel,
before legally appointed by the President. See also the Article 18A and 18B of the Act
No.4 of 2014 on the Amendment of ICC.12See also the Article 1 (5) The ICC Regulation Regulation No. 3 of 2013 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results Members of the Board of Parliament, Regional
Representatives Council, and the Regional Parliament Council.13Ibid, see Article 2 (3).14Ibid, see Article 5 (1).15Ibid, see Article 5 (2).
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In the future, the selection process of the ICC judges must have a
fixed standard in the procedures and process. The recruitment of the ICC
judges has to look at the roles, functions, and duties of the judges, who
are the most influential persons to the nation in terms of constitution.
5.3. The ICC under Five Presidents
The composition of the ICC that consists of nine judges is likely to
affect the kind of discourse that the court generates. The court will
construct a jurisprudence that mediates between different spheres of
knowledge. Its discourse will be relatively autonomous and different from,
what Comella mentioned the more legalistic kind of reasoning which one
could expect from ordinary judges, especially in civil-law countries, as well
as from purely political discourse.16
To put it in a rather simplified manner, the professors on the court
will tend to be more philosophical, governmental officials will be more
sensitive to policy considerations, former politicians will have insights into
what is feasible for the court to do given the existing political climate, and
judges will bring their expertise in more technical ordinary law.
The Constitution 1945 lays down the very high qualifications for a
person to be a judge for the ICC, in which he or she should have a noble
and dignified personality, be fair and be a statesman with a great mastery
of the constitution and the governance administration. The position is
open to personalities with academic and politics backgrounds provided
they are wise, and not partisan. The qualifications required by the
constitution should be carefully considered by the House of
Representatives, the President, and the Supreme Court in nominating
their delegated candidates for the Constitution Judges.17
Since 2003 to October 2015, the ICC has been headed by five
ICC’s presidents with a variety of educational and political backgrounds.
The president, having a political background has normally faced more
critics in terms of impartiality. In contrast, the academicians, in some
____________
16Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts & Democratic Values A European
Perspective (Yale University 2009) 45-46.17The Act Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia.
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situations, have received minor criticisms. The academicians have been
criticised because of using more philosophical approach rather than the
clear text of the constitution.
The glory periods of the ICC were about 2008 – 2013. In that time
the ICC made significant breakthrough in Indonesian law reform, such as
in 2009 by allowing unregistered-voters to vote based on their identity
cards as replacing the Election Commission’s card. The gloomy eras were
in 2013 – 2014. This was because the ICC president was caught-red-
handed in a bribery case. In that period, the ICC’s dignity reached its
nadir. Even the ICC session was interrupted easily, and riot within the
session happened frequently. Nowadays, the ICC has been in the process
of building public trust to regain its previous glory. Below, will be briefly
explained the characteristics of the ICC judges under five leaders.
Table 11: The ICC President from 2003 to 2017
Source: http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id
5.3.1. Jimly Asshiddiqie
He is the constitutional law professor from the University of
Indonesia who is known for his strong academic background, calm and
can control his emotion. Similarly, he is recognized as one of the key
persons underpinning the foundation of the ICC, and led from 19 August,
2003 until 19 August, 2008, accompanied by his vice Mohammad Laica
Marzuki.18 Jimly was known as the person longest holding the position of
ICC president.
Under his leadership the ICC became a respected court. The
ICC’s judgements could be easily downloaded directly through the ICC
____________
18Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Mantan Hakim Konstitusi,’ accessed 23 December 2014,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.HakimLain&id=>
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website shortly after the judgement had been read. In terms of
bureaucracy and finance, the Audit Board also expresses the honourable
award for the financial statements of the Court.19 The debate on
constitutional law in this period was very exciting, especially when the ICC
made controversial judgements, such as the case Ultra Petita on the Act
of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Electrical Power.
At that time, although there were some issues about the possibility
of deviant practice, most people still saw the ICC as one of the most
transparent and authoritative court in Indonesia, with an established
record of independent rulings, such as the landmark 2007 decision to
inversion denouncement related articles of the penal code.20 Other state
organs which are still publicly trusted are the Anticorruption Court and the
Corruption Eradication Commission.
At the beginning of his leadership period, the ICC was much closer
to the basic idea of constitutional courts as the negative legislator
introduced by Kelsen. In this time the ICC only invalidated the basic norm
in the provisions, which indicated against the 1945 Constitution, and then
sent to the parliament to make some changes. However, this basic idea
was changed, when the ICC judged several controversial judgements.
One of the crucial judgements was the judgement about the invalidation of
the Judicial Commission’s role in supervising the ICC’s judges.21
Another debatable judgement in the time of Jimly, was about the
former communist party member. As is publicly known, Indonesia had a
miserable experience regarding the communist party. A lot of innocent
people, mostly Muslim, were brutally killed by members of the communist
party.22 From that experience, Indonesia has banned permanently all
communist activity, and all of their members from involvement in political
____________
19BPK (The Audit Board), ‘BPK Menyerahkan Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan
Keuangan Tahun 2013 Kepada 37 Kementerian/Lembaga, ’ accessed 14 November 2014.
<http://www.bpk.go.id/news/bpk-menyerahkan-laporan-hasil-pemeriksaan-atas-laporan-
keuangan-tahun-2013-kepada-37-kementerianlembaga>20Arch Puddington, and Aili Piano. Freedom in the World 2009: The Annual Survey of
Political Rights & Civil Liberties (Freedom House 2009) 337.21ICC’s Judgment No.005/PUU-IV/2006 on the Judicial Commission.22Robert Cribb,’Genocide in Indonesia 1965‐1966,’ (2001) 3 (2) Journal of Genocide
Research 219-239.
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activity. The ICC, under Jimly, conversely, restored the political rights of
those former communist party members, to become a political contestant,
and giving a voting right in elections.
The restriction of communist party to involve in any political
activities had clearly been mentioned in the Act of Election, Article 60 (g)
which stated that former member of the banned Communist Party of
Indonesia, including its mass organizations, or not a person who is directly
or indirectly involved in the G30S / PKI or other banned organizations.
The ICC’s judges have given their opinion on the Article, saying that the
article was not relevant to the purposes of national reconciliation for the
nation of Indonesia. However the majority of the Indonesian population
stressed that the involvement of the Communist Party, and their mass
organisations, in the tragedy of the G30S/PKI in 1965 was a crimes
against humanity.23
5.3.2. Moh. Mahfud MD
Moh. Mahfud MD is the professor of constitutional law and politics
at the Indonesian Islamic University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He has a
strong academic background, combining law and politics. His previous
experience as parliament member and ministry give him credit point to
become the ICC judge. Mahfud led the ICC from 19 August 2008 until 3
April 2013, accompanied by his vice Achmad Sodiki.24 In this period,
Mahfud was only following and strengthening the success story of the ICC
which had already been designed in the time of Jimly.
Influenced by his previous experience as a politician, who tended
to speak to media, he easily commented on the cases judged by the ICC.
Sometime he was commenting on matters which did not related to the
ICC, such as the Suprem Court’s judgement on death penalty and drug
dealers.25 In contrast, the ICC judge is restricted ethically to comment only
____________
23ICC’s Judgment No. 011/PUU-I/2003 on the Act of Election.24Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Mantan Hakim Konstitusi, accessed 23 December 2014,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.HakimLain&id=>25 Waspada, Mafia Narkoba Dibalik Dinding Istana [Drug Mafia Behind the Palace Wall],
accessed 17 November 2014,
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upon his own judgement when speaking to the public. Also, in the time of
Mahfud, the ICC undertook several controversy judgements. Even, at
times, the ICC bravely decided a breakthrough in a few crucial
judgements, even must invalidate some articles in an act.
An example is the judicial review of the Employment Act.
According to ICC, the rules for outsourced workers (providers of
employment services) in the act, namely Article 65 paragraph (7) and
Article 66 paragraph (2), b is considered unconstitutional, if it does not
guarantee the rights of workers, thus violating the constitution. On this
case the ICC stated that the Act does not have a binding force, if the
employment agreement is not required the transfer of rights protection for
workers or labourers.26
Another controversial judgement was the judicial review of the Act
Number 49 of the State Receivables Affairs Committee, Article 4, 8, and
12. In this judgement, Mahfud and the judges annulled the terminology of
‘state agencies’ stated in the Act. The ICC stated that the state’s bills
receivable is simply an amount of money that must be paid to the central
government and/ or local governments; whilst receivables owned by state-
owned enterprises are not included in the state accounts.27
Therefore, it is not compulsory for the state to pay the debt of the
national company. With this judgement, the completion of state bank
accounts is no longer borne by the state, because the settlement
mechanisms have been submitted to the respective state banks.
Receivables state-owned banks can be resolved solely by the
management of each state-owned bank, based on the principles of
fairness.28
In the Mahfud era, the ICC had not specifically annulled or
invalidated all over an act. But he intervened the parliament jurisdictions
by fixing and editing text of in act. Even he made his own judgement
____________
<http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267637:mafia
-narkoba-di-balik-dinding-istana&catid=59:kriminal-a-hukum&Itemid=91>26ICC’s Judgment No. 100/PUU-X/2012, on the Employment Act.27ICC’s Judgment No. 77/PUU-IX/2011, on the State Receivables Affairs Committee.28ICC’s Judgment No. 77/PUU-IX/2011, on the State Receivables Affairs Committee
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format, which did not exist before in the ICC’s judgement, or before other
acts.
Those judgement formats are: firstly is the conditionally
constitutional. This judgement states that an act provision is not
contradicted to the constitution. But the ICC makes a condition to state
institution to implement act provision based on the ICC’s interpretation,
especially on the constitutionality of an act provision. Secondly is the
conditionally unconstitutional. This judgement states that an act provision
is contradicted with the ICC, if it does not fulfil the requirement stated in
the ICC’s judgement. 29
5.3.3. Akil Mochtar
Akil Mochtar is widely known as a member of a political party. In
contrast, his background is very different from the previous leaders as
academician. His extended process for next period of the ICC judge has
created a serius controversy.30 He was recognized as the election case
specialist, because of his concern over the election disputes, chiefly
provincial and district elections. Because of the bribery case, Akil led the
ICC for the shortest period - only six months, between 3 April, 2013, and 5
October, 2013. His vice-president in that time was Hamdan Zoelva.31
The corruption indication by Akil was detected since 2010. The
Mayor of Simalungun District admitted to having asked the cost of winning
the case to be giving for the ICC’s judge in April 2010. Knowing the
extortion, the Mayor’s solicitor rejected giving the cost of winning for the
ICC judge, and he then published the awkwardness to a broadsheet
newspaper.32 Responding to the article and ensuring public trust, the ICC
____________
29ICC’s Judgment No.072-073/ PUU-II/ 2004, ICC’s Judgment No. 5/PUU-V/2007, ICC’s
Judgment No. 102/PUU-VII/2009. ICC’s Judgment No.01/PUU-VIII/2010, ICC’s Judgment
No.65/PUU-VIII/ 2010.30Martin Hutabarat, ‘Memang Ada Kejanggalan dalam Perpanjangan Masa Jabatan Akil
Mochtar’ [Indeed There is irregularity in the Extension Term Akil Mochtar], accessed 13
October 2014
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/14/1426485/.Memang.Ada.Kejanggalan.dalam.
Perpanjangan.Masa.Jabatan.Akil.Mochtar>31Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Mantan Hakim Konstitusi, accessed 23 December 2014,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.HakimLain&id=>32Refly Harun, ‘MK Masih Bersih’ [Is MK still Clean?], accessed 19 November 2014
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had an independent investigation unit seek the indication of bribery. After
a few months’ work, unfortunately, the ICC could not find strong evidence
of Akil involvement in several cases.
During 2010 and 2013, the Corruption Eradication Commission
found several occasions of awkwardness in provincial and district
elections, specifically, the session under Akil - such as making lots of
jokes in the session; wasting time in examining witnesses; not being
concerned about checking a voted letter, even tending to ignore it;
controlling the election cases under his authority; and so forth.33
Unfortunately, Akil was not clever enough to hide his actions from the
Corruption Eradication Commission. On 2 October, 2013, he was caught
red-handed whilst accepting a bribe from the case of a district election
dispute.34
The Honorary Council of the ICC officially dismissed Akil Mochtar
with no respect for his position as a constitutional judge. Akil was
considered deviant in deciding local election disputes during his period.
He was also proven on deciding a case with a bias to one party only.35
From this case, it seemed that Akil decided a case only partially, and was
also proven to have received funding from litigants. In fact, according to
the code of ethics, the ICC’s judges and their families are prohibited from
asking for gifts or loans from the parties litigate.36
After Akil’s case, most people who ever had a case under Akil
have been asking about the validity of Akil’s judgement, and whether the
judgement needs to be reviewed or annulled. Answering their anxiety,
Harjono, one of the ICC judges, stated that all of the ICC judgements are
____________
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/03/0837290/Melihat.Lagi.Catatan.Refly.Harun.
MK.Masih.Bersih>33KPK, ‘Akil Mochtar Terjerat Dua Sengketa Pilkada’ [Akil Moctar Entangled Two Election
Disputes], accessed 19 November 2014,
<http://www.kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita-sub/1422-akil-mochtar-terjerat-suap-dua-sengketa-
pilkada>34Ibid.35Harjono, ‘Semua Putusan MK Dinilai Bermasalah’ [All of ICC’s Judgments Accessed
Troubled] , accessed 19 November 2014,
‘<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/02/063526682/Semua-Putusan-Akil-Mochtar-
Dinilai-Bermasalah>36The ICC Regulation Number 02/PMK/2003 on the Code of Conduct and Ethics of ICC
Judges, Article 3.
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valid, and will not be annulled or reviewed. Harjono also insisted that the
Akil’s case is in police domain that not affecting the ICC judgements.37
Regarding Akil’s judgements, the researcher personally has a
contrasting point of view. The ICC must recheck the judgements made
under Akil. The rechecking process is needed for several purposes:
specifically, to foster public trust; to identify the indication of corruption in
other cases and catching other suspect; to give election justice to the right
persons; and most importantly restores the dignity of the ICC, which is
known as the trusted court in Indonesia post reformation era. Unveiling
Akil’s judgements are same like covering a time bomb which can be
explode at any time.
5.3.4. Hamdan Zoelva
Hamdan Zoelva is broadly recognized as a member of a political
party, who led the ICC from 1 November, 2013, until 2015, accompanied
by his vice Arief Hidayat. Personally, Hamdan was known as a calm
person who was also straight to the point in session process, chiefly, in
checking the witnesses.
He replaced Akil Mochtar, who left the position due to the bribery
case. The Zoelva’s period was known as the decline of ICC. The public,
generally, no longer trusted the institution. Zoelva was in a difficult
position at that time, because he faced the daunting task of restoring
public trust in the ICC after the Akil’s case. 38
In the time of Jimly, the ICC departed from zero. In contrast, in
the time of Zoelva, who currently leads, the ICC set out below zero. The
ICC is in the most difficult position to restore public trust. The riot, which
can be identified as a contempt of court, frequently happened in the ICC
____________
37Harjono, ‘Semua Putusan MK Dinilai Bermasalah’ [All of ICC’s Judgments Accessed
Troubled] , accessed 19 November 2014,
‘<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/02/063526682/Semua-Putusan-Akil-Mochtar-
Dinilai-Bermasalah>38Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Profil Dr. Hamdan Zoelva, S.H., M.H’, accessed 23 December
2014,  <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilHakim&id=659>
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session room after the reading of judgements.39 Previously, this had never
happened – either before, during, or at the time of Jimly and Mahfud;
because during those times the ICC was very authoritative and also
respected.
Currently, the ICC has gradually begun to restore public trust. It
has started with the success record in resolving election disputes in 2014.
The election was a crucial test for the ICC. Fortunately, the ICC has able
passed the test with fair and trusted tribunal system.
In improving public trust, Hamdan has made a significant
upgrading to the ICC. Every case and its judgement in the ICC can be
accessed easily on the ICC’s website after the judges read it; this is one
of the applications of public transparency on the court. The public can
always access the information and monitor the performance of ICC’s
judges. In the form of public scrutiny of the ICC, universities can also play
a significant role in supporting the daily work of the ICC. Also, a number
of models of justice in the ICC have been derived from the contributions of
academicians.
For the eleven years of the ICC establishment, several
universities have played an important role for the ICC. At the beginning of
the establishment of the ICC, Jimly successfully led the ICC as a
respected institution, and throughout the leadership period of Mahfud, the
ICC was increasingly powerful and respected. The position of the ICC was
in a stronger place because the ICC had managed to fulfil the mandate to
be one of the trusted institutions at that time.
Hamdan’s term of office finished in January 2015, moreover,
many critics asked him to resign from the post of judge. As mentioned by
Erwin, under Hamdan the ICC was considered to lack transparency, and
provided inconsistent court decisions. For instance, the ICC’s judgement
____________
39Patrialis Akbar, ‘MK: Kerusuhan Sidang MK Bentuk Contempt of Court’, accessed 20
November 2014, < http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5284f162198a3/mk--
kerusuhan-sidang-mk-bentuk-icontempt-of-court-i>
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has limited the Judicial Commission’s authorities to probe the ICC’s
judges who violating the code of ethics of the ICC.40
5.3.5. Arief Hidayat
Arief Hidayat is publicly known as the environmental law professor
in the University of Diponegoro. So far, he is recognised as the only ICC
president who does not have a previous political background, or
associated with any political party. He was elected by nine ICC judges on
7 January, 2015, as the ICC President until 6 January, 2017.41 Current
elected president has future hard work. His presidency period has
significat task to heal and rapidly restore the public trust and honour,
which were tarnished by the Akil’s bribery case.
One of the popular cases in his first year presidency was the circle
process of the parliament members, who allegedly were suspected of
breaking the law. The ICC made the judgement that the green light of
investigating the parliament members must be given by the Honorary
Council Board, instead of the President who can delegate his authorities
for chief of police. This implies that the suspect might be innocent with the
political approach. Thus, the Honorary Council Board is dominantly ruled
by the number of political members that do not want their members will be
found guilty.42
Moreover, ICC judges are expected to come from backgrounds of
constitutional law, public law, or administration law. In contrast, Arief
academic background is in environmental law. Thus people have asked
an essential question on his capability. Only a few of his publications have
indirectly related to the matter of constitutional law. Similarly, his sense of
____________
40Erwin Natosmal Oemar, ‘Hamdan Zoelva Tak Layak Dipilih Kembali Jadi Ketua MK
[Hamdan Zoelva Not Eligible To Be Re-selected as the Chief Justice
],’ accessed 20 November 2014,
<http://m.jurnas.com/news/157591/Hamdan-Zoelva-Tak-Layak-Dipilih-Kembali-Jadi-
Ketua-MK--2014/1/News/Hukum/>41Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Profil Arief Hidayat [The Profile of Arief Hidayat],’ accessed 7
October 2015.
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilHakim&id=669>42See also the ICC’ Judgment No.76/PUU-XII/2014 on the Parliament Members.
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humour is sometimes publicly misplaced. He apologized for his mistakes
of satirizing the GP profession.43
5.4. The ICC Role in Law Reform in Indonesia
The establishment of the ICC has also projected to provide law
reform to overcome problems relating to the outcome of general elections
- which has been recognized as the main pillar in a modern democratic
system. In other words, judges must be involved in political dispute, or
rather, unleashing the political without the dispute mechanism.
Regarding law reform in election disputes, if there are differences
of opinion regarding the count of votes amongst the electorate with the
organizer of a general election, the ICC will act as the first and final court
in order to provide a final binding judgement. Through a justice
mechanism of this style, the deviation of view concerning the product of
an election will not turn into a political conflict, rather, it is managed
objectively and rationally as a law related dispute, which must also be
established legitimately.
5.4.1. Reforming the Legacy of Dutch Colonial
In reforming the legacy of Dutch colonial, the ICC has made
several significant points, including amending the Criminal Act. It was
inherited by the Dutch since 1 January 1918.44 The Act previously
impressed as the sacred act which was forbidden from review. Generally,
the clauses and articles in the act have been easily interpreted by the
____________
43In the seminar held by University of Diponegoro on 29 November 2013, with the title
Dekonstruksi dan Gerakan Pemikiran Hukum Progresif [Deconstruction and the movement
of progressive legal thought], he made a joke statement that the mechanic is more difficult
than the GP, if a mechanic  fails, he will be unpaid. However if a GP fails to remedy or
even a patient pass away, he will still pay with huge amount of money. Because the GP
can say this is the God’s destiny, We have done our best! This joke statement received
critics from GP association stated that the ICC judges have supposed to be a polite person
not making a degraded joke. See also Widodo Judarwanto, ,’Pantas MK Terpuruk,
Hakimnya Tidak Beretika dan Tidak Bijaksana [The ICC deserve slumped, the Judges
Have Not Ethical and Unwise],’ accessed 7 October 2015,
<http://www.kompasiana.com/sandiazyudhasmara/pantas-mk-terpuruk-hakimnya-tidak-
beretika-dan-tidak-bijaksana_55290157f17e6126268b4670>44Ahmad Bahiej, ‘Sejarah Pembentukan KUHP, Sistematika KUHP, dan Usaha Untuk
Pembaharuan Hukum Pidana Indonesia’ [History of the Formation of the Criminal Code,
the Criminal Code Systematics, and Effort To Reform Criminal Law Indonesia]
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government for general purposes, such as, activist detention and holding
other political prisoners.
Indeed, in terms of the Criminal Act, the ICC has decided some
crucial judgements, which have also caused controversy amongst criminal
law experts. Those judgements are: firstly, the reviewing article on
insulting the President or Vice-President. The ICC has clearly found that
the articles were the colonial’s articles, used to convict people of colonies
in a very easy way, including charging for insulting the power holder
during that time. Therefore, the people could be intimidated and
humiliated; and arranged their lives so as to not go against the power
holder.45
The ICC’s judges also stated that those articles may create legal
uncertainty because of susceptibility to the interpretation of whether a
protest, statement, or opinions are an insult or criticism of the President
and/or Vice President. Similarly, the articles hampered the rights of
thoughts expressed either orally or written such as demonstration on the
public space.46
Secondly, was reviewing the article regarding criminal offense
expressed feelings of hostility, hatred, or humiliation in public against the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The ICC has the opinion that
the offense norms in the articles were the formal offense, giving rise to a
tendency of abuse of power, as they could easily be interpreted according
to the will of the power holder. Also, those articles can be said to be
irrational; because a citizen of an independent and sovereign state, could
not be hostile to the state and his own government - which is independent
and sovereign. In the same way, a citizen intending to express criticism or
opinions of the government, which is a constitutional right guaranteed by
the Constitution 1945, could be easily qualified by the authorities as
statements of feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt.47
____________
45ICC’s Judgment No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 on The Insulting President and Vice-
President, Article 134, 136, and 137.46Ibid.47ICC’s Judgment No. 6/PUU-V/2007 on The Criminal Offense Expressed Feelings of
Hostility, Hatred, or Humiliation in Public Against the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia, Article 154 and 155.
101
Thirdly was the review of Article 160 on the crime of incitement.
The judges stated that the legal value protected in the article is to provide
legal protection to the public from acts that incite another person to
commit a criminal act, incite people to commit violence against public
authorities, and protect from those who disobey the law or positions of
command. Therefore it must be the consequences arising from such
incitement, and then the criminal offense can be implemented.48
5.4.2. Reforming Natural Resource Acts
In reforming natural resource acts, the ICC has also played a
substantial part. Several acts were reviewed because of contradiction with
the constitutional spirit, those acts are; namely,
Firstly, the Act Number 4 of 2009 on the Mineral Mining and Coal
was reviewed four times. It could be understood that this act has a
significant impact on the economic perspective. The mining issue is not
only an energy issue, but could also be a business issue. The national
and multinational corporations have their own interest in minerals and coal
energy. Therefore, the state has to have a protective mechanism, in
handling energy security, such as the Act on Mineral Mining and Coal.
The four-time reviews have different concerns. On the first
review, applied by WALHI, the ICC annulled the Article 10 (b), because
the norms in the article cannot protect people living within the mining area.
In the decision, the court asserted that the act should protect, respect, and
fulfil the interests of people whose area and land ownership will be
occupied in the mining area, and the people affected by the impact of
mining.49
On the second review, the court annulled the Article 22 (e/f), 55
(1) & 61 (1), which asserts about the area of exploration. The court also
annulled the Article 51, 60, and Article 75 (4), which asserted about the
bidding process.50 Lastly, the court annulled and revised the Article 6 (1e),
____________
48ICC’s Judgment No. 7/PUU-VII/2009 on the Crime of Incitement.49ICC’s Judgment No. 32/PUU-VIII/2010.50ICC’s Judgment No.30/PUU-VIII/2010. The Court stated that those article is
unconstitutional, because the mechanism process in the bidding and the exploration do
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Article 9 (2), Article 14 (1), and Article 17. Those articles had unclear
meaning about the authority of giving permission for exploration, whether
it is the regional authority or belongs to central government. So, in this
decision, the court stated that provincial level does not have authority to
issue the permission for the exploration.51
Secondly, is the judicial review of the Act Number 22 of 2001 on
the Oil and Earth Gas. The ICC has significantly made other
breakthroughs in protecting energy security, most importantly, the
annulment of some articles in the Act Number 22 of 2001 on the Oil and
Earth Gas. One of the court’s reasons in the act is that the function of the
Executive Organ (Badan Pelaksana) in the act is against the constitution.
Consequently, the function of the Executive Organ reduced stated role, in
ensuring and controlling the distribution of the oil and gas, which could
have a deep impact on providing energy security in Indonesia.52
On its judgement, the ICC explained that the act was
unconstitutional and did not have a binding power. The court asserted
that the act had openly liberated the oil and gas management, due to
influence by foreign parties. The unbundling53 method, separating upper
course and lower course, indicated that foreign parties want to split
national industry on oil and gas, so it is could easily occupy the oil and
gas industry in Indonesia.
Lastly, is the judicial review of the Act Number 20 of 2002 on the
Electrical Power. The ICC annulled entire act, and asserted that the act is
unconstitutional. The act mentioned that electrical power was a
commodity which can be competitively increased in price. With this
concept, the ICC’s judges asserted, that the state does not have full
control to enhance the benefit of electricity for the people’s needs,
____________
not guarantee the rights of citizen. See also Indonesia, ICC’s Judgment No.25/PUU-
VIII/2010.51ICC’s Judgment No.10/PUU-X/2012.52ICC’s Judgment No. 36/PUU-X/2012. See also ICC’s Judgment No.002/PUU-I/2003.53Unbundling is to sell related products and services separately, rather than as one unit.
See also MacMilllan Education, MacMillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners
(Macmillan Publishers 2007) 1622.
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because the price might be controlled by the market and private sector.54
The act is very dangerous on protecting energy security, because the
natural resources will not fully not belong to the state. Likewise, the 1945
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, in the Article 33 (2) implies that
sectors of production, which are important for the country and affect the
life of people, shall be under the powers of the state.
The annulment of the Act Number 20 of 2002 on the Electrical
Power, consequently, influenced on law certainty. Owing to this situation,
the government had to refer to the previous act, the Act Number 15 of
1985 on the Electrical Power, whilst the House of Representatives had
been reviewing the new act.
5.5. Questioning in the ICC Judgements
As mentioned in the constitution, the ICC’s judgement is final and
binding.55 This means that the ICC judgement has a permanent legal
force whilst read at the ICC trial. The court judgement having a final
binding also has a legal force and legal binding - to be implemented as
soon as possible. However, in practice, the main problem for ICC
judgements is the power to execute the judgement.
In contrast to ordinary court ruling, which is only binding on the
parties, the ICC judgements are binding all components of the nation
including state institutions and also citizens. The judicial review case tests
abstract norms (having multi interpretation) existed in an act. To have
legal interpretation and final binding, abstract norms must be tested
through judicial review process in the ICC. Although the basis of a petition
is because the presence of the applicant's constitutional rights has been
harmed, the real action is to represent the legal interests of the nation or
community as a whole by the enforcement of the constitution.
The ICC’s judgement is binding entire state elements. The
parties relate with the implementation of act, must implement the
____________
54ICC’s Judgment No.001-021-022/PUU-I/2003. See also, Ida Bagus Radendra Suastama,
‘Asas Hukum Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Undang-Undang Migas dan
Ketenaga Listrikan [Principles of Law Constitutional Court Judgment on Oil and Gas Law
and electricity power],’ (2012) 24 (2) Mimbar Hukum 187- 375.55Indonesian Constitution, Article 24C (1).
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judgement. The norms in act have integrated system in the judgement
implementation. It has to pass through certain stages, depending on a
substance of judgement. Some of them can be implemented immediately
without making new rules or changes. But other judgements require
further adjustment in advance such as needing any supported decrees.
Thus, the immediate implementation is impossible. Based on these kinds
of judgements, the ICC judgements can be separated into two categories;
namely, (1) Hard Judgements; and (2) Soft Judgements. These
categories will be elucidated briefly below.
5.5.1. Hard Judgements
The hard judgement can be defined as a judgement annulling
certain norms which are not disturbing the existing norm system, and also
do not require further adjustment. This judgement can be immediately
implemented after being declared by the judges. This kind of judgement
can be examined in several ICC judgements. In reviewing the Election
Act, the ICC annulled the Article 60 in letter g.56 This article stated the
disallowance of the persons in realtion to elections who was directly or
indirectly involved in the communist party—which existed in Indonesia
during 1965—or any other organizations banned in Indonesia.
In this regard, the ICC has the point of view that the article denied
the rights of citizens, and discriminated on the basis of political beliefs.
The 1945 Constitution did not justify discrimination based on differences
of religion, race, ethnic group, class social status, economic status,
gender, language, and also political beliefs.
In the same way, the hard judgement has also been found in the
case of reviewing the Criminal Act, which was the legacy of the Dutch
colonial.57 The act was reviewed several times, producing the annulment
of some articles, such as Article 134, 136bis, and 137. Since the
judgement declared by ICC, no one can be convicted based on those
articles. Even police cannot use the articles as a basic inquiry of
____________
56ICC’s Judgment Number. 011-017/PUU-I/2003 on the Former Member Communist Party.57ICC’s Judgment No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 on the Insulting President and Vice-
President, Article 134, 136, and 137.
105
investigation, and the prosecution by the prosecutor. The judgement has
to be applied immediately, even though the Criminal Code has not yet
been amended.
5.5.2. Soft Judgements
The soft judgement can be defined as the judgements requiring
other supported regulations, such as decrees. Without any supported
regulations the judgements cannot be implemented. The soft judgements
erase the norms of act, affecting other norms, rules, or regulations. To
implement this judgement, necessitates an operational regulation. The
judgement technically has not been allowed to be instantly implemented
after the judgement has been declared by the judges.
However, the lack of supported regulations following the
judgement does not reduce the binding force attached at the time the
judgement is declared. Each party should be implementing the judgement.
If it happened someday that there were some regulations against the
ICC’s judgement, then the legal basis is the ICC’s judgement, not the
other regulations.
Examples of soft judgements have commonly occurred in
election cases, whether general elections or provincial elections. One of
the negative impacts of soft judgements can be analysed in the case of a
non-party candidate in Aceh’s Governor Election. The ICC’s judgement,
reviewing the Article 256 of Act Number 11 of 2006 on the Governing of
Aceh, has given a chance for the non-party candidate in the election.58 In
spite of giving an assuring judgement, the ICC created legal uncertainty in
Aceh at that time, because of the lack of supporting regulations after the
judgement.
After the judgement was released, Saleh, the Head of the
DPRA59 strongly refused the judgement because of contradicting with the
____________
58ICC’s Judgements No. 35/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Non-Party Candidate for The
Governor/Mayor Election. See also the previous judgement in same cases ICC’s
Judgements No. 5/PUU-V/2007.59DPRA = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh (Aceh House of Representatives). It is the
provincial parliament located in the Aceh Province that has the special autonomy stated by
the Act of Aceh.
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Act.60 The DPRA argued that the refusal of the judgement was due to the
ICC not asking for a consideration from the DPRA as stated in the Act.61
Therefore, in an administration state law, this opinion seemed weird.  It is
commonly known that in the Indonesian legal system, the position of the
ICC is higher than the DPRA. The ICC’s judgement has the final binding
without the need for any parties’ consideration, which means that the
DPRA has to obey and must fully accept the ICC’s judgement.
As a consequence of this dispute, the Aceh’s Election
Commission62 was affected from the judgement. As part of a state organ,
the Commission assumed that Aceh’s Provincial Election would be
established as soon as possible, by using the Qanun Number 7 of 2006
on the Aceh Provincial Election.63 On the other hand, the DPRA stayed
with their point of view - that Aceh’s Provincial Election must have a new
bylaw, regulating the Aceh Provincial election. The DPRA strongly
suggested that the Commission implement the Election with a new bylaw,
which would be made by the DPRA, otherwise the Election would be
invalid because it did not have a strong legal foundation.
In the same way, the Governor of Aceh holding executive power,
agreed with the Aceh Election Commission, who stated that the Aceh
Provincial Election must be immediately implemented. It had to refer to
the Qanun Number 7 of 2006 on the Aceh Provincial Election. Implicitly,
the Governor’s statement was highly understandable, because he wanted
to add more periods for his position. Thus, he could take more
advantages from his position as a governor. Conversely, if the election
was postponed, his position’s period would end, and he could not take
any advantages at all. The regulation dispute consequently affected
____________
60Abdullah Saleh, ‘PA: Jangan Utak-atik UUPA’ [Do Not Modify The Aceh Governing Act],
accessed 16 March 2012, <http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2011/10/10/pa-jangan-utak-atik-
uupa>61In the Article 269 Clause 3 state that: ‘Any planned amendment to this act must first
undergo consultation by and receive considerations from the DPRA. The term
‘considerations’ in this article has no compulsory binding, normally the words consideration
in Indonesian legal terminology is not a must. See also Act Number 11 of 2006 on The
Governing of Aceh.62In Aceh, the Election Independence Commission is called Komisi Independen Pemilihan
Aceh (KIP Aceh).63Qanun is terminology for bylaw in Aceh Province. See also The Qanun Number 7 of
2006 on the Governor and Mayor Election in Aceh Province.
107
elections at the district level. Some district parliaments postponed
allocating budget for election at the district level, such as in Pidie and
Aceh Jaya.64
From the Aceh’s case election dispute can be learned that the
conflict in local election could be prevented, if the regulation dispute did
not happen. Indonesia’s election mechanism has to learn quickly from
influential cases. A regional election frequently happens because of
personal competitions, struggling for political power at the provincial level.
If intense scrutiny is not provided, this competition will potentially produce
violence.
Although religion and indigenous issues have commonly
occurred in elective competitions, fortunately, they have not trigger any
serious conflict on cultural values and religion issues. Local political
competition is not only a matter at provincial level, which can be ignored,
but is a national issue as well. A central government has to take serious
concern in preventing provincial election disputes.65
5.6. The ICC from Negative Legislator to Positive Legislator
The idea of constitutional court has not only happened in
Europe, but has also spread broadly around the world. The doctrine as
negative legislator imposed by Kelsen has intensely changed during
last few decades.
The role of the constitutional court, as asserted by Hans Kelsen,
is as a negative legislator, because the decision is almost the same as
parliamentary process.66 The decision in the court might be revised;
annulled some of the article or clause; and even annulled all over of the
act.
____________
64Nyak Arief Fadhillah Sya, ‘Dana Distop, Tahapan Pilkada Terganggu [Budget stoped, the
Election Disturbed]’, accessed 19 December 2014.
<http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2011/11/10/dana-distop-tahapan-pilkada-terganggu>65International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Mencegah Kekerasan Dalam Pemilu Kepala
Daerah Asia Report N°197 – 8 Desember 2010 [Indonesia: Preventing Violence in the
Provincial Election], (International Crisis Group 2010) 3.66Victor  Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts & Democratic Values A European
Perspective (Yale University Press 2009) 6-25.
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Additionally, Kelsen’s distinction between the positive and the
negative legislator relies almost entirely on the absence, within the
constitutional law, of enforceable human rights. Although this fact is
ignored by his modern-day followers, Kelsen explicitly warned of the
‘dangers’ of bestowing constitutional status to human rights, which he
equated with natural law, because a rights jurisprudence would inevitably
lead to the obliteration of the distinction between the negative and the
positive legislator.67
In some egalitarian countries, constitutional courts, which are
conventionally permitted to annul or to cancel unconstitutional statues,
furthermore have the role of interpreting and applying the constitution to
preserve its supremacy and to ensure the prevalence of fundamental
rights. The view of constitutional courts as veto players are expanded in
political space, allowing for consideration of a variety of actions by the
court. Though courts can never directly initiate nor enforce policies, they
can, nonetheless, influence policy change in several ways.68
In this sense, they were traditionally considered ‘negative
legislators,’ unable to substitute for the legislators or to enact legislative
provisions that could not be deduced from the constitution. During the
past decade, the role of constitutional courts has dramatically changed.
Their role is no longer limited to declare the unconstitutionality of statutes
or to annul them.69 Consequently, the constitutional courts condition with
their decisions on the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes,
opting to interpret them according to or in harmony with the constitution to
preserve them, instead of deciding their annulment or declaring them
unconstitutional, have made long debate on their existing.
More often, constitutional courts, instead of dealing with existing
legislation, have assumed the role of assistants or auxiliaries to the
legislator. The court has also created provisions deduced from the
____________
67Alec Stone Sweet (n1) 83.68Mary L. Volcansek, ‘Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Divorce and Decrees in Italy,’
(2001) 39 European Journal of Political Research 367.69Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators A
Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) I
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constitution when controlling the absence of legislation or legislative
omissions.
In some cases, the court acts as the positive legislators, issuing
temporary analyses. This is a new role of the constitutional courts,
conditioned by the principles of progressiveness and of prevalence of
human rights, particularly regarding the important rediscovery of the right
to equality and non-discrimination.70
In terms of the court’s role as the law-interpreter, MacCormick
stated that the self-interpretations of legal acts are error-prone and
susceptible to self-obfuscation.71 This is the case, in particular, when the
law is in the hands of courts. Courts need to decide. Owing to the
permanent embarrassment that arises from carrying a burden of
justification, courts are likely to ascribe to their reasoning on more solid
foundations than they actually can possess. This is unavoidable. Indeed,
in the case of courts, it is particularly obvious that the raising of legal
claims involves self-validation in spite of insufficient reasons. As a result,
the reality of legal systems, aside from over-determination by money and
power, is marked by the incessant production of ideology.72
In balancing the power of interpretation within the constitutional
court, Marmor insisted the need for moral values. Perhaps it is true the
constitutional courts have too much political power in the interpretation of
the constitution. But since they do have power, they must exercise it
properly. If the best way to exercise their power is by relying on sound
moral arguments, then moral considerations are the ones which ought to
determine, as far as possible, the concrete results of constitutional cases.
Sometimes moral consideration may dictate caution and self-restraint and
at other times they may not. But what the appropriate moral decision
ought to be is rarely affected by the question of who makes it.73
____________
70Ibid.71This overlooked by theorists who mistake such self-reference for a simple social fact and
not as an indication of a contestable claim to validity. Neil MacCormick, Questioning
Sovereignty (Oxford University Press 2001) 118.72Alexander Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan KomÃirek
(ed), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012)
343-379.73Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2005) 168.
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Marmor’s argument is confined to the nature of the moral
considerations which ought to determine constitutional decisions. If the
decision is of such a nature that it depends on relative institutional
competence, then morality itself dictates that those who are more likely to
have the better judgement should be left to make the relevant decision.
Either way, the courts should rely on sound moral judgement.
From the above explanation, and comparing with the Indonesian
legal system, it is always hard to draw a clear line, whether the ICC is the
negative legislator or positive. In theory the ICC has been defined as the
negative legislator, notwithstanding, in practice it has sometimes
positioned itself as the positive legislator. In the first period of
establishment of ICC, the judgements were not too far from the idea of
negative legislator. Along with the times, and the number of ICC’s
judgements which were not immediately revised by the DPR, the ICC
began to take their own initiatives - being the positive legislator. Here we
can see that the ICC wanted to immediately fill the legal vacuum in that
time with judicial review procedure.
For this reason, the ICC has played a significant role as the
shadow of parliament. Although the constitutional court is the judiciary
institution, their decisions sometimes reflect the parliament’s role. Indeed,
on the doctrine of the parliament’s sovereignty, parliament has
the authority to annul and to revise the act.74 Conversely, the
constitutional court, as a judiciary institution, has seriously played the
parliament role, such as revising, editing, annulling an act in the name of
the guardian of the constitution.
Based on the basic norms set out in the constitution, the negative
legislator authorities have been possessed by two institutions in the
judicial authorities, namely the ICC and the Supreme Court. For the ICC,
as negative legislator, reviews the acts as opposed to the constitution;
whereas, for the Supreme Court, as negative legislator, reviews the
regulations under the acts, which are against the acts opposed to the
____________
74Mark Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review, (Hart Publishing 2001)
87-96. See also Tom Ginsburg (n 2) 3-20.
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1945 Constitution. It delivers the role of positive legislator only for DPR
and the President not for the ICC.75
Most of the cases for ICC as the positive legislator have occurred
in cases relating to elections including general elections, provincial
elections, electing the senator, and so forth. Commenting on the ICC role
as positive legislator, Martitah specified that the judge’s consideration
here is to secure the constitutional rights of citizen, and also the
consideration of argumentation. The judges may have insistence to fulfil
legal certainty at that time.76 Explained below are some cases where the
ICC is ruling itself as the positive legislator, rather the negative legislator.
5.6.1. The Election Supervisory Committee Case
Referring to the Election Supervisory Committee case, it seemed
clear that the ICC has switched its domain from negative legislator to
positive legislator. This happened in the Election Supervisory Committee
case. The ICC has not only declared that the Article 93, 94, and 95 does
not have legal binding, but also drafting and creating new norms. The ICC
then declared that those articles were invalid, unless obeying the new
norms and the draft provided by the ICC.77 The ICC invalidated the word
‘Calon’ (candidate) stated in those articles. As the negative legislator, the
ICC should only be stating that the article does not have binding legal
force.
The ICC’s point of view in this judgement saw an urgency to
avoid a legal vacuum, due to the implementation of urgent elections.
However, the reason was unacceptable because of its unconstitutionality.
The situation of emergency has been clearly stated in the constitution, in
that it belongs to the jurisdiction of President to release the law regarding
emergency.78
____________
75See also Indonesian Constitution, Article 5 Clause (1) and Article 20.76Martitah, Mahkamah Konstitusi dari Negative Legislature ke Positive Legislature
[Constitutional Court from Negative Legislature to Positive Legislature], (Konpress
2013)163.77ICC’s judgement No.11/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Election Supervisory Committee78Indonesian Constitution, Article 22.
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5.6.2. The Domicile Requirement Case
ICC as positive legislator can also be analysed in the ICC’s
judgement on Domicile Requirement for Candidates of DPD on the Act
No. 10 of 2008 on Election.79 In this judgement, the ICC decided that the
Article 12 in the Act No.10 of 2008 on Election still had legal binding force,
but the candidates must have domicile in the province where they want to
be represented. In other words, the candidates having domicile in
province A cannot represent the province B. The debate on this
judgement is not only about the ICC as positive legislator, but is further
expanded, in that the ICC has been asked whether it needs to handle this
case, or to unaccepting the case, because there was no indication of loss
of constitutional rights.
The substance regulated in Article 12 and 67 of the Act of
Election was the requirement for individuals to nominate themselves, or
be nominated as a member of the DPD (Senator). Thus, is concerned with
the constitutional right to be a candidate. Those articles have no part that
can be said to hinder, impede, or eliminate the rights of Indonesian
citizen. The absence of a condition "domicile in the relevant province" and
the terms "not a member and/ or political party officials" in the
requirements to become a member of DPD in Article 12 and 67, does not
impede, obstruct, or remove the right to be a candidate. For this reason, it
can be argued that there is no loss of rights and/or authority of the
applicant as a result of the enactment of Article 12 and Article 67 of the
Act of Law, so that, the ICC should be declared unacceptable not partly
accepting the case.
5.6.3. Provincial Election Case
In this case, the ICC reviewed and also legislated Articles 57, 66,
67, and 82 (2) that existed in Act Number 32 of Local Government.80
Those articles which were edited are; namely,
____________
79ICC’s judgement No.10/PUU-VI/2008 on the Domicile Requirement for Candidates of
DPD.80 ICC’s judgement No. 072- 073/PUU-II/2004 on the Act of Local Government.
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 in Article 57 clause (1) the words … ‘yang bertanggung jawab kepada
DPRD’ (who is responsible to the Parliament);
 in Article 66 clause (3) letter e “meminta pertanggungjawaban
pelaksanaan tugas KPUD” (asking responsibility of the task execution
of Election Commission);
 in the Article 67 clause (1) letter e, along the clause “… kepada
DPRD” (to the Parliament); and
 in the Article 82 clause (2) along the clause “… oleh DPRD” (by the
Parliament).
These articles, judged by the ICC, do not have legal binding
force, and are also against the Constitution. In contrast, not all ICC judges
agreed with the judgement, some of them had the dissenting opinion.
Fadjar stated that, as the guardian of constitution, the ICC must give
enlightenment to build a significant sustainability for the 1945 Constitution,
and also creating a system of democracy for the whole aspects.
Therefore, all modern democracies do indeed carry elections, but not all
elections are democratic. In Indonesian’s experience during three
decades of the New Order there have always been election activities,
including general and provincial, but they cannot be qualified as
democratic elections.81
Though, the constitutional mandate, contained in Article 18
paragraph (4) of the constitution, requires the head of the region should
be elected democratically. The basic democracy must have certain
eligibility criteria, such as, the recognition and protection of human rights;
the existence of public confidence in the direct elections, which could
produce a legitimate local government; and fair competition between the
participants involved in the direct elections. These measures should be
reflected in the electoral laws, such as basic principles, electoral system,
suffrage, organizers, and so forth. Equally important are in the electoral
process, particularly participants, voter registration, campaigning, voting,
determining the results and dispute settlement, and so forth.
____________
81Mukthie Fadjar, Disseting Opinion in ICC’s judgement No. 072- 073/PUU-II/2004 on the
Act of Local Government.
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For the ICC, however, being a positive legislator is not something
forbidden, but firstly the MPR must amend the 1945 Constitution, most
importantly, in the jurisdictions of the ICC. This experience was created by
the Austrian Constitutional Court which amended its constitution to make
the constitutional court into a positive legislator.82
5.7. Conclusion
The basic idea of establishing the ICC in Indonesia after the
reformation era is that the justices must be involved in the development of
democracy, and similarly in law reform. This court, it is believed, can
protect the constitution.
During 2003 to October 2015, the ICC was led by five ICC
presidents with a variety of educational backgrounds and political
affiliations. Judges coming from academician will tend to be more
philosophical; governmental officials will be more sensitive to policy
considerations; former politicians will have insights into what is feasible for
the court, to do for the existed political circumstance; and judges will bring
their expertise in more technical ordinary law.
In combination with other state officials, constitutional judges own
wide powers to rule, by quality of an obvious act of assignment. In the
lexis of delegation concept, constitutional courts are the mediators. These
courts, when measured as functional solutions to the varied problems of
narrowing and pledge, seem to adapt, paradigmatically, as it were, to the
delegation concept’s preferred logic of institutional design.
The composition of nine judges has affecting the kind of discourse
generated by the ICC. The numbers of cases were not in accordance with
the capacity of the existing judges, most importantly in election season. In
this case the ICC impressed that the judges were too hurried, making
judgement without deep consideration.
In reforming legal matters, it seems the ICC has made a significant
leap in the annulment of the old-fashioned Criminal Act inherited from
____________
82Since 1925, Article 138, paragraph 2, of Austrian Constitution has enabled the Austrian
Constitutional Court to act as a positive legislator. See also Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías
(n 71) 251.
115
Dutch Colonials, such as, the articles about publicly insulting the
President or Vice-President, expressing hostility, incitement, hatred, or
humiliation in public against government. In protecting natural resources,
furthermore, the ICC has made crucial improvements with reviewing the
Act of Mineral Mining and Coal, and the Act of Electrical Power.
However, the ICC has also faced a serious problem regarding its
final-binding judgement. Some of judgements can be implemented
immediately without making new rules or changes, called hard
judgements. On the other hand, there are judgements requiring further
adjustment in advance, which are impossible to immediately implement,
called soft judgements, which have often been disobeyed by other state
organs.
Chiefly in terms of resolving election disputes, reviewing act
against the constitution, and resolving disputes among state agencies, the
future of the ICC’s jurisdictions have been questioned, asking whether
they need to be expanded further, or be reduced. These problems
became amplified when at times the ICC positioned itself as positive
legislator, rather than its basic idea as negative legislator. For this
intention, the ICC has occupied another role as the shadow of parliament.
Although the constitutional courts are a judiciary institution, their decision
and their role, sometimes reflect the role of parliament.
The constitution has possessed the role of negative legislator
authorities for the two judicial institutions, namely the Indonesian
Constitutional Court (ICC), and the Supreme Court. For the ICC, its role
as negative legislator is for annulling any acts contradicting with the
constitution. The Supreme Court as negative legislator is required to
examine, invalidate, or annul regulations under the acts. The Supreme
Court will identify regulations contradicting with acts. Moreover, the roles
of positive legislators belong to parliament and president as stated in the
1945 Constitution.
But in some cases the ICC has positioned itself as the positive
legislator. It can be seen in several cases that have occurred relating to
elections, including general elections, provincial elections, electing the
senator, and so forth. The ICC as positive legislator happened because of
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judge’s reflections on securing the constitutional rights of citizen, and legal
necessities, at the time.
To be a positive legislator is not essentially prohibited. The ICC
can arrange that, however, firstly, the parliament should amend the
constitution, chiefly, in the part of the ICC’s jurisdictions. This experience
practiced in the Austrian Constitutional Court by amending its constitution
to make the court able, in some cases, to be a positive legislator.
An embarrassing moment happened for the ICC when the ICC’s
president was caught red-handed accepting bribery from a provincial
election case. After the case, the ICC seemed at its nadir point. It is hard
for the ICC to heal public trust of the institution. Other problems arose.
People who ever had a case under Akil have questioned the validity of
Akil’s judgement - whether the judgements need to be reviewed or
annulled. Answering this worry, the ICC judges quickly responded to the
situation. They strongly stated that all of the ICC judgements are valid;
and will not be annulled, or be reviewed.
This ICC statement was made regarding the judgement during
Akil’s time as the ICC judge. However, the ICC must double-check Akil’s
judgements. The double-check process is desirable for significant
purposes, such as fostering public trust; identifying the indication of
corruption in other cases, and catching other suspects; giving election
justice to the correct persons; and most importantly, is returning the
dignity of ICC as one of trusted judiciary institution in Indonesia post
reformation. Veiling Akil’s case and his judgements are also same with
keeping the future problem that can happen again.
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CHAPTER 6 - ULTRA PETITA AND FUTURE CHALLENGES OF THE ICC
6.1. Introduction
The Ultra Petita cases in the ICC are particular challenges for Indonesian
law reform. This chapter will explore several judgements identified as Ultra Petita
during 2003 to 2012. There were more than ten cases acknowledged as Ultra
Petita with different variations, but only ten are discussed, covering the different
variations occurring in that time. To analyse those judgments, the researcher
uses basic theory from Kelsen on the constitutional courts as the negative
legislator, and other methodologies, particularly comparative constitutional law1
and black-letter law.2
Before going further, it is appropriate to define the term Ultra Petita. It is a
Latin term defined legally as beyond that which is sought, or a decision of a court
which grants more than was asked for. This implies that a judgment which is Ultra
Petita may be successfully appealed as it is not good law. For example, where a
court grants more damage than was claimed by the plaintiff.3
In the Indonesian legal system, Ultra Petita is known in the context of
private law, derived from the Dutch law called HIR4 and RBg.5 A judge is
prohibited to give a judgement which is not asked in a claim/suit, or granting more
than what a plaintiff asked for; but may reduce a plaintiff’s claim/suit.6
____________
1Ran Hirschl, ‘From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies,’ (2013)
11 (1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1-12.2Michael Salter, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction And Guide To The Conduct Of Legal
Resarch (Longman 2007)56.3USLegal, ‘Ultra Petita Law & Legal Definition’, accessed 4 August 2014,
<http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/ultra-petita/>4Herzien Indonesis Reglement (HIR) is the private law resource produced by Netherland; it is also
called the Rule for New Indonesia. See also R. Tresna, Komentar Atlas Reglemen Hukum Atjara
Didalam Pemeriksaan Dimuka Pengadilan Negeri Atau HIR: Dihubungkan Dengan Ketentuan-
Ketentuan Dari Undang-Undang Darurat No. 1, Tahun 1951 Diubah Dengan Undang-Undang No.
11, Tahun 1955 [The Comment on the Procedural Law in the Front of the Provincial Court] (W.
Versluys 1956).5Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten (RBg) is the private law resource produced by Netherland
specifically for the outside of Java and Madura. Muhammad Syaifuddin, ‘Perspektif Global
Penyelesaian Sengketa Investasi di Indonesia [Global Perpective Resolving Investment Dispute In
Indonesia],’ (2011) 3 (1) De Jure 58-70.6Herzien Indonesis Reglement (HIR), Clause 178 (3). See also Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten
RBg, Clause 189 (3).
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In the ICC, Ultra Petita has been widely defined beyond the definition given
in HIR and RBg. Based on several judgements produced by ICC, the judges have
expanded their jurisdictions regulated by several acts, including prosecuting
themselves, granting more than what is claimed, interfering in others court’s
jurisdiction, and intervening in other state organ’s jurisdictions. The Ultra Petita
ICC judgments are not based on the original intent of the constitution as the
supreme law source. Ultra Petita has happened when an applicant asks the ICC
to review a clause or an article in the act, but the ICC may go further, by not only
annulling a clause or an article, but also invalidating the whole act.
6.2. Ultra Petita and Its Future Challenges
Ultra Petita judgments have been widely criticised in Indonesia by
academics, newspapers, social media, and so forth. The future challenge faced
by the ICC regarding Ultra Petita is the judges’ unlimited power potentially
violating a value of democratic justice. They can easily choose the target act to
be annulled with a serious threat in law certainty. The Ultra Petita judgment, as
asserted by Huda, has appeared because the ICC had an improvisation sense in
the tribunal process. Ultra Petita judgements may happen again in coming
years.7
Mahfud MD, a university professor, has stated that the ICC has claimed
itself as a superior state institution, sheltering its final judgements under the
constitution. For this reason, the ICC has sometimes made judgments beyond its
jurisdiction and based on the judges own argument, rather than the acts on
constitution.8
The experienced solicitor Nasution had also given a hard criticism of Ultra
Petita, claiming that the extra-controversial judgement shows the judges’
arrogance. Nasution has claimed that the ICC has infringed legal tradition and
legal doctrine of the court, with the judges become the final arbiter, with no
chance for further appeal the injustice.9 The expanded jurisdiction by the ICC has
____________
7Ni’matul Huda, ‘Pengujian Perppu oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi [The Judicial Review of Perppu by
the Constitutional Court],’ (2010) 7 (5) Jurnal Konstitusi 10.8Moh. Mahfud MD, ‘Rambu Pembatas Dan Perluasan Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi [Barrier
Signs And Expansion Authority of the Constitutional Court],’ (2009) 4(16) Jurnal Hukum 441-462.9Adnan Buyung Nasution,’Putusan MK Tentang UU KKR Dianggapi Ultra Petita [ICC Judgment on
the Truth and Reconciliation Act is Ultra Petita],’ accessed 30 July 2014,
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also occurred in other countries, often making it hard to draw the line between
legal and political questions.
Ultra Petita cases in ICC invalidating an entire act are not found in
Germany. Pursuant to the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court Act,
which govern the FCC’s jurisdiction, the Court decides on the basis of
constitutional law and enumerated cases (constitutional complaints, judicial
review proceedings, and so forth.) Moreover, the Court does not act /ex officio/
but only on the request of others. Whilst the justices are thus required to base
their decisions on the constitution and to only answer the questions of the case at
hand, there is always a possibility that somebody believes that they went too
far.10
In some cases, the justices might also try to send a message to the
legislature or other state bodies through obiter dicta.11 An example is the
Classroom Crucifix case. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany decided
that the Provision of 13(1), third sentence, of the Bavarian School Regulations for
Elementary Schools, was unconstitutional by the panel majority. The mere
presence of a cross in the classroom does not compel the pupils to particular
modes of conduct, nor make the school into a missionary organization. Nor does
the cross change the nature of the Christian nondenominational school; instead it
is, as a symbol common to the Christian confessions, particularly suitable for
acting as a symbol for the constitutionally admissible educational content of that
form of school. The affixation of a cross in a classroom does not exclude
consideration of other philosophical and religious contents and values in
education. The form of teaching is, additionally, subject to the precept of Art.
136(1) BV, according to which, at all schools, the religious feelings of others are
____________
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol15882/putusan-mk-tentang-uu-kkr-dianggap-iultra-
petitai>10Statement by Margret Böckel, (Personal email correspondence on 23 October 2014).11Obiter dicta (sometimes referred to merely as dicta), is a Latin expression literally meaning “said
by the way” or a “statement in passing”. It is used for statements, remarks or observations made by
a judge that re incidental or supplementary in deciding a case, upon a matter not essential to the
decision. Thus, although they are included in the body of the court’s opinion, such statements do
not form a necessary part of the court’s decision. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, statements
constituting obiter dicta are therefore not binding, although in some jurisdictions, they can be
strongly persuasive. Translegal, ‘Obiter-Dicta,’ accessed 29 October 2014
<http://www.translegal.com/legal-latin/obiter-dicta>
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to be respected.12 The Federal Constitutional Court, furthermore, stated in
connection with the precept of neutrality, that the school, insofar as it may
influence children's decisions as to belief and conscience, may contain only the
minimum of elements of compulsion. It may not be a missionary school nor claim
binding validity for Christian beliefs, and must be open to other philosophical and
religious contents and values.
From the above case can be seen that the German Constitutional Court
has not expanded its jurisdiction, only invalidating the provision in the Bavarian
School Regulations for Elementary Schools, not all of the regulation. It thus
accords with the judicial review concepts of Kelsen, to not annul the entire
statute.13
Another comparison can be made with South Korea’s Constitutional
Court, which has just had its twentieth anniversary, an important milestone. Of
the five designated constitutional courts in East and Southeast Asia (the others
being Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and Mongolia), it is arguably the most
important, and merits close examination as a case study in constitutional politics
in Asia. The Act of Constitutional Court has allowed the Court to expand its
jurisdiction for invalidating an act:
The Constitutional Court shall decide only whether or not the requested
statute or any provision of the statute is unconstitutional: Provided, that if
it is deemed that the whole provisions of the statute are unable to enforce
due to a decision of unconstitutionality of the requested provision, a
decision of unconstitutionality may be made on the whole statute.14
This article shows that the court can magnify access to constitutional
justice, and has applied its authority to cover ordinary court decisions. In 1995 the
court confirmed a tax law as partly illegitimate, and said that it might only be
applied on a particularly narrow interpretation by ordinary courts.15 This case
shows that a system of constitutional review can assist the interests of all parties,
____________
12Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, ‘Case BVerfGE 93, 1 1 BvR 1087/91 Kruzifix-decision
Crucifix Case (Classroom Crucifix Case)’, accessed 28 October 2014,
<http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=615>13Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of legislation: A Comparative study of the Austrian and the
American Constitution,’ (1942) 4 (2) Journal of Politics 186.14South Korea Constitutional Court Act, Article 45 (Decision of Unconstitutionality).15Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies Constitutional Court in Asian Cases
(Cambridge University Press 2003) 232.
121
and the design of the court, providing it with institutional power with which to
broaden its power.
This comparison shows two models of expanded jurisdictions in the
constitutional court. From the German case, the court is not too bold of
expanding its jurisdiction out of the regulation, whilst South Korea is brave
enough to expand its jurisdiction, because its regulation has allowed for that. In
the context of Indonesia, its ICC does not have authority to expand its jurisdiction,
but in practice has done so through Ultra Petita.
In the United Kingdom, the issue of Ultra Petita is usually known as Ultra
Vires, a Latin term which literally means beyond the powers.16 In practice, a court
might sometimes expand its authority, whilst respecting parliamentary
sovereignty without invalidating or annulling an act. Ultra Vires has been
subjected to criticism over recent years, and its justification for judicial review of
power questioned.17 Elliot has asserted that the courts are not competent to deny
the power of the other branches, because the court's powers are themselves
derived from and regulated by the constitution. The constitutional legitimacy of
such review is vouchsafed by the Ultra Vires doctrine which provided that, when
a court reviews an exercise of statutory power, this entails nothing more than
judicial enforcement of the express and implied limits which parliament attaches
to grants of such power.18
Craig has asserted that the Ultra Vires principle is based upon the
assumption that judicial review is legitimated where the courts are applying the
intent of the legislature. The Ultra Vires principles have been used as the vehicle
to impose constraints on the way in which the power given through the agency
has been exercised: it must comply with rules of fair procedure; it must exercise
its discretion to attain proper and not improper purposes; it must not act
unreasonably, and so forth.19 If the courts fail to exercise their law-making
function with caution, the courts can create a totalitarian state, where the courts
can possibly strike down any chosen acts.20
____________
16Mark Elliot, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing 2001) 3.17Ibid. 3-16.18Ibid.19Paul Craig, ‘Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review’ (1998) 57 (1) Cambridge Law
Journal 64-65.20Lord Devlin, ‘Judges and Law makers’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Review1-16.
122
6.3. Analysis of Ultra Petita Cases
6.3.1. Intervening Parliament’s Jurisdiction
Regarding reviewing an act against the constitution, the ICC has only
been permitted to interpret the constitution, based on the constitution itself. The
ICC has been allowed to declare whether an act conflicts with the constitution, or
cannot be justified by the constitution. Therefore, the ICC cannot be permitted
intervention into parliament’s jurisdiction to amend an act, or to revise it.
The jurisdiction border between ICC and parliament are clear, that the
parliament has a role as the positive legislator (known as norm maker), whereas
the ICC has an essential role as negative legislator (known as the norm
canceller). Constitutionally, the ICC is prohibited to cross the border of parliament
jurisdiction.21 The theory and reality have not always been followed. In some
cases, the ICC has intervened parliament jurisdiction, by making several changes
within an act.
Consider the Case of Children Outside of Marriage, Machica Vs the Act
No.1 of 1974 on Marriage.22 On 20 December, 1993, Machica married with
Moerdiono in Jakarta, and had a son one year later. The marriage was held in the
Islamic tradition fulfilling all requirements in Islamic law. Unfortunately, in that
time, Machica and her husband did not register their marriage in the Marriage
Office.23 Their marriage was held legitimate fifteen years later, receiving a
Religious Court judgment in 2008.24
On 7 October 2011, her husband passed away, and Machica claimed
the inheritance for his son, but the Religious Court denied her inheritance claim,
arguing that his son was not legitimate25 because the marriage was not held in
the Marriage Office, and had not been officially registered.26 Machica claimed
judicial review of the clause within the Marriage Act to the ICC. She argued that
with the enactment of Article 43 (1) of the Act No.1 of 1974 on the Marriage has
____________
21Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators A Comparative
Study (Cambridge University Press 2011) 29.22ICC Judgement Number 46/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Case of Children Outside of Marriage23Marriage Office is called Kantor Urusan Agama (KU).24Indonesian Religion Court Judgement, Number. 46/Pdt.P/2008/PA.Tgrs.25Article 43 Clause 2 the Act No.1 of 1974 on the Marriage, stated that Children born outside of
marriage only have a civil relationship with her mother and her mother’s family.26Clause 2 Article 2 the Act No.1 of 1974 on the Marriage stated that each marriage has to register
according to the act.
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violated her constitutional rights as a mother and also her son. Thus, she cannot
receive legal endorsement of her marriage, and also cannot legalise the status of
her son. Even though her marriage is guaranteed by Article 28B paragraph (1)
and paragraph (2) and Article 28D (1) of the 1945 Constitution. After judiciary
process and long debate, finally, the ICC reviewed and amended the Article 43
(1) of the Act No.1 of 1974 on the Marriage:
Children born outside of marriage only have a civil relationship with
their mother and their mother’s family.
After the judgement, it was stated:
“Children born outside of marriage only have a civil relationship
with their mother and their mother’s family as well as with men as
her father, who can be proved based on science and technology
and/or other evidences under the law to have a blood relationship,
including civil relationship with his family.”27
The judgement shows the ICC expanding its jurisdictions. Editing and
changing the article in an act is the DPR’s jurisdiction. The ICC should simply
state that the act is invalid and have no legal binding, and allow the DPR to fix it.
6.3.2. Judging Itself.
The ICC has infrequently judged the act, ruling itself. This category is
against the principle of Nemo iudex in causa sua, a Latin phrase that means,
literally, no-one should be a judge in his own cause. In this case, ICC has
invalidated jurisdiction of the Judicial Commission to observe the behaviour of
ICC’s judges.28 They ruled that the Judicial Commission has constitutionally no
jurisdiction to observe the constitutional court’s judges, rather the jurisdiction to
observe belongs only to the Supreme Court’s judges.
This judgement has violated the Act of Judicial Power,29 which stated
that a judge, or a registrar, must resign from a session if they have a direct or
indirect interest with the case being examined. If a judge, or a registrar, are still
continuing a case regardless of the act, then their judgments are invalid. Those
breaking the act will receive administrative sanctions, or will be sentenced based
____________
27 ICC Judgement (n22).28ICC’s Judgment No.005/PUU-IV/2006 on the Judicial Commission.29The Act Number 4 of 2004 on the Judicial Power.
124
on the regulations. The ICC still continued the case, and the judgement has had
a valid binding.
The reason for forming the Judicial Commission was to build the checks
and balances mechanism among state organs, mainly in the judiciary power. The
commission, born by the reformation era, has prevented a judicial mafia during
the authoritarian era. The invalidation of this watchdog function has placed the
ICC as the superior court. Unfortunately, after seven years of this judgment, a
worrying judicial mafia has been created.
In October 2013, the head of the ICC was caught red-handed by the
Corruption Eradication Commission accepting bribery from the election case that
he was handling. After this case, all judgements involving the bribed judge have
been questioned, whether to be validated or re-examined. Thus the idea of
establishing a watchdog body for the ICC is back on the reform agenda.
6.3.3. Reviewing President Decree.
The constitution states that the ICC can only review an act. In fact the
ICC also has reviewed several president's decrees, such as the Perppu.30 The
presidential decree has had a lower level in Indonesia's legal system, which
means that it is not the jurisdiction of ICC to review, but the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Perppu is not equal to the act. There is no clause
in the constitution or other acts, that states a Perppu can be reviewed by the ICC.
Constitutionally, Perppu is legislated by the president in an emergency situation.
Perppu can only implement for two years, unless the DPR upgrades Perppu
status to be an act. If, in two years, Perppu has not been upgraded, the
automatically a Perppu cannot be applicable. The mechanism of reviewing
Perppu belongs to the DPR, whether it will be accepted or be rejected. If the ICC
really wanted to review a Perppu, the ICC has to wait until the Perppu becomes
an act.31
____________
30Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang (Perppu) is the president decree produced by president
in the emergency situation. This decree is fully the rights of president to announce it, even though;
the state situation is not really emergency. The rights to decide whether state in emergency or not
are under president’s overviews.31Muhammad Siddiq,  ‘Kegentingan Memaksa Atau Kepentingan Penguasa (Analisis Terhadap
Pembentukan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (PERPPU)) [Crunch Forcing Or
Interests Ruler: Analysis of Formation PERPPU],’ (2014) 48 (1) Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah
dan Hukum 261-292.
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6.3.4. Inconsistent on Judgement Format
The formats of ICC’s judgements have been regulated, whether in the
constitution, or in the act. Act number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court,32
specifies six formats of judgment; namely, 1) denying; 2) granting; 3) rejecting; 4)
not-legally-binding; 5) justify the DPR’s petition; and 6) rejecting DPR’s petition.
These formats of judgements will be explained below:
1) Denying: The denying judgement is where ICC believes that the
applicant and/or the application do not fulfil the requirements requested by
the ICC.
2) Granting: The granting judgement is where ICC believes that the
application is reasonable. It is also used for a judgement where the
disputed formulation of an act does not fulfil the requirements stipulated by
the constitution.
3) Rejecting: The rejecting judgement is where the disputed act does not
contravene the constitution, either on its formation, parts, or overall material
content.
4) Not-legally-binding: The not-legally-binding judgement is where the
material content of a sub-article, article, and/or parts of the act, contradicts
the constitution. The ICC may state that the formulation of an act, referred
to in the application, does not fulfil the requirement of the constitution.
5) Justifying the DPR’s petition:33 The justifying the DPR’s petition
judgement is when the ICC decides that the President and/or the Vice President
is proven to violate the law through an act of a treason, corruption, bribery,
serious criminal offence, or through moral turpitude; and/or no longer qualifies as
President and/or Vice President.
6) Rejecting the DPR’s Petition: The rejecting the DPR’s Petition judgement
is when the ICC decides that the President and/or the Vice President is not
proven to violate the law through an act of a treason, corruption, bribery, serious
criminal offence, or through moral turpitude; and/or no longer qualifies as
President and/or Vice President.
____________
32The Act Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, Clause 56 (1) (2) (5), 57 (1) (2), 64, 70,
77, and 83.33 DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is House of Representative of Indonesian. See also <
http://www.dpr.go.id/>
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These formats have not always been applied by the ICC, which has made
new formats, not in the constitution or the Act, as follows: 1) the conditionally
constitutional judgment, and 2) conditionally unconstitutional judgment.34
1) The conditionally constitutional judgement states that an act provision is
not contradicted by the constitution, with giving a condition to a state organ
implementing an act provision, for considering the ICC’s interpretation, on the
constitutionality of an act provision, which has been reviewed. In contrast, 2) a
conditionally unconstitutional judgement states that an act provision is not
fulfilling the requirement stated in the ICC’s judgment.
An example of ICC own-format-judgement is the case of the Presidential
Election 2009.35 The Act of Presidential Election stated that voters must be
registered in the election list to get their right to vote. Unfortunately, the plaintiff,
because of administration failure by the Election Commission, was not registered
as a voter, asked the ICC for his voter rights, and won. The ICC made its own-
format-judgement that the plaintiff could vote by showing his ID, such as
Passport, ID card, or other valid ID documents—ID types not stated in the act, or
the Constitution. Was his right to vote constitutional? These judgements take the
ICC into the jurisdiction of the DPR, as legislative. The ICC has bravely abolished
the clause stated in an act, and made its own version, acting as a positive
legislator (rule maker) rather than a negative legislator (rule canceller).
6.3.5. Invaliding All Over Act
The ICC can annul or invalidate an act, although not asked to do so. In
this case, the Ultra Petita is more extreme than Ultra Vires, which still respects
parliament sovereignty. Two cases illustrate the fact: firstly, is the invalidation of
Act number 27 of 2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The human
rights organisation called Elsam, which asked the ICC to judicially review Act 27
of 2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Elsam found unfairness
within Articles 1, 27, and 44, about restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation
for victims affected by gross human rights violation during Indonesia’s
____________
34 ICC’s Judgment No.072-073/ PUU-II/ 2004, ICC’s Judgment No. 5/PUU-V/2007, ICC’s Judgment
No. 102/PUU-VII/2009. ICC’s Judgment No.01/PUU-VIII/2010, ICC’s Judgment No.65/PUU-VIII/
2010.35ICC’s Judgment No.102/PUU-VII/2009 on the Election Voter Rights.
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authoritarian era. After the reviewing process, on the contrary, ICC abolished and
also annulled all over the act in its judgement. This judgement made the plaintiff,
Elsam, feel hopelessly confused because they never asked for the abolishment
and annulment, only for review. This Ultra Petita judgement has produced long
debate on the authority of the ICC, whether having authority to annul an act or
only reviewing the specific article submitted by plaintiff.
Secondly, in the case of Act Number 20 of 2002, on the Electricity
Power, after reviewing four articles (8, 16, 22, and 68), submitted by plaintiff, the
constitutional court annulled the whole act, and asserted that the act was
unconstitutional. One court reason was because the act mentioned that electric
power is a commodity, the price of which can be increased competitively. This
was a free-market price, putting the price that depended on the demands of the
market. The ICC similarly argued that the act unpowered the role of state in
safeguarding public interest.
The ICC judges argued that the state does not fully have control to
enhance the benefit of electricity for the people’s needs, because the price might
be controlled by the market and private sector.36 Subsequently, the ICC
interpreted that the act was dangerous on protecting energy security, because it
did not belong to the state. The judges also stated that the act was clearly
against the 1945 Constitution, which is stated in Article 33.37 This implies that the
annulment of the Act Number 20 of 2002 on the Electrical Power influenced on
the law certainty. Owing to this situation, the government has to refer to the
previous act, the Act Number 15 of 1985 on the Electrical Power, although it was
the old-fashion one and the House of Representative had been considering the
new act.
6.3.6. Incorrect Judgement Code
This judgement followed the Aceh Election of 2012, to elect a governor
and vice governor, and head of regency and vice. This election was unique in
____________
36ICC’s Judgments Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 on the Electrical Power.See also, Ida Bagus
Radendra Suastama, ‘Asas Hukum Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Undang-Undang Migas
dan Ketenaga Listrikan [The Basics Priciples of ICC’s Judgments on the Natural Resources and
Electrical Power] (2012) 24 (2) Mimbar Hukum 187- 375.37In the Article 33 (2) imply that sectors of production, which are important for the country and affect
a life of people shall be under the powers of the state.
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implementing the election law in a special autonomy province. The Election has
to follow Election Law regulation, yet Aceh has its own autonomy law. It followed
a long debate pertaining to which law could cover the election, and became more
complicated because of the political interest amongst candidates who took part in
this election. After long debate, the ICC made the judgement, but unfortunately
put the code judgement with PHPU (Disputes on General Election Results),
whilst the election result was not released yet. The ICC was still stating the
judgment’s code as the Disputes on General Election Results, and was reluctant
to revise it. 38
6.3.7. Intervening Supreme Court Authority
Clash with other state organs has often occurred, including the Supreme
Court. A plaintiff who failed in the ICC could win in the Supreme Court, and vice
versa. A parliament candidate could be judged by the ICC as unable to contest
because they do not fulfil the requirements, but the Supreme Court could permit a
candidate to join the election process. This case has happened frequently,
because the Supreme Court and constitutional court has the same jurisdiction in
handling election disputes.39
Ultra Petita has usually happened in election dispute cases. The ICC
has frequently decided to hold re-election in some places, instead of examining
carefully each of the cases. In the election cases, most of the plaintiffs have filed
a lawsuit to the ICC, seeking an election justice rather than hold re-election. Now
elections have cost a lot of time and energy. Election dispute cases are the most
prominent cases in the ICC. The election in Indonesia has consisted of
presidential election, parliaments, governor, until district level. In 2010 the ICC
made more than 230 judgements on election cases.40 The number of judgements
can increase in election seasons.
____________
38ICC’s Judgment Number 108/PHPU.D-IX/2011 on the Aceh Governor Election.39Akil Mochtar, ‘Putusan Kasus Pilkada Saling Bertrubrukan, MA MK Gelar Pertemuan Tertutup
[ICC and SC Judgments Collide with Each Other, ICC and SC Hold a Closed Meeting],’ accesed 26
June 2013 <http://news.detik.com/read/2013/06/25/164914/2283856/10/putusan-kasus-pilkada-
saling-bertubrukan-ma-mk-gelar-pertemuan-tertutup >40Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi [ICC Judgments],’ accessed 31 July 2014
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Putusan&id=1&kat=1>. See also
Muhidi, ‘Sengketa Pilkada Paling Banyak Diperkarakan [Provincial Elections Are the Most Sued
Cases] accessed 31 July 2014.
<http://www.antaranews.com/berita/239861/sengketa-pilkada-paling-banyak-diperkarakan>
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The ICC’s record in handling election cases has not always been good.
Occasionally, a crucial mistake has been made. In the parliament election 2009
dispute involving the Democrat Party and the National Amanat Party at Donggala
district, Centre Sulawesi, the ICC decided that the National Amanat Party won
one chair in the parliament.41 Feeling unsatisfied, the Democrat Party filed a
lawsuit to the district court. Astonishingly, the district court decided the Democrat
Party as the winner. The National Amanat Party was found guilty of inflating the
number of voters. This fact of trial could not be identified during the session in the
ICC, because it was manipulated by the election commission member.
6.3.8. Judging Based on Other Country Experiences
Based on research by Zhang, between 2003-2008, the ICC has adopted
foreign resources rather than the constitution itself. In her qualitative research,
Zhang discovered 813 foreign references scattered in 62 ICC judgments,
referring to 34 international agreements, legislations and case law from 26
foreign countries, as well as the jurisprudence of supranational courts. To
interpret the constitution, the ICC has referred to international agreements, case
law and practices of other countries, the United Nation resolution, the general
opinion of the Human Rights Council, and customary international law.42 Using
other foreign resources instead of the constitution could be as Ultra Petita, the
ICC’s judges being regarded reluctant to use the constitution as the supreme
resource, with several implications.
Firstly, the constitution should be placed as an expression of national
interest. Using foreign law in constitutional adjudication has no legitimacy
because the preparation of foreign law is not made by the representatives of the
people elected democratically.
Secondly, it is impossible for judges and legal practitioners to know the
context and historical background of other countries, which have influenced the
development of foreign law to address cases in their countries.
____________
41ICC’s Judgment Number 039/PHPU.C1-II/2009 on the General Elections.42Diane Zhang, ‘The Use and Misuse of Foreign Materials by the Indonesian Constitutional Court: A
study of Constitutional Court Decisions 2003-2008,’ (Masters Coursework Thesis, Melbourne Law
School, The University of Melbourne 2010) 1-10.
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Lastly, each case has constitutional views, opinions, and positions,
which are different in other parts of the world. There are no agreements amongst
the judges to use one methodology in making a judgment, which can lead to
reasoning that can support the personal views of each judge. If the ICC really
wanted to adopt foreign law, the constitution itself should give a license for
picking other sources. In this issue, Tushnet stated that the constitution must
have a license to use comparative foreign law for the court as part of the
constitutional authority, such as in South Africa.43
Not all ICC judges agree on adopting foreign law as ICC sources. Some
judges had a dissenting opinion in the case of imposing the death penalty for
drug dealers, where the ICC’s judgment was decided by 9 judges attending the
session, of whom four disagreed with the judgment. In this judgment, the ICC
neglected the constitution protecting the life of a human being, and referred to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).44
Using foreign sources instead of the constitution may strengthen judges’
opinion, because if they were to use the black-letter approach, the opinions could
be against the constitution itself.
6.3.9. Judging Based on Scholarly Theory
The ICC’s judgments have often adopted several legal theories, instead
of the constitution. However, the ICC’s judgment should not be based on theories
not clearly embraced by the constitution—because it is very much theory, and a
variety of options. Theories contradict other theory, which affects law certainty.
One such theory picked by the ICC in its judgment is the theory by Quinney,45
regarding ICC’s judgment on the death penalty for the drug dealer.46
Also ICC’s judgments should not be based on what works in other
countries, even though those countries are well developed. This is because in
other countries, the provisions of the constitution have a difference between each
____________
43Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press 2000)
200.44 ICC’s Judgement Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007 on the Narcotics.45 See also Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Transaction Publishers 1970) 3-6.46 ICC’s Judgement (n44).
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other.47 Therefore, it should be the content of the constitution which will be the
basis, and all of its original intent of ICC resources.
6.3.10. Adding Jurisdiction in Handling Provincial and District Election
As regulated in the Constitution, the ICC’s jurisdiction only consists
of reviewing laws, determining disputes over the authorities of state institutions,
deciding over the dissolution of a political party, deciding over disputes on the
result of general election, and to issue a judgement over a petition concerning
alleged violations by the President and/or the Vice-President as provided by the
constitution.48
Regarding “general election”, Article 22E Clause (2), states that: General
elections shall be conducted to elect the members of the House of
Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, the President and the
Vice President, and the Regional House of Representatives.49 In fact, ICC has
extended its jurisdiction to adjudicate provincial and district election disputes,
even though that jurisdiction was not stipulated within the constitution, which has
excluded the provincial and district election disputes, including the governor and
mayor elections, as part of the meaning of “general election”. In the beginning,
the disputes of those elections were handled by the Supreme Court. At that time,
the ICC still focused on its jurisdiction in reviewing the act against the
constitution.
6.4. The Causes of Ultra Petita
Ultra Petita in the ICC has so far been caused by several factors;
namely, the judges, the approach of judicial interpretation, the undisclosed
recruitment process, and political interference, as discussed below.
6.4.1. The Judges
The ICC judges’ decisions have received praise and criticism for their
judgements. The ICC has nine judges: three derived from representatives of the
DPR, three from the President, and three from the Supreme Court. The three
judges coming from Supreme Court have more experiences from their judiciary
____________
47 Mohd. Mahfud MD (n8).48 Indonesian Constitution, Article 24C.49Indonesian Constitution, Article 22E.
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record. In contrast, the six judges representing the DPR and President have a
lack of judiciary experiences, some of them none at all. This is because most of
them come from different backgrounds, such as academician, politician, solicitor
or barrister, and so forth.50
In the ICC’s Act it is not clearly stated what mechanism can be used for
selecting the judges, making it hard to select a judge with integrity. Moreover, the
three states organs representing the ICC’s judge do not have a specific
regulation regarding the recruitment mechanism.51 The judges from DPR and the
President have lack experience in tribunal process. Most of them have not been
trained before becoming a judge, and also do not have knowledge background in
constitutional law. Usually they follow the ICC-judges-selection because are not
elected as parliament members.
Some cases have happened in the selecting process of ICC judges,
where the judge candidate who was unelected in the DPR selection, will often be
switched to the President selection, because the President selection process is
very simple, only needing a political and personal approach compared with the
DPR, who have cognitive and interview tests.52
6.4.2. The Approach of Judicial Interpretation
The judicial interpretation in the ICC is supposed to be based on the
constitution. Whereas, in fact, occasionally the ICC’s judges have used other
resources, instead of the constitution, particularly international conventions and
other countries experiences as the main resource of the interpretation.53 Another
example can be seen in the case of supervising the ICC’s judges, where the word
“judges” stated in the Act of Judicial Commission excludes the ICC’s judges.54
From those cases, it seems the ICC has used unleashed interpretation
in making a judgement. It means that the interpretation has come purely from the
____________
50Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Profil Hakim [Judges Profile],’ accessed 31 July 2015,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilHakim&id=670>51See also the Act Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, Article 20 (1).52One of ICC judges, Patrialis Akbar, after several tests in Parliament resigned, then approached
the President to be elected for ICC judge. Hukumonline, ‘Tiga Calon Hakim Konstitusti
Mengundurkan Diri’ [Three Candidates Constitutional Court Resigned], accessed 10 October 2014,
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt512dd0d76012b/tiga-calon-hakim-mk-mundur>53ICC’s Judgement (n44)54ICC’s Judgement (n28)
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judges understanding and interpretation, without considering acts, regulations,
and even the constitution itself. This interpretation has made a diversity of
meaning, and is also vulnerable to misuse for personal interest, such as
happened in the Akil’s case.
6.4.3. The Undisclosed Recruitment Process
The undisclosed recruitment process has commonly occurred. It can be
seen from the elected judges, Patrialis Akbar and Maria Farida, who have been
elected by President without any fit and proper tests, leading to public protest and
a lawsuit in the Administration Court, which decided that the recruitment process
invalidated.
In this case, the Administration Court was giving a consideration that the
recruitment process should be publicly declared, instead of being hidden by the
President. ICC’s judge is a public office; consequently, the public should know all
of the process, from the beginning.55 The judges have continued their job pending
on appeal to the Supreme Court. Morally, they should be suspended, respecting
the first judgment from the Administration Court because publicly they are
unaccepted for the judge position.
Another incongruity was Akil selection process behind closed doors
violating the ICC-judges-selection, because the quota of DPR attended members
was insufficient. Also, in that time, Akil did not attend the fit and proper test, as is
one of the requirements to becoming an ICC judge. 56
Usually, as the state organ having authority to select the ICC judges, the
DPR starts the selection process by publishing in public media, including
newspapers, television, and so forth. Furthermore, the selected candidate
fulfilling all of requirements will be attending the fit and proper test in the DPR, but
____________
55Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara (PTUN) DKI Jakarta (Administration Court of Jakarta), Case
Number 139/G/2013/PTUN-JKT, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI) and Indonesia
Corruption Watch (ICW) Vs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, on the President Decree Letter Number
87/P Year 2013 on the Constitutional Court Judges Appointments for Patrialis Akbar and Maria
Farida Indrati.56Martin Hutabarat, ‘Memang Ada Kejanggalan dalam Perpanjangan Masa Jabatan Akil Mochtar’
[Indeed There is irregularity in the Extension Term Akil Mochtar], accessed 13 October 2014
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/14/1426485/.Memang.Ada.Kejanggalan.dalam.Perpanj
angan.Masa.Jabatan.Akil.Mochtar>
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being extended. He was caught-red handed by the Corruption Eradication
Commission accepting bribery in an election dispute case.
6.4.4. The Political Interference
Political interference in the ICC was shown in the Akil’s case, that,
abusing his power to win his previous party in the Ratu Atut’s case, both Akil and
Ratu Atut were active members of the Golkar Party. As reported by the head of
Corruption Eradication Commission, Akil abused his power in several provincial
election cases.57 The warning of abuse power by Akil had been indicated since
2010, until in October 2013, his was caught red-handed receiving an amount of
money from provincial election cases, namely the provincial elections of Lebak
and Gunung Mas. Thus interference of a political party does occur, and the ICC
has no mechanism to prevent interferences. The ICC’s judges vulnerable to
interference are the judges selected by the DPR and the President, because
those organs are state organs. For future ICC judges, special arrangement is
needed to select them, including their relationship with political party.
6.5. The Impact of Ultra Petita Judgements
The main tool of constitutional courts is the power to interpret the
constitution and to ensure its application.58 The ICC has had positive and
impacts, generating a long debate over the interpretation over the 1945
Constitution.
Ultra Petita judgements have no legal background. The constitution only
explains ICC jurisdictions, and the ICC’s Act and its procedural law do not
elucidate the role of Ultra Petita. There are no articles in the ICC’s regulations
justifying Ultra Petita. After the first Ultra Petita judgement, the ICC made it
legally based, positioning the judgement as doctrine and also jurisprudence. The
Ultra Petita doctrine has threatened public trust. The interpretation by the judges
has indicated that the position of the ICC is equal in the supremacy of the 1945
Constitution. Alternatively, the rule of interpretation asserted by Bennion states
____________
57Abraham Samad, ‘Ini Kronologi Dua Kasus Yang Menjerat Akil’ [This chronology of the two cases
that led Akil],’ accessed 24 October 2014 <http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/790580/13/ini-
kronologi-dua-kasus-yang-menjerat-akil>58Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías (n21) 29,
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that the process of interpretation has to look at the main problems connected with
drafting, interpreting, and applying legislation, though there are many lesser
problems.59
Furthermore, juridical formalism allows courts to conceal legal
improvement under the guise of constitutional interpretation. The shift from
formalism to balancing marks a key transition in the emergence of courts as self-
confident actors have a creative role in constitutional maintenance.60
Above all, the decisions handed down by courts are self-validating in the
sense that they situate themselves within a context representing the source of
their authority. Authentication is a co-operative social process in which legal
theory generates an evolving structure of reasoning. Somek insisted what
remains from pluralism and cosmo-pluralism, unless they are recast as a version
of monism, is the mutually assured trust in capacities of problem solving. This
self-confidence is shared among networks of international actors whose free-
floating and self-ascribed authority lacks an impeccable legal pedigree.61
The basic philosophy behind the establishment of a constitutional court
is to protect the constitutional rights of the citizen. The constitutions are often
seen as creating a closed and hierarchically organized system of law.
Constitutional systems are taken as closed to claims of legality from outside the
system, setting forth a hierarchy of norms and institutions within the system. This
consolidation of authority is predominantly associated with a radical political
reestablishment of the state.
The constitutional rights have the character of individual rights against
the DPR; they are positions which by definition form legislative duties and limit
legislative powers.62 Similarly, the mere existence of a constitutional court
establishing legislative breaches of duty and abuse of powers for constitutional
reasons is not sufficient to ground an objection of the unconstitutional transfer of
____________
59Francis Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation Drafting and Interpretation (Oxford
University Press 2009) 79.60Miguel Schor, ‘An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The Cases of Mexico and
Colombia’ (2009) 16 (1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17761Alexander Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan KomÃirek (ed),
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012) 343-379.62Daniel Halberstam, ‘Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National,
Supranational and Global Governance’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan KomÃirek (ed), Constitutional
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012) 85.
136
competence from the legislature to the ICC. If the constitution grants to the
individual rights against the legislature and intends there to be a constitutional
court in the field of legislation to uphold these rights is not an unconstitutional
assumption of legislative competence; it is not only constitutionally permitted; it is
also required.63
In the same way, Comella insisted that constitutional courts cannot be
passive when they review legislation: they cannot easily abstain from ruling on
constitutional matters they might otherwise wish to avoid; nor can they be
extremely deferential toward the governmental majority. Despite some dangers,
this tendency toward activism is not a trait we should condemn.64
6.5.1. The Impact for the Parliament
The DPR as the lawmaker has always been involved in judicial review
by ICC, which has to give attention and consideration in earnest testimony given
by the DPR as the lawmaker. Instead of being a good partner, the DPR is a state
organ feeling really hit from ICC judgment. As the representative of the people’s
voice, the DPR has frequently felt a weak state organ instead of sovereignty.
The act making is principally a parliamentary process, related closely to
the political bargaining or the majority domination, which is potentially to bring
into legal inconsistency against the constitution. For this reason, most Indonesian
scholars are fully aware, that the judges have to be involved throughout the
process of democracy, chiefly to protect the constitution.
Constitutional judges possess broad powers to govern, in conjunction
with other state officials, by virtue of an explicit act of delegation. In the
terminology of delegation theory, constitutional courts are the agents. These
courts, when considered as functional solutions to the mixed dilemmas of
contracting and commitment, appear to conform, paradigmatically, as it were, to
the delegation theorist’s preferred logic of institutional design.65
In contrast, the National Legislation Program designed yearly has
seemed that the DPR has tended to avoid an act affected by the ICC judgment.
____________
63Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 367-368.
64Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts & Democratic Values A European Perspective
(Yale University 2009) xvi.65Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy,’ (2002) 25 (1) West
European Politics 1.
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For instance, the Electrical Power Act invalidated in 2004, and the Truth and
Reconciliation Act invalidated in 2006, those acts had not been redrafted until
2014 by the DPR.66 This can be understood, although the DPR has redrafted and
made a new one, the ICC still has power to annul or invalidate it again in the
future.
This is because the main tool of ICC courts is the power of interpreting
the constitution and to ensure its application, enforceability, and supremacy by
adapting the constitution when changes and time require such a task, but without
assuming the role of a constituent power or of the legislator, they cannot on a
discretionary political basis create legal norms or provision that cannot be
deducted from the constitution itself.67
This implies that the presence of the ICC has not only manufactured
positive impacts in the Indonesian judicial system, but also has created a long
debate over the interpretation over the 1945 Constitution. The subjective
interpretation of the constitution has been made by the judges. This has indicated
that the position of the ICC is equal with the supremacy of the 1945 Constitution,
Even in some cases are higher than the 1945 Constitution.
6.5.2. The Impact for the President
As the holder of executive power, the president directly affects the ICC’s
judgments because he constitutionally has the role as the partner of the DPR.
Although the legislator is constitutionally parliament, in the process of discussion
with the DPR in matters such as mutual consent, the president plays a large role,
and so is also involved in the process of the legislation of an act.68
For the President, the ICC judgments moreover are hard judgments. This
means that the President must implement what the ICC judgments order to do,
especially concerning the determining of disputes over the authorities of state
institutions, deciding over the dissolution of a political party, deciding over
disputes on the result of general election, and to issue a judgement over a
____________
66In the National Legislation Program. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, ‘Badan Legislasi’, accessed 27
September 2014, <http://www.dpr.go.id/id/baleg/prolegnas>67Allan-Randolph Brewer Carías (n21) 29.68Regarding relationship between the President and Parliament is regulated in the Indonesian
Constitution Article 20 Clause (5).
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petition concerning alleged violations by the President and/or the Vice-President
as provided by the constitution.
One of the cases can be seen in the case of judicial review of the Act
Number 22 of 2001 on the Oil and Earth Gas against the Constitution. The ICC,
significantly, has made other breakthroughs in protecting energy security, most
importantly, the annulment of some articles in the Act Number 22 of 2001 on the
Oil and Earth Gas. One of the ICC reasons given is that the function of the
Executive Organ (Badan Pelaksana) in the act is against the constitution.
Consequently, the function of the Executive Organ has reduced a stated role in
ensuring and controlling the distribution of the oil and gas, which could have a
deep impact on the providing of energy security in Indonesia.69
On its decision, the ICC explained that the act was unconstitutional and
does not have a binding power. The ICC asserted that the act had openly
liberated the oil and gas management, because of influence by foreign parties.
The unbundling method, separating upper course and lower course, indicates
that the strange parties want to split national industry on oil and gas. So the
foreign company can easily occupy the oil and gas industry in Indonesia. In this
case the president was quickly to react, responding by making a new president
decree.
6.5.3. The Impact for the Supreme Court
Like other judgements, the Supreme Court has also been affected by the
ICC judgment. Constitutionally, the Supreme Court has to fully obey all of the ICC
judgements. However, the Supreme Court has sometime seemed reluctant to
fully obey ICC judgments, in some cases even ignoring a judgement. This can
be seen in the Dr. Bambang’s case, where the Supreme Court made judgment
based on an article abolished by the ICC in 12 June, 2007, which was
nevertheless used by the Supreme Court in 20 October 2013.70 Dr. Bambang
____________
69ICC Judgment Number 36/PUU-X/2012 on the BP Migas. See also Kompas, ‘Alasan
Pembubaran BP Migas,’ accessed 21 February 2013,
<http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2012/11/14/15130050/Alasan.Pembubaran.BP.Migas>.70ICC’s Judgement Number 4/PUU-V/2007 on the General Practitioner. In this judgement ICC
stated that the Articles 29 Clause (1); Article 36, Article 37 (2), Article 73 (1), (2), (3), Article 75 (1),
Article 76, Article 77, Article 78, and Article 79 (a) the Act Number 29 of 2004 on General
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was sentenced to 18 months in prison.71 Responding this case, the Judicial
Commission has suggested Dr. Bambang to use the appealing mechanism to
final stages for reconsideration. The Commission has seriously concerned to the
case, and has also looked further indication of violation code of conduct and
undignified behaviour by the Supreme Court’s judges.
From that case, it can be analysed that the ICC judgements has not
widely impacted to the Supreme Court. Because the ICC does not have power to
force its judgement to be implemented by other state institutions. On this it
seemed that the ICC’s judgements were voluntarily judgments, which only have
power to be obeyed voluntarily. In this case, the Supreme Court has seemingly
classified the judgment as soft judgment, which is allowed to not be immediately
implemented after the judgment is declared by the judges, even displaying a
tendency to ignore the judgement.
6.6. The Arrangement of Ultra Petita in ICC Ordinance
Ultra Petita is a serious violation for the existence of the ICC.
Constitutionally, there are no single acts or other regulations allowing the ICC to
decide more than what is asked for. As stated in ICC’s Ordinance, every request
has to be clear in its legal standing, containing the plaintiff claim on the rights and
authorities in the constitution which has been aggrieved by the implementation an
act.72
The legal uncertainty in ICC procedural law creates difficulty for the ICC
jugdes. For the time being, the procedural law implemented in the ICC is the
ICC’s Ordinance Number 06/ 2005 on the Guidelines for the Hearing Judicial
Review Cases. This procedural law still does not arrange the limit of Ultra Petita
that allowed in the ICC.
For this reason, ICC has adopted other countries experiences, justifying
the need of Ultra Petita. The ICC has also stated “public interest” as the reason
for the legal background of establishing Ultra Petita. They have interpreted that, if
the public interest is more important than the plaintiff’s claim, then the judges can
____________
71Imam Anshori Saleh, ‘MA Penjarakan Dokter Bambang dengan Pasal yang Dihapus MK, Ini Kata
KY [SC Prisoning General Practioner with the Invalid Act] ‘accessed 12 September 2014,
<http://news.detik.com/read/2014/09/11/161501/2687799/10/ma-penjarakan-dokter-bambang-
dengan-pasal-yang-dihapus-mk-ini-kata-ky?nd771104bcj>72ICC Ordinance Number 06/ PMK/2005, Article 5 (1)b. Act of Constitutional Court, Article 51 (3).
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expand their jurisdiction to protect public interest.73 This point of view is highly
subjective, the judges could decide anything on behalf of public interest, although
this does not happen. The situation can lead a judge becoming an authoritarian
person with his interpretation power.
Responding to the superiority of ICC, Mahfud MD stated that the Ultra
Petita has not only been forbidden in the civil court, but has also been restricted
in the ICC; because if Ultra Petita has been allowed in the ICC, all contents in the
act could be reviewed, although not asked for. In this situation, the ICC can justify
that it is very important and necessary for public interest.74
Therefore, even though the ICC has been given the mandate by the
constitution as the single interpreter of constitution, it does not mean that its
interpretation can be made in a limitless manner, including using other resources
instead of the constitution, demolishing supervising mechanisms, and becoming
more supreme than parliament.
In carrying out its duties and responsibilities, the ICC must follow the
existence of rule of law, instead of rule by law. In rule of law, the law is something
the ICC serves; in rule by law, the ICC uses law as the most convenient way to
judge and interpret. Otherwise, the ICC would truly be the state organ called 'the
superior one.
6.7. Conclusion
Ultra Petita judgment has received many criticisms, which addressed
judges as the key actor. Regarding constitutional practice in the ICC, Ultra Petita
judgments are not based on the original intent of the constitution, and the ICC
has widely expanded its jurisdiction, not only reviewing or analysing, but also
invalidating or annulling all over of act.
The Ultra Petita judgements can be classified into several categories;
namely, 1. intervening parliament’s jurisdictions; 2. judging itself; 3. reviewing
president decree; 4. inconsistent on judgement formats; 5. invalidate all over act;
6. incorrect judgement code; 7. intervening supreme court authorities; 8. judging
____________
73Haposan Siallagan, ‘Masalah Ultra Petita dalam Pengujian Undang-Undang [The Problem of Ultra
Petita in Judicial Review],’ (2010) (22) 1 Mimbar Hukum 80.74Mohd. Mahfud MD, Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara Pasca Amandemen Konstitusi [The Debate
on the Constitutional Law Post Amendment of Constitution] (LP3S 2007) 73.
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based on other countries experiences; 9. judging based on scholar theory; and
10. adding jurisdiction in handling provincial and district election.
So far, the Ultra Petita has been caused by several aspects; namely, 1.
the judges; 2. approach of judicial interpretation; 3. undisclosed recruitment
process; and 4. political interference.
The ICC’s Ultra Petita has slightly manufactured the positive impacts in
the Indonesian judicial system, rather than creating negative impact. The clear
impact is a legal uncertainty, because an annulled act as a result of Ultra Petita
cannot be replaced in the near future. Therefore, the DPR has tended to avoid an
act affected by the ICC judgment. For instance, the Electrical Power Act
invalidated in 2004 and the Truth and Reconciliation Act invalidated in 2006 have
still not redrafted by the DPR until 2014. This can be understood. If the DPR had
redrafted and made a new one, the ICC would still have the power to annul or
invalidate it again in the future.
As the part of executive institution, President has also been affected by
the Ultra Petita, because of his role as the partner of parliament. In proces of law
making the legislator is the DPR but the President still plays a significant role
and  also involved in the process of the legislation of an act.
In the Supreme Court, by contrast, the ICC judgements have not strongly
impacted. The Supreme Court has seemingly classified the ICC’s judgement as
soft judgement, which is allowed to not be implemented immediately after the
judgment is declared by the judges, even displaying a tendency to ignore the
judgement. The ICC does not have power to force its judgement to be
implemented by other state institutions. On this, it seemed that ICC judgements
have looked like voluntarily judgments, which only have power to be obeyed
voluntarily.
In terms of a supervising mechanism, the recent mechanism has a crucial
weakness. The judge monitoring mechanism basically involves two supervising
bodies, namely, the internal monitoring supervisor, and external monitoring
supervisor (which involves institutions outside the organisational structure). In
order to uphold the honour, the dignity, and to maintain the behaviour of judges,
the need of an independent agency to supervise judges’ behaviour and also be
free from the interference of other institutions is absolutely necessary. This is a
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part of making good and clean governance. If not, the ICC will truly be the state
organ called the superior one.
The ICC authority to handle provincial and district election has drawn too
many critics. This jurisdiction has positioned the ICC as the ‘election bin’. With a
limited number of judges, the court needs to decide cases within a limited time. In
2013, there were 178 provincial elections in Indonesia, of which more than 90%
were brought to the ICC. This means, more than 160 provincial election dispute
were brought to the ICC. If a year is 360 days, and excluding holidays and
weekend is roughly 300 days, this means that every 2 days ICC had to judge 1
case of provincial election dispute. The session has only three times chances,
and then hearing a judgement. With these statistics and logic, quality judgements
and  judicial fairness are almost impossible to achieve. The situation is vulnerable
to abuse of power.
The main change that must be made regarding the ICC is changing the
constitution, because the main problem of ICC is strongly located within the
constitution—called the “Fifth Amendment of Constitution”. The main points for
amending the constitution are; namely 1. the prohibition of judging beyond its
jurisdictions, such as Ultra Petita; 2. centralizing the judicial review of regulations
under ICC jurisdictions; 3. creating the mechanism of asking for constitutional
opinion; and 4. supervising state organs. At this time, the supervising state organ
has been abolished by ICC judgment, stating that the ICC’s judges did not find
necessary a supervising body. This judgement makes an ICC judge vulnerable to
abusing his power.
If we compare with another country such as Germany, it seemed that the
court is not too bold in expanding its jurisdiction out of the regulations. Unlike the
case of South Korea that is brave enough to largely expand its jurisdiction,
because their regulations has allowed for it. In the context of Indonesia, the ICC
does not have a tool, such as South Korea to expand its jurisdiction, but in
practice ICC has regularly made its own tool to expand its jurisdiction, known
broadly in Indonesia as Ultra Petita.
Finally, whilst waiting for the new amendment of the constitutional court,
the ICC must return to the principle of black-letter law, deciding based on what is
stated in the constitution, without expanding or interpreting more widely. This is
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one of the ways to prevent Ultra Petita in years to come. The ICC judges should
be negative legislator, rather than the positive legislator.
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CHAPTER 7 - JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE AMENDED 1945 CONSTITUTION
7.1. Introduction
This chapter will explore judicial review in the Indonesian legal system,
particularly after the amendment of the constitution, which was a milestone of
transformational law review, from the authoritarian to the democratic era (see
Table 12). Before there is almost no space and mechanism for ordinary persons
to express legally their reluctance on the acts, decrees, regulations, and so forth.
The mechanism of judicial review can demolish the impression of the ‘sacred
constitution,’ from the time of the authoritarian era.
Pursuant to the 1945 Constitution, the authority regarding legislation lies
with the DPR.1 The provisions issued by legislative institutions are different to
those issued by executive ones, including those such as the PP, the Perpres, and
the Keppres.2 Definitions of juridical legislation, legislative act, and executive
legislations are often differentiated, because those provisions have been made
by different state institutions, follows criticism in the MPR Decree,3 which grants
authority for the MPR to review acts against the 1945 Constitution, including the
MPR Decree. Judicial review of an act, as well as the MPR Decree, will empower
a political institution instead of a judiciary process. Therefore, several authorities
of the MPR, after the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution,4 have been
transferred to the ICC.5
The third amendment of the 1945 Constitution, giving the ICC power to
review an act, is a result of a prolonged process since 1945. Muhammad Yamin
proposed the need for a judiciary institution to review laws against the 1945
Constitution. Indicating a change of thinking of all people in Indonesia, especially
____________
1The 1945 Constitution, Article 20.2PP= Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Decree), Perpres= Peraturan Presiden (President
Decree), Keppres= Keputusan Presiden (President Decision). Those provisions are positioned
below an act. See also the Act No. 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation, Article 7 which is
arranging the types and hierarchy of legal sources in Indonesia.3See also the MPR Decree Number III of 2000 on the Sources Law Hierarchy, Article 5 paragraph
(1).4See also the 1945 Constitution, the Article 24C.5Marwan Mas, ‘Mengurai Putusan Pembatalan UU Nomor 45 Tahun 1999’ [Analyzing of the
Judgment Regarding Invalidation of the Act No.45 on 1990] (2004) 1(2) Jurnal Konstitusi 19.
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those Indonesian figures regarding acts, constitution, and government
administration.6
Reviewing law by the ICC is new in the development of judicial review.7
Since its establishment, the ICC has been open for reports from people whose
rights and authority are violated by a certain act. The Indonesian people have
become aware of this new function of the ICC. Many cases were proposed in
2004, and investigated by the ICC with judgment on some.8 The establishment of
the ICC marked a new era in the power of the judiciary system in Indonesia.
Some untouchable areas, such as judicial review issues on the 1945
Constitution, can now be addressed by the ICC, including other authorities
regulated in the 1945 Constitution after the amendment.9
Jimly claims that an act is a product of democracy, which is the will of the
people, but the substance of an act does not always comply with justice and truth
according to the constitution.10 An act contradicting directly with the 1945
Constitution will, in whole or part, be considered not binding. It is an implication of
duties given to the ICC as the countervailing power as well as the guardian of
democracy.
The implications of judgment made by the ICC reviewing an act against
the 1945 Constitution need to be re-examined in terms of judiciary administration,
along with the level of consistency from those judgments.11
The implementation of juridical review according to the 1945 Constitution
is not only conducted by the ICC, but also by the Supreme Court.12 The judicial
____________
6Benny K.Harman, Mempertimbangkan Mahkamah Konstitusi: Sejarah Pemikiran Pengujian
Undang-Undang Terhadap UUD [Considering the Constitutional Court: History of Thought in
Reviewing an Act against the Constitution] (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia 2013) 145-237.7Muchamad Ali Syafa’at, ‘Pengujian Ketentuan Penghapusan Norma dalam Undang-Undang’
[Reviewing the Elimination Provision of a Norm in the Act], (2010) 7(1) Jurnal Konstitusi 2.8Bambang Sutiyoso, ‘Pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Pelaku Kekuasaan Kehakiman
di Indonesia’ [The forming of the Constitutional Court as the Actor of Judicial Power in Indonesia],
(2010) 7(6) Jurnal Konstitusi 26.9Ibid.10Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara [Introduction on the Constitutional Law]
(Sekretaris Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI 2006) 335.11Aan Eko Widiarto, Penyelenggaraan Kekuasaan Kehakiman Dan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi
[Implementation of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Court Judgment] (University of Brawijaya
2012) 1.12The Supreme Court is authorized to hear at the level of cassation, review legislations under laws,
and bear other authorities granted by laws. See also the 1945 Constitution, Article 24A paragraph
(1) of the 1945 Constitution.
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review conducted by the Supreme Court is a balancing manifestation in order that
the authority to review laws is not merely restricted to the ICC.
The ICC has an equal position to the Supreme Court. The 1945
Constitution also established a commission, which is authorized to keep the
purity, honour, and dignity of a judge, known as the Judicial Commission. It has a
significant role in upgrading the judiciary system in Indonesia, because the 1945
Constitution amendment has emphasized goals of reform in reinforcing legal
supremacy, and making institutions more clean, free, and authoritative.
Table12: Diagram of Judicial Review Pre and Post Amendment
7.2. Judicial Review pre the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution
The idea of authority to review a regulation was proposed by the founding
fathers of Indonesia since the earlier stage of independence during 1945, part of
the idea a state based on the rule of law, later known as the state-law. In one of
the meetings of the BPUPKI13 an Indonesian founding father, Mohammad Yamin,
proposed an institution authorized to resolve disputes regarding the
implementation of the constitution, and a supreme court given an authority to
compare laws.14
____________
13BPUPKI = Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, is the Investigative
Committee for the Preparation of Independence Indonesia. See also Ananda B. Kusuma, Risalah
Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI): Panitia
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI): 29 Mei 1945-19 Agustus 1945 [Minute of Sessions the
Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Independence Indonesia] (Sekretariat Negara
Republik Indonesia 1992).14 Moh. Mahfud MD, Membangun Politik Hukum Menegakkan Konstitusi [Building Political of Law
and Upholding the Constitution] (LP3ES 2006) 31
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Mohammad Yamin’s view was not widely accepted. One of his
colleagues, Soepomo, disapproved of the idea, for four reasons. Firstly, was the
basic concept of the constitution being established at that time, which did not
emphasize on separation of power, but on distribution of power. Secondly, was
that a judge was to implement the law instead of reviewing it. Next, was that the
authority given to a judge to review the law contradicted with the concept of the
MPR supremacy. Lastly, was because the Republic of Indonesia was a new
state, which just gained independent, and did not have experienced experts on
judicial review. For those reasons, the idea was not adopted by the 1945
Constitution at that time.15
Additionally, Soepomo also claimed that the term of “judicial review” was
a characteristic of the law of the United States. It investigated every government
action violating the constitution. He similarly added that the concept was
unknown in the Netherlands, in which, in this regard, authority to review was the
only concept known.16
Soepomo’s argument can be understood, because at that period most
Indonesian legal scholars made the Netherlands as the prime destination for
studying law.17 However, if Soepomo had shifted slightly to German or Austria at
that time, instead of concentrating only in Netherlands, he would have found that
the judicial review mechanism, through judicial process, was implemented in
those countries.
7.2.1. The Domination of Supreme Court
The establishment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia
dates back to the time of colonialization, and its history. It was evident from the
fact that Indonesia was colonialized by Dutch, England, and Japan at different
periods of time. However, the development of justice in Indonesia was influenced
by these eras.
____________
15Laica Marzuki, Merambah Pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi di Indonesia [Clearing-away on
the Establishment of Indonesian Constitutional Court], (Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional
2003) 79.16 Moh. Mahfud MD, (n16) 8.17Soepomo did his PhD in Leiden Netherland. He was involved directly in the legislation of the 1945
Constitution. See also Adriaan W. Bedner, Sulistyowati Irianto, Jan Michiel Otto, and Theresia Dyah
Wirastri, ed, Kajian Sosio-Legal [Socio-Legal Studies] (Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Leiden,
Universitas Groningen, 2012) 35-45.
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In 1807, Mr. Herman Willem Deandels was appointed Governor General
by Lodewijk Napoleon to defend Dutch colonialization in Indonesia from attacks
by England. Deandels made many changes in the area of judiciary established
earlier by the Dutch, amongst others was changing Raad van Justitie into Hooge
Raad in 1798.18
When the 1945 Constitution was passed, there was not any Supreme
Court in Indonesia. The only regulation referring to the Supreme Court institution
was in the 1945 Constitution.19 Later, the PP was issued to determine the City of
Jakarta Raya as the city where the Supreme Court was located.20 Then, the Act
on the Supreme Court gave staff positions in the Supreme Court and Attorney
General,21 This Act was amended in 1948 and assigned the Supreme Court as
the highest federal court.22
The Supreme Court was established on 18 August, 1945, one day after
the Indonesia’s Independence Day, by a committee dominated by the Judicial
Commission, with approval from the House of Representatives which later
appointed the President. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the state.23 It
hosts 4 judiciary institutions, the General Court, the Military Court, the Religious
Court, and the State Administrative Court. The Supreme Court Act in 198524
stated that the Supreme Court is one of the executors for the judiciary power as
the highest institution, independent from the Government or others’ influence in
performing its functions.
Three norms can be reviewed: regulatory decision, administrative
decision, and judicial decision.25 The three norms can be reviewed in court or by
other mechanisms. The Supreme Court has the following jurisdictions:
(1) to conduct judicial review towards legislations under laws
____________
18RM. A.B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 [The Birth of the 1945 Constitution]
(Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia 2004) 3.19The Supreme Court is the only state institution owning the judicial power. See also the Article 24
paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution before amendment.20 See alsot the Government Decree No. 9 of 1946 on Giving Military Rank to the Members of the
Supreme Court of the Army.21See also for the comparison the old version of the Act No. 7 of 1947 on the Supreme Court, which
was enacted on 3 March 1947.22 RM. A.B. Kusuma (n20) 4-5.23See also the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No.
III/MPR/1978 on the Position and Working Relationship Governance Institutions with Highest State/
or from High State Institutions.24See also the Act No.14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.25Jimly Asshiddiqie (n11) 1.
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(2) to declare invalid all legislations under laws if it violates the higher
legislations
(3) decision on the invalidity of a regulation is made and based on a review at
the level of cassation26
After the establishment of the ICC, the authority of the Supreme Court on
law review has been amended:
(1) The Supreme Court is authorized to review legislations under laws
towards the 1945 Constitution.
(2) The Supreme Court declares invalid legislation under the 1945
Constitution if it violates higher level legislations, or if it is not
established in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations.
(3) The judgement on the invalidity of a legislation as intended in
paragraph (2) is based on a review at the level of cassation, or based
on direct request from the Supreme Court.
(4) The legislation which has been declared invalid as intended in
paragraph (3) does not have any binding legal force.
(5) The judgment as intended in paragraph (3) should be included in the
State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia within the maximum period
of 30 (thirty) days since the judgment is declared.27
The Supreme Court plays an important role in determining the validity of a
legislation result, while the ICC’s authority is restricted to only review legislations
under the 1945 Constitution.
7.2.2. The Limitlessness of Presidential Power in Law Review
The authorities for reviewing such provisions are not restricted to judicial
authority only. The executive institutions, chiefly the President, are also
authorized to review regulations, known as executive review.28 The objects for
executive review can be divided into legislative products, and regulative ones.
The legislative products are products of regulation involving parliament as
____________
26See also the Act No.14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court. Article 31 stated that the Supreme Court
has the authority to test materially only against regulations under the Supreme Court Act.27Gede Pantja Astawa and Suprin Na’a, Dinamika Hukum Dan Ilmu Perundang-Undangan Di
Indonesia [Law Dynamics and Legislation Science in Indonesia], (Alumni 2008) 124. See also the
Act No. 5 of 2004 on the amendment for the Act No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, Article 31.28Muhammad Siddiq, Studi Epistemologi Perundang-undangan [Epistemology Studies on
Legislation], (Teratai Publisher 2011) 97.
150
legislators or co-legislators. The DPR acts as the legislator, whilst the
government as co-legislator because any bills which will be made into acts, need
discussion as well as approval by the DPR and the President.29
The president has authority to carry out executive review, limited only to
bylaws, a result of control by the central government over regulations in
autonomous provinces. Local regulations by the DPRD with the Governor shall
be submitted to the government within 7 days after enacted.30
For executive review, there are two types of control: preventive and
repressive controlling. Preventive controlling reviews local-regulations regarding
the Local Government Budget, Local Government Tax and Retribution, and
City/Municipality Spatial Planning that is the responsibility of a governor.31
Furthermore, preventive controlling is purposed to any draft of local regulation
regarding Provincial Government Budget, Provincial Government Tax and
Retribution, and Province Spatial Planning that is the responsibility of central
government. Repressive control applies all regulation passed by a local
government, including local regulation to which preventive controlling has been
conducted. Therefore, it is possible that one local regulation undergoes both
types of controls.32 The cancellation of local regulation is imposed by President
through presidential decree, no more than 60 (sixty) days since submission to
central government. However, the evaluation process conducted by the regional
government usually takes longer, which delays legal certainty.33
The standard of executive review by the government is different with the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews a bylaw to find out whether violates
higher regulations, and whether the procedure of making this regulation is in
accordance with the existing acts and regulations. The government reviews a
bylaw against a wider standard, higher level regulation, but public interest as well.
____________
29Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang [The Procedural Law on the Judicial
Review] (Konstitusi Press 2006) 30.30See also the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government, Article 136, 145.31Muhammad Siddiq, ‘Retribusi Daerah di Provinsi Otonomi Khusus: Kajian Terhadap Eksekutif
Review Peraturan Daerah [Provincial Retribution in the Special Province: A Study on Executive
Review Bylaw],’ (2010) 12 (24) Media Syari’ah: Jurnal Hukum Islam dan Pranata Sosial 1-19.32Imam Soebechi, Judicial Review Perda Pajak Dan Retribusi Daerah [The Judicial Review of the
Tax Bylaw and Livies] (Sinar Grafika 2012) 196-217.33 See also the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government.
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Public interest review depends on a variety of social laws and norms such as
lives of society, public services, public orders, and so forth.34
Cancellation of a bylaw is by presidential regulation,35 by Decree of the
Ministry of Home Affairs acting on behalf the President. Cancellation of bylaws by
Decree of the Ministry of Home Affairs should be confirmed by the Presidential
Regulation, without which the regulation is still valid.
7.3. Judicial Review Post the Amendment of the Constitution
7.3.1. The Role of Supreme Court
The 1945 Constitution as amended makes role of judicial authority has
been independent from other authority in line with the ambition of a state based
on the rule of law. The Supreme Court has been authorized to conduct judicial
review, in addition to performing court in the level of cassation, and other
authorities based on the prevailed acts and regulations.36 The Supreme Court
moreover may invalidate provisions of the PP, Perpres, Keppres, Ministry
Decrees, Perda and other regulations.37 In performing its function, the Supreme
Court has acted passively, waiting for any objections submitted by local
governments. However, the authorities of the Supreme Court in conducting
judicial review of legislations under acts have been restricted by the ICC. The
provisions being reviewed by the Supreme Court must be postponed, if the
provision relates to act which is being reviewed by the ICC until ICC decides final
judgement.38 The restriction is made because the ICC has the authority to
conduct judicial review as well.
To implement its authority to review legislations, the Supreme Court has
authority to review only the substance of the provisions, not how the provisions
have been made. The mechanisms contrast with the ICC, which can also be
reviewing a process of making an act assumed against the constitution. The
____________
34A Perda is prohibited contrary to the public interest and/ or the provisions and higher regulations.
See also the Act No.32 of 2004 on the Local Government. The Article 136 Paragraph (4).35See also the Act No.32 of 2004 on the Local Government. The Article 145 Paragraph (4).36Zainal AM. Husein, Judicial Review di Mahkamah Agung RI: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan
Perundang-Undangan [The Judicial Review in the Supreme Court; Three Decades of Judicial
Review of the Regulations] (Rajawali Pers 2009) 2-10. See also Harun Al-Rasid, ‘Hak Menguji
Dalam Teori dan Praktek [The Rights to Review in Theory and Practice],’ (2011) 1 Jurnal Konstitusi.37See also the Act No. 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation, Article 7 which is arranging the
types and hierarchy of legal sources in Indonesia.38See also the Act No. 24 of 2003 on the ICC, Article 55.
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standard used by the Supreme Court in conducting judicial review is whether the
following statement is true about the local regulation:
1) The local regulation contradicts higher level legislations; and/or
2) The local regulation is not made by complying with the prevailed acts and
regulations.
If a local regulation contradicts the higher level regulations and/or it was
not established in accordance with the prevailed acts, laws, and regulations, the
Supreme Court approves the proposal and instructs the local government along
with the DPRD, to cancel the local regulation in no more than 90 days from the
time of the decision.
7.3.2. The ICC Position
The ICC has the authority to examine the law against the constitution,
the Supreme Court to examine the existing regulations under the law so as not to
conflict with the law. The problem faced by the ICC is that the DPR often ignored
even for years, particularly acts which needed amending. The Supreme Court still
uses invalidated acts, which have been cancelled by the ICC.39
The future challenges faced by the ICC are the problem of the credibility
and dignity of the judiciary. To overcome this situation, firstly, are forceful
measures to enforce ICC’s judgments. Another effort is the dissemination of
information acts cancelled by the ICC to all state institutions, especially the
ordinary court under the auspices of the Supreme Court. For the moment, the
ICC judgments are only published on the website without a thorough
dissemination. The ICC needs additional authority to consolidate the supremacy
and safeguarding of the constitution.
Jenedri stated that safeguarding the constitution means to reinforce the
constitution, suggesting reinforcing laws and justice. The ICC is given the
position, authority, and constitutional obligation to guard and guarantee the
implementation of the constitution.40 Thus, an act is a political product which the
____________
39It can be analysed in the dr. Bambang’s case that the Supreme Court made judgment based on
the annulled Article on 12 June 2007. See also ICC Judgement No. 4/PUU-V/2007, General
Practitioner. In this judgement ICC stated that the Articles 29 Clause (1); Article 36, Article 37 (2),
Article 73 (1), (2), (3), Article 75 (1), Article 76, Article 77, Article 78, and Article 79 (a) the Act
Number 29 of 2004 on General Practitioner is invalid and against the Constitution.40Janedjri M. Gaffar, Kedudukan, Fungsi Dan Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Sistem
Ketatanegaraan Republik Indonesia, [Status, function and Role of the Constitutional Court in the
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political interest of law makers are crystalized in the act. As a political product,
the substance of an act might contradict with the constitution.
Additional authority is doing the testing on all legislation, so that there is
consistency of all legislation from the constitution to the local regulations.
Therefore, the Supreme Court, who had been holding the authority of judicial
review of legislation under the law, can only concentrate with ordinary cases
which are not reviewing regulations.
Sri Soemantri proposes that the judicial review is an authority to
investigate and assess whether the substance of legislation is inline or contrary to
the higher level laws, and whether a certain power is authorized to establish
certain legislation.41 Therefore, the objects of judicial review are divided into two
categories. There are namely, the substance of a provision, and procedure in
establishing legislation. If a request is submitted to review a provision for both
objects, what the judge has to review first is the procedure, because if a provision
is established not based on the procedure regulated by the prevailed acts and
regulations, the legislation shall be declared invalid, including its substance.
A judge defines a provision is by using two interpretations, chiefly: the
original intent or non-original intent—commonly known as textual meaning and
contextual meaning. The two interpretations have created endless argument
between legal positivism42 and progressive law. Another known theory in
constitutional law is the living constitution theory,43 considered as a principle for
progressive law.44
According to the law hierarchy, the substance of a lower-level law shall
not violate or refer to that of higher-level law (see Table 13). To test whether an
____________
Constitutional System of the Republic of Indonesia] (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia
2009) 11.41Sri Soemantri, Hak Menguji Material di Indonesia [The Rights to Review in Indonesia] (Alumni
1986) 842Hans Petter Graver, Judges against Justice on Judge when the Rule of Law is Under Attack
(Springer 2015) 205-224. See also Wilfrid J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Clarendon
Press 1994).43See also Michael E. Parrish, ‘The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution by John W.
Compton (review),’ (2015) 45 (4) Journal of Interdisciplinary History 593-594.44Sekretaris Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi, Perkembangan Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-
undangan di Mahkamah Konstitusi-Dari Berpikir Hukum Tekstual ke Hukum Progresif, [The
Development of Judicial Review in ICC- from the Textual Legal Thought to the Progresive La]
(Sekretaris Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi 2010) 11.
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act contradicts with the constitution, the mechanism used is judicial review.45 If an
act, or any part in it, is declared to violate the constitution, then the act shall be
cancelled by the ICC. Through a judicial review authority, the ICC becomes a
state institution ensuring that there are no such acts or any provisions violating
the constitution.
Table 13: The obelisk of law hierarchy in Indonesian legal system
Source: The Act Number 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation
Above all, in the future it is expected that the ICC will be the only state
organ owning authority to carry out the judicial review for all regulations not
sharing with government as executive. Thus, the government will no longer be
justified to use its power to review legislative product in the provincial level.46
Because the government is in the domain of executive, notwithstanding, the
DPRD/DPRA is in the domain of legislative, even in provincial or district level.
At the moment, in practice, the revocation of regulation by the
government is in the form of ministry, because the government has delegated the
____________
45Ibid.,14.46In the Article 136 Clause 4 the Act Number 32 of 2004 on the Local Government, stating that
‘Bylaw prohibited contrary to the public interest and / or legislation higher’.
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power to the Minister of Home Affairs. There are two tools which are commonly
used by the ministry to test the bylaw regulation; namely, preventive and
repressive. The preventive process uses for regulation relating to financial
regulations such as taxes, levies, layout, and budget. The repressive process
uses for regulation which is indicated as a contradicting regulation during the
legislation process. If the regulation has contradiction, it will not be passed to be
a bylaw, and will be removed in earlier. The tested regulation by government is a
means of control, in order to avoid future problems in society.
Table 14: The differences of the SC and ICC after the 1945 Constitution
amendment
Differences The Supreme Court The ICC
Authority
according to the
1945
Constitution
1. hearing at the level of
cassation;
2. reviewing provisions under
the acts;
3. other authorities granted by
acts.
(Article 24A paragraph [1] of the
1945 Constitution)
1. hearing at the first and last
process which results in final
decision to review laws
toward the 1945 Constitution;
2. deciding disputes between
the authority of state
institutions whose authorities
are granted by the 1945
Constitution;
3. deciding dismissal of a
political party;
4. deciding disputes regarding
general election;
5. impeachment the President
and/or Vice President.
(Article 24C paragraph [1] of the
1945 Constitution)
Duties and
Authorities
The Supreme Court is given
duties and authority to review
and decide (Article 28
paragraph [1] of Supreme Court
Act):
1. request for cassation;
2. disputes on authority to
adjudicate.
The Supreme Court has a
jurisdiction in the first process
and latest for all disputes:
a. between court in a certain
judiciary institution and that
in another;
b. between courts under
different high courts in the
level of appeal under the
same judiciary institution;
The ICC has a jurisdiction in the
first process and latest which its
decision will be considered as a
final decision to (Article 10
paragraph [1] of ICC Act):
1. review laws towards the
1945 Constitution;
2. deciding disputes between
the authority of state
institutions whose
authorities are granted by
the 1945 Constitution;
3. deciding dismissal of a
political party;
4. deciding disputes regarding
general election.
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c. between two high court
appeals under the same or
different judiciary institutions.
(Article 22 of the Supreme
Court Law)
3. request for appealing of
judgement with permanent
legal power. This is an
extraordinary legal remedy.
In this case, the Supreme
Court conducts the latest
correction towards a
judgment containing injustice
due to errors and mistakes of
a judge;
4. Judicial review for the
provision under the acts
(Article 31 of the Act No. 5 of
2004)
Candidacy of a
judge
The judges’ candidate proposed
by the KY to the DPR for
approval. (Article 24A
paragraph [1] of the 1945
Constitution)
The ICC has nine members of
constitutional judges appointed
by the President. The
candidates are proposed by the
Supreme Court (three
candidates), the House of
Representatives (3 candidates),
and The President (3
candidates). (Article 24C
paragraph [3] of the 1945
Constitution)
Number of
judges
The maximum number of
Supreme Court judges is 60.
(Article 4 of Act No. 5 of 2004)
The ICCs has 9 judges. A chief
justice concurrently serving as
member, a deputy chief justice
concurrently serving as member,
and 7 members of constitutional
judges. (Article 4 paragraph [2]
of Act No. 8 of 2011)
Branches of
judiciary
authority
The Supreme Court has
branches of judiciary authority,
consisted of judiciary
institutions under the Supreme
Court in general high court,
religious high court, and military
high court, and administrative
high court. (Article 24
paragraph [2] of the 1945
Constitution and Article 65 of
Act No. 14 of 1985)
In exercising its power, the ICC
does not have any branches of
judiciary authority. There is only
one ICC located in the capital
city of Indonesia. (Article 3 of the
Act of ICC)
The nature of
judgment
The judgment of the Supreme
Court is considered a final
judgment, but a legal remedy is
possible by reviewing the
judgment with permanent legal
power and clemency.
The judgment of the ICC has a
final binding and no legal
remedy is possible. (Elucidation
of Article 10 paragraph [1] of the
Act No 8 of 2011)
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- the legal remedy to review
is regulated in Article 66 –
76 of Law No 14 of 1985)
- For judgment with
permanent legal force, a
convict may request
clemency to the President.
(Article 2 paragraph [1] of
the Act No. 22 of 2002 on
Clemency). After that, the
Supreme Court provides
legal advice to the
President in order that the
President is able to grant or
reject the clemency. (Article
35 of the Act No. 14 of
1985)
7.3.3. The Boundary of Presidential Authority in Law Review
There are several parties as well as states institutions which have the
rights to review the local regulations. The rights to review are not only owned by
the Supreme Court, but are also owned by the President and his ministries.47
These authorities have purposed to fully control the local governments, whether
they have a special autonomy, or only ordinary autonomy.
The controlling of implementation of a local government is a process
aimed for ensuring that the local government is running based on the prevailed
acts and regulations. According to the relation between central and local
government, controlling is a mechanism to maintain the unity of the country, in
order that autonomy does not threaten the unity. Controlling a local regulation is a
part of local government implementation in Indonesia.
The local regulations are consisted of 1. Perda for the provincial level, 2.
Perda for the district level, 3. Governor Decree, and 4. Mayor Decree.48 In
controlling those local regulations, the government has used a mechanism
____________
47Riawan Tjandra, W. and Kresno Budi Darsono, Legislative Drafting Teori dan Teknik Pembuatan
Peraturan Daerah [Legislative Drafting, Theory and Technic on Making Bylaws] (Universitas Atma
Jaya 2009) 21.48In various autonomy province of Indonesia, the term of Perda have been called in various name.
In Aceh is called Qanun, in Papua and West Papua is called Perdasi and Perdasus. See also the
the Act No. 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation, in the explanation of Article 7. See also
Jum Anggriani, ‘Kedudukan Qanun dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Daerah dan Mekanisme
Pengawasannya [The Position of Qanun within Local Government System and Its Supervising
Mechanism],’ (2011) 18 (3) Jurnal Hukum, 333-334.
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regulated by the prevailed acts and regulations.49 The mechanism for controlling
the local regulation is regulated in the Act of the Local Government stating that
Any local regulation must be submitted to the Government in no more
than 7 (seven) days after being endorsed. Seven days is given to allow it
to be delivered from the Central Government to the Local Government.
The local regulation which contradicts the public interests and/or the
higher regulations shall be cancelled by the Local Government…,50
The decision of the cancellation of the local regulation is laid down in the
Perpres, in no more than 60 (sixty) days after the local regulation has been
received. If the province/district/municipality cannot accept the decision on the
cancellation of the local regulation on reason justified by the acts, the
governors/mayors may file an objection to the Supreme Court.51
Supervision and controlling for the implementation of the local
government are conducted by the President. It includes the supervision and
controlling for the implementation of local government, local regulation, and
governor regulation. The purposes of this supervision and controlling are to
clearly implement the goal of local autonomy implementation, and to ensure that
the local government is running as planned and in accordance with the highest
norm. For those purposes, a number of regulations have been regularly
established, including the government regulations as well as the ministry
regulations.
The President, as the holder executive power, commonly, will not review
the local regulations by his own hand. He functions his executive review power
through the Ministry of Home Affairs, who will review those regulations within two
months.52 The delegation of authority in this context is very reasonable,
____________
49Meri Yarni and Latifah Amir, ‘Penguatan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Yang Baik Dalam
Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Sebagai Pilar Penegakan Hak Asasi Manusia Di
Indonesia [Strengthening Good Governance In Formation Laws and Regulations for the Pillar
Enforcement of Human Rights in Indonesia],’ (2015) 5(2) Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 133. See also the
Decree of Ministry of Home Affairs No.1 of 2014 on the Forming of Local Regulations.50See the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government. Article 145.51See the Government Regulation No. 79 of 2005 on Guideline for Supervision and Control of Local
Government. See Article 37.52See the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government. Article 145.
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considering the number of provinces and districts in Indonesia are too many.53
Thus, the President can concentrate on other important tasks.
If a local regulation is contrary to the related acts and regulations, it can
be declaring invalid by the Ministry. However, if the Governor/Mayor and/or the
DPRD/DPRK are reluctant to accept the ministry decision regarding the invalidity
of the regulations, they may legally file an objection to the Supreme Court. The
second institution to review the local regulation is the Supreme Court through a
judicial review.54
The executive review which may result in the cancellation of a local
regulation through a Presidential Regulation, which finally becomes a Regulation
of the Ministry of Home Affairs, has been debated by politicians, lawyers, and
academicians. It is considered contrary to the interpretation of doctrine
argumentum a contrario.55 Thus, the interpretation or elucidation of a law has
been regulated in several acts. It is based on opposite definitions between a
concrete event happening at the time, and a concrete event happening in the
past. In argumentum a contrario doctrine interpreting the cancellation of a
decision can only be done by the institution issuing the decision.
The former ICC judge, Jimly has not fully agreed with those
mechanisms. He asserted that local regulations cannot be cancelled unilaterally
by the central government through the executive review mechanisms. The central
government is supposed not be given power to invalid the regulations by the Act
of Local Government.56 His opinion can be understood. As a Kelsenian, he wants
to protect the local norms existing in the local regulations from being invalidated
by the political process, but must be through the judicial process in the Supreme
Court.
____________
53The Republic of Indonesia are consisted of 34 Provinces, 403
Districts, and 98 Cities. Kemendagri, Profil Daerah [District Profile], accessed 14 March 2015
<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/pages/profil-daerah>54 See the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government. Article 145.55Argumentum a contrario (Latin) or argument from the contrary is an argument for different
treatment made by negative reasoning from another argument.  Accessed 14 March 2015.
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-
9780195369380-e-243>.56Jimly Asshiddiqie (n11) 1.
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Furthermore, to control the regulations under the act, the Ministry on
behalf of the President have conducted two methods of controlling. 57 Firstly, is
through repressive controlling. Succeeding the beginning of the democratic and
dispersed era in Indonesia, both political and socio-economic environments have
tended to be more dynamic on the common level. The amendment, in the most
projecting term originates in local politics, covering four fundamental sides
including political, constitutional law, public administration, as well as repressive
controlling onto local regulations. The repressive controlling is conducted when a
local regulation has been made. In repressive controlling, the controlling process
may result in the cancellation of a local regulation, decided by the Presidential
Regulation.58
In reality, the cancellation of a local regulation is not conducted through
a Presidential Regulation but by the Regulation of the Ministry of Home Affairs
who is acting on behalf of the President.
Repressive supervision shall similarly happen if the result of the review
made by the governor is not followed up by the regent/mayor;59 who instead
insists on enacting the drafts as its regional regulation and regent/mayor
regulation. In this regard, the governor shall cancel both the regional regulation
draft and regent/mayor regulation draft and simultaneously declare the enactment
of the APBD of the previous year. Similarly, the stages of review over regional
regulation draft on spatial plan follows the same mechanisms as those for the
regional regulation draft on APBD. However, repressive controlling will not easily
be implemented in the years to come. The Act on the Formulation of Regulation
has limited the mechanism of cancelation regarding the local regulations. It stated
that
1) In the case that a statutory regulation is allegedly against the 1945
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Constitutional Court shall test
(review) it; and
____________
57See the Government Regulation No. 79 of 2005 on Guideline for Supervision and Control of Local
Government. See Article 37.58See the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local Government. Article 145.59Tri Widodo W Utomo, ‘Beberapa Issu Strategis Jangka Pendek Di Daerah Dan Langkah
Antisipasinya [Some Short Term Strategic Issues in the Region and Anticipation Step],’ (2014) 1(1)
Jurnal Borneo Administrator 11.
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2) In the case that a statutory regulation inferior to the acts allegedly
contradicts to the acts, the Supreme Court shall carry out a judicial review
over it.60
In terms of hierarchy a regional regulation is a legislative product below
an act and President Regulations. It is understood that the ICC signifies the only
institution that can undertake to review an act against the 1945 Constitution.
Therefore, the test over a regional regulation that allegedly contradicts public
interests or its superior law, both formally and materially, can only be conducted
by the Supreme Court.
Thus, it can be said that the central government has no longer what is
called a repressive surveillance, because it does not distinguish the estimator
subject. Referring to the doctrine lex posteriori derogate lex priore,61 several legal
norms consisted in the Regional Government Act have automatically been
deleted and removed, most importantly their legal forces.62 Consequently, the
central government absolutely loses its authority to review a repressive
supervision over a regional regulation; rather, it can only be done through the
Supreme Court.
With this consequence, all parties are supposed to be aware that the
executive review is a repressive control that is legally no longer applicable. The
President and his ministry should have no power to cancel and/or to invalidate a
regional regulation. If the central or provincial government need to review a
regional regulation, they must submit an appeal to the Supreme Court. To enable
the implementation of this need, a statutory regulation regarding the procedures
of regional regulation review appeal by the central and provincial government to
the Supreme Court should be immediately formulated.
____________
60The enactment of the Act of the Forming of the Legislation has provided a space to question the
executive review, especially in regards with the revocation mechanism of a regional regulation by
the President. See the Act No. 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation, Article 9 point (2) and
(3).61Lex posteriori derogate lex priore (Latin) is a principle of treaty interpretation, as a supplementary
means of interpretation under Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention. Accessed 14 March 2015.
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195389777.001.0001/acref-
9780195389777-e-1330>.62The Act No. 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation, Article 9 point (20] has removed the
legal force entitled to Article 145 and article 185 point (5) of the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Local
Government.
162
The principle of local autonomy used by the Government is the broadest
possible autonomy. The local government has consequently given power to
manage all affairs. The local government should be given authority to make its
own policies, providing services, improve its participation, community
empowerment for the welfare and improvement of the people.
Lastly, is through preventive controlling. Preventive controlling is
commonly done before the activity started, and is basically made to avoid
misconduct in an activity.63 Preventive controlling is specified for a bill or
legislation that is in the drafting process.64 Preventive controlling is also
conducted through an evaluation by the Ministry of Home Affairs towards the
draft of provincial regulations, which are related to several matters; namely,
a. Local Tax
b. Local Retribution
c. Local Budget
d. General Plan for Spatial Planning
Evaluation for the draft of local regulations on local tax and retribution is
clearly regulated by the Act of Local Tax. Those regulation drafts must technically
be submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance in no
more than 3 (three) days since its approval date, before it is passed to the further
mechanisms. In addition, the draft coming from district level has to pass the
Governor’s review, before being submitted to the Ministry, in no more than 3
(three) days since its approval date. 65
The time limit for the Governor in making decision is no more 15 days
after receiving the application. Furthermore, the Home Affairs Minister and the
Governor—according to their respective authority—review the drafts to test their
compatibility on the public interests and/or other acts and regulations superior to
them. The review is conducted in coordination with the Ministry of Finance,
resulting in either approval or rejection.
____________
63 Revrisond Baswir, Tony Prasetyantono, and R. Maryatmo, Politik Ekonomi Indonesia Baru
[Polical Economy in the New Indoesia] (Forum LSM 2000) 123.64Endang Purwaningsih, ‘Bentuk Pelanggaran Hukum Notaris Di Wilayah Provinsi Banten Dan
Penegakan Hukumnya,’ [The Shape of the Notary Law Violations in Banten Province area and
Enforcement Legal], (2015) 27(1) Mimbar Hukum 14-28.65See the Act No.28 of 2009 on the Provincial Regulation on Tax and Retribution, Article 157-159.
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If the review leads to rejection, the passing of the result should be
accompanied with the reasons of rejection. Whilst, once a regional regulation
draft is approved, it can be immediately decided to be enacted. The rejected
regional regulation draft, however, still has the chance of revision by the
governors or the mayors, together with their respective parliaments.
Subsequently, the revised versions can be passed back to the ministries through
the governor or mayors.
In case of a regional regulation draft goes against the public interests
and/or contradicts any acts superior to it, and then the Ministry of Finance shall
recommend the President to cancel that regional regulation draft. The
cancellation recommendation shall be passed through the Home Affairs Minister
no later than twenty working days, since the date of the regional regulation draft
is received. Based on the cancellation recommendation, the Home Affairs
Minister proposes to the President the proposal for the regional regulation draft
cancellation.66
To these extents, to assure that a regional legislative product is within
the national legal system framework, preventive supervision should be optimized.
Therefore, the amendment of the Act of Local Government should be observed
and implemented immediately.67 So that, the preventive supervision over the
drafts of regional legislation is not confined solely to the matters on taxes, levies,
regional revenue and spending budget, and spatial planning, but also to all other
materials.
7.4. Dissenting Opinions Amongst the Judges
One of the result from legal reform in Indonesia, post the amendment of
1945 Constitution, is the freedom of expression by judges, when deciding a case.
Judges can disagree with the majority of the members of the assembly, and the
opinion is included as an integral part of the court judgment. A different opinion is
now commonly called a dissenting opinion.
____________
66See also Mailinda Eka Yuniza and Adrianto Dwi Nugroho, ‘Mekanisme Pertanggungjawaban
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Studi Kasus Di Yogyakarta) [Accountability
mechanisms Budget and Expenditure-Case Study in Yogyakarta],’ (2014) 25(2) Mimbar Hukum
231-243.67Johan Kaloh, Mencari Bentuk Otonomi Daerah: Suatu Solusi Dalam Menjawab Kebutuhan Lokal
Dan Tantangan Global [Finding the Form of Regional Autonomy: A Solution In Answering the
Needs of Local and Global Challenges] (Rineka Cipta 2007) 72-75.
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In defining the term of dissenting opinion, Hussain mention that the
dissenting opinion is the opinion of a judge who disagrees with the decision or
recommended opinion, whilst a distinct opinion is one in which a judge supports
the view of the majority. It can also be said that the dissenting is when the judge
finds it hard to agree with the effective part of the judgment or opinion; whereas in
separate view the judge agrees with operative part, but disagrees with the
majority on the grounds of decision.68
In differentiating between dissenting opinion and concurring opinion,
which commonly happens in Indonesian justice system, Sarwoko (a former
Supreme Court judge), stated that the dissenting opinion, since the beginning of
consideration, has been different; starting from the legal fact, legal
considerations, until the judgment, are different. In contrast, the concurring
opinion is that the legal fact and legal consideration are the same, but the
verdicts are relatively different. The base statement, chiefly in the Indonesian
criminal justice system, is indictment. If indictment has been different, it means a
difference since the beginning. Although the guilty in a case is fairly clear, in
responding an indictment could be different. It entered a dissenting opinion
because of different indictment.69
Although there are three dissenting opinions, the panel still can take a
decision. The court cannot let the dissenting opinion hinder decision making. For
instance, in the existing mechanisms established in the Supreme Court, justices
can be added if the case cannot be disconnected because there was a dissenting
opinion.70
An overview of the tradition of a dissenting opinion, Germany became the
first European country to legislatively recognize dissenting opinion within its
positive law during the drafting of the Judicature Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz)
in 1877. The example of Germany was followed by Spain and Portugal, which
permitted the use of dissenting opinions in their constitutional courts from the
____________
68Ijaz Hussain, Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1984) 8.69Djoko Sarwoko, ‘Dissenting Opinion di Mata Hakim Agung [Dissenting Opinion on the Eye of
Supreme Court Judge], accessed 23 December 2014,
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt51f1005f68a4c/idissenting-opinion-i-di-mata-mantan-
hakim-agung>70Ibid.
165
time of their establishment. Actually, dissenting opinions were considered to be
part of the German model at that time (the end of the 1970s).71
Indonesia is relatively new in the application of a dissenting opinion. This
idea was first introduced in 1998,72 furthermore, in the Act of Judicial Power and
in the Act of The ICC.
A judgment taken by a judge would not necessarily be the same. The
factors of interpretation in the trial, the legal knowledge of the judge, and their
beliefs will also influence the attitude of the judge whilst making decisions. The
judgment of the judges’ assembly are taken during the deliberations.
The discussions and debates during the consultative meeting can
influence a judge’s decision. A junior judge for example may have a reluctant
sense to oppose the opinion of senior judges. They are still reluctant and not
brave enough to dissent with others, not only because of the seniority, but also
from concern over other judges excluding them from other parties.73 Before
reaching a final judgment, a judge should be questioning to his heart, whether a
judgment will be giving a fairness judgment, or not. The judge must consider,
assess, and choose the final judgment—which influences people’s lives.
Dissenting opinion in some cases is essential. It is a realization of the
democratization of justice, judicial transparency, and independent opinion
requiring free speech. It also prevents collusion; corruption and nepotism; as well
as preventing the judicial mafia.
The main debate concerning dissenting opinion, however, is whether the
judgment should be attached within a judgment, or in the separate note, because
it does not show a tangible benefit, most importantly for those who were defeated
in court.74 In term of dissenting opinion in the ICC, there is not a strict correlation
between constitutional justice and the publication of dissenting opinions. It can be
____________
71Katalin Kelemen, ‘Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts,’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal
1347.72The Dissenting Opinion was firstly introduced in the Act Number 4 of 1998 on the Bankruptcy.
See also Sunarmi, ‘Dissenting Opinion Sebagai Wujud Transparansi Dalam Putusan Peradilan
[Dissenting Opinion As Being Transparency In Court Ruling],’ (2007) 12 (2) Jurnal Equality 146-
150.73Tata Wijayanta and Hery Firmansyah, Perbedaan Pendapat dalam Putusan Pengadilan
[Dissenting Opinion in the Court Judgment], (Pustaka Yustisia 2011)90.74Soedarsono, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tanpa Mufakat Bulat: Catatan Hakim Konstitusi
Soedarsono [Constitutional Court Judgment Without Consensus Round; A Note of Judge
Soedarsono], (Sekretariat Jenderal Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi 2008) 27.
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said that permitting ICC judges to publish their disagreements has become a
strong development in Indonesia, which might be following the success story in
Europe. This has happened because of increasing the judicial transparency in
Indonesia after law reform, and is also due to the limitless discussions over the
democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts.
However, looking to European experiences, even if today the majority of
European constitutional courts are permitted to publish dissenting opinions, there
is much heterogeneity as to how they make use of the possibility. The non-ICC-
judges are still not tolerated in stating their dissent publicly. The ICC’s judges,
who attach a higher value to institutional loyalty than common law judges, are still
quite reluctant to dissent. In this respect, even in constitutional justice, the classic
division between civil law and common law carries some weight, as the mentality
of the jurist tends to differ.75
The repetition of dissenting opinions discloses that there is still much
difference in the mind-set of judges between common law and civil law systems.
Therefore, an examination of dissenting opinions in constitutional courts can offer
a very instructive and opened-eyed picture on continental European constitutional
adjudication.
7.5. Conclusion
The concept of judicial review over statutory legislation has already
existed since the convening of the BPUPKI, in meeting prior to the independence
of Indonesia. The judicial review concept was initiated by the founding fathers,
granting the authority to the judicial power institution. The Supreme Court, as the
highest court after independence, had authorities to review laws. But it could not
run up because of lack of legal scholar.
During the old order, and the new order period, the dominance of the
Supreme Court was very strong. The Supreme Court was granted the authority to
conduct a judicial review, but its authority was restricted to examining regulations
under inferior to the 1945 Constitution.
____________
75Katalin Kelemen, ‘Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts,’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal
1371.
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The concept of review is recognized not only in the judicial domain, but
also in other innermost power domains, such as the legislative and the executive.
In this instance, the implementation of executive review was restricted to the
regulations inferior to the acts, namely, the regional regulations in specific
province. This was due to the nature of heavy executive influence in the
governance system of Indonesia during the New Order era. The executive review
preceding the amendment of the 1945 Constitution was performed by the central
government, to preserve its control over the regulations issued by regional
government, as a result of regional autonomy implementation within the
centralised system.
Upon the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, however, the central
government still maintains its executive review under the legal force as provided
in the Act No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Government. Furthermore, the
authority of the central government to cancel or annul a legislative product inferior
to the act is restricted to regional regulation and the governor or regent/mayor
regulation. The legislation cancellation authority made through executive review,
serves as a repressive supervision over regional legislative products, to ensure
they are in line with their superior laws.
The role of the ICC as the guardian of the constitution also contributes to
carry out judicial review over statutory regulations, but focusing only to review an
act against the 1945 Constitution. This is highlighted in article 24C of the 1945
Constitution, as well its statutory derivatives.
The authority of the ICC in reviewing an act against the 1945 Constitution
also confines the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the regulations below an
act. The Supreme Court is not permitted to review regulations whilst the ICC has
been reviewing the act related to those regulations. Consequently, these
mechanisms have occurred because the Indonesia legal system has not
centralised the judicial review system in the one state institution, such as in
Austria and Germany. This mechanism has frequently postponed the legal
certainty for the parties feeling their rights have been corrupted by the existence
of such local regulations.
The divided mechanisms of judicial review into the separated institutions,
instead of concentrating in one state institution have frequently made the law
vacuum. Sometimes, these state institutions, such as the ICC and the Supreme
168
Court, disobey each other. Kelsen has anticipated this problem when designing
the Austrian Constitutional Court. He centralised the jurisdictions to carry out
judicial review only in the constitutional court, and shared the ordinary case—
which was not closely related to judicial review—to be solved by the ordinary
court, and placed the Supreme Court as the appeal level.
The President’s authority in executive review mechanisms of repressive
controlling, as well as preventive controlling, will also create a snow ball effect.
The President, with his authority, could easily cherry-pick local regulations, which
he does not like to be effortlessly annulled. Thus, the review of local regulation,
produced by the local parliament, is supposed to be reviewed through judiciary
process, instead of political process done by the President. He is supposed to be
given the authority only to review the product of the state government officer
under his domain, particularly ministries and governors/mayors. If the President
objects to fully accepting the local parliament product, he can be given a chance
to carry out judicial review through judicial process, instead of political process.
Above all, one of result from post amendment of the 1945 Constitution is
the freedom of expression by judges when deciding a case. Judges can disagree
with the majority of the members of the assembly, and the opinion is included as
an integral part of the court judgment. A different opinion is now commonly called
a dissenting opinion. The debate on this matter is whether the dissent needs to
be combined within a judgment, or be better elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 8 - SPECIAL AUTONOMY IN INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY OF
ACEH PROVINCE
8.1. Introduction
The approach in this chapter uses the case study that occurred in Aceh
province, and considers some ICC judgments (as black-letter law) that influence
the autonomous regulations. With interpretation power, the ICC makes a
significant role in preventing clash of regulations - discussed in sub-chapter “The
ICC Involvement in Aceh Province”. Another important sub-chapter is “Potential
Conflict Between Central Government and Provincial Level” – which identifies
clash of regulations during special autonomy in Aceh.
The special autonomy implemented in Aceh has a long historical
background. It is a compensation of ending 30 years’ conflict which happened
during 1975-2005. The conflict has emerged serious concern from human rights
activist regarding the civil victims indirectly involved in the conflict.1 As an Aceh
resident, the researcher has personal experience of the conflict. A person could
be easily tortured; even murdered for accusation of involvement in the Free Aceh
Movement; or jailed for many years with extrajudicial process.2
The conflict was mainly triggered by the injustice of central government in
the sharing of revenue from the exploitation of natural resource. The natural liquid
gas was found and explored on 24 October, 1971 by Exxon Mobil.3 Despite the
exploration increasing Aceh revenue and prosperity, it made Aceh the poorest
province in Indonesia. This fact created a significant social prosperity, and then
emerged the conflict, led by the Free Aceh Movement.
The Tsunami disaster of 26 December, 2004, that killed 126,741 people,4
finally ended the conflict. The Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian
____________
1Ian Bannon, and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions
(World Bank publications  2003) 28-30.2Based on the Act No. 11/PNPS of 1963 on the Eradication of Subversive Activities, everyone can
be jailed with extrajudicial process, if someone, base on the assumtion, can threat national security.
This act was later abolished after the reformation era in 1998. Benedict Richard O'Gorman
Anderson,Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia (SEAP Publications 2001) 215.3Exxonmobil, ‘ExxonMobil Indonesia at a Glance Aceh Production Operations Fact Sheet,’
accessed 12 October 2015, <http://www.exxonmobil.com/Indonesia-
English/PA/Files/pub_fs_APO_052015.pdf>4Reuters, ‘Asia Remembers Devastating 2004 Tsunami with Tears and Prayers,’ accessed 12
October 2015,
< http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/12/26/us-tsunami-anniversary-idUKKBN0K30PR20141226>
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Government signed the memorandum to end the conflict, later known as the MoU
Helsinki 2005.5 To be constitutionally applicable in the Indonesian legal system,
some of the MoU articles have been incorporated in Act Number 11 of 2006 on
the Governing of Aceh. The act has been recognized as the fundamental
regulation for implementing special autonomy in Aceh the 1945 Constitution, and
allows the ICC authority for judicial review on the Act of Governing Aceh, instead
of the MoU Helsinki.
Special autonomy in Aceh province is identified as part regional autonomy
in Indonesia, giving right, authority, and responsibility of the local government to
organize and manage its own region in accordance with the legislation in force.
Local government is granted by the central government the rights to set up and
take care of their own affairs and interests, as provided in the 1945 Constitution.6
Article 1 point (1) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that Indonesia is a Unitary
State in the form of Republic. The unitary state emphasized is an archipelagic
nation, considering the geography of Indonesia, which consists of a wide range of
waters and myriads of islands.7
Republic denotes a governing system based upon democracy. The
regions that make up Indonesia are therefore called provinces instead of states.8
A local governing system is based upon the principles of autonomy and
assistance (co-administration)9 for the governing of the provinces.10
Decentralization comprises three (3) terms; namely,
1) Decentralization in the sense of de-concentration;
2) Decentralization in the sense of authority delegation;
____________
5See also Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?
(East-West Center Washington2005) 42.6Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia [Constitution and Constitutionalism
of Indonesia] (Konpress 2006) 257-286.7A unitary state is a state governed as one single unit in which the central government is supreme
and any administrative divisions (subnational units) exercise only powers that their central
government chooses to delegate. Accessed 21 March 205, <
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Unitary+States>.8The Republic of Indonesia is divided into provinces and the provinces are composed of districts
(kabupaten) and municipalities each of which has its own local government which is regulated by
law. See the 1945 Constitution, Article 18 point (1).9See the 1945 Constitution, Article 18 point (2)10The implementation of autonomy and co-administration is further regulated by law namely the Act
No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government. The implementation of the Act No. 23 of 2014 has
purposed to amend the Act No.32 of 2004 as well as the Act No.12 of 2008 on the Local
Government.
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3) Decentralization in the sense of devolution of functions and authority
delegation.
De-concentration is the delegation of tasks or workload by the central
government to the representatives of the central government in the regions with
the absence of authority delegation, to make decisions. Authority delegation
(transfer of authority by the central government) means the handover of decision
making authority to the regions or local governing units that lie beyond the reach
of the central government's control. Devolution is the delegation of governing
function and authority by the central government to Local Government, which
becomes autonomous and out of the control of the central government.11
Decentralization has the following characteristics:
1) Territorial decentralization: the delivery of government affairs, or the
delegation of authority to administer the government affairs from the higher
level government to a lower level government unit, based on territory;
2) Functional decentralization: handover of the government affairs, or the
delegation of authority from a higher-level government to a lower-level
government unit, to organize the government affairs on the basis of
purposive aspects (such as to Subak in Bali);
3) Political decentralization: the delegation of authority that comes along with
the right to take care of their own domestic affairs through the political body
in the region, that is elected by the people. This also has a correlation to
territorial decentralization;
4) Cultural decentralization: the grant of rights to certain groups to organize
their own cultural activities, such as the educational activities for the foreign
embassies, and nagari (village) autonomy to organize its own cultural
activities. Such grants apparently do not include local government affairs,
whilst economic decentralization means the delegation of authority in the
administration of economic activities;
5) Administrative decentralization: delegation of parts of the authority to self-
governing tools or units in the region.
Article 18B point (1) of the 1945 Constitution states that the Nation
recognizes and respects the local government units that have special or specific
____________
11Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara [Introduction on the Constitutional Law],
(Sekretaris Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI 2006) 28.
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characteristics as regulated by law. There are many views saying that the
provisions of the article are contrary to the concept of the unitary state adopted
by Indonesia.12
Edie states that the Article 18B (1), and the Act No. 32 of 2004 as
amended by the Act No. 23 of 2014 stipulates that the nation recognizes the
privilege and the specificity, as long as there is compatibility to the diversity
concept within the system of the Republic of Indonesia. This is analogous to the
concept of diversity in unity (unity in diversity) within the federal system,13 and
goes against the unitary state concept adopted by Indonesia, as highlighted in
Article 1 point (1) of the 1945 Constitution.14 Philipus argues that four principles
are implied by the provisions of the Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution. They are
1. the principle of territorial division is hierarchical as in point (1);
2. the principle of autonomy and co-administration as in point (2);
3. the principle of democracy as in point (3) and point (4); and
4. the principle of great autonomy as in point (5);15
8.2. The Types of Autonomy in Indonesia
The enactment of local government is viewed according to the principles
of autonomy as regulated by the act. In general, the principles of autonomy
involve the notions of centralization, decentralization,16 de-concentration,17 and
co-administration.18 Regional autonomy serves as one of the mechanisms
bringing government closer to the people, so they are enabled for the
participation of democratization in a wider space. With a smaller political and
____________
12Rusdianto, ‘Status Daerah Otonomi Khusus Dan Istimewa Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan
Republik Indonesia [Special autonomy and Specialties In the constitutional system of the Republic
of Indonesia],’ (Conference in Fakultas Hukum Universitas Narotama, Surabaya) 1.13Edie Toet Hendratno, Negara Kesatuan, Desentralisasi, dan Federalisme [Unitary,
Decentralization, and Federalism] (Graha Ilmu dan Universitas Pancasila Press, 2009) 238.14Ni’matul Huda, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia [The Constitutional Law of Indonesia]
(RajaGrafindo Persada 2005) 95.15Philipus M. Hadjon, ‘Kedudukan Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Daerah Dalam Sistem
Pemerintahan [The Position of the Act of Local Government in Government System],’ (The
Conference of Indonesian Government System Post Amendment of The 1945 Constitution, East
Java, 9-10 June 2004) 4.16See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 1.17See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 1 (9).18See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 1 (11).
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geographical gap between the people and the policy makers, the control over the
policies issued by local governments should be greater.19
At the level of the superstructure of state and restructuring government
management, decentralization policy has been commonly developed in line with
an agenda of de-concentration. The decentralization policies also have a concept
of vertical distribution authorities. The de-concentration policy means a policy
division of government authority. In the context of bureaucracy is called a
horizontal distribution. Both decentralization and de-concentration have a
restrictive power. They have played an important role in order to create a climate
that is more democratic, and rule of law.20
An autonomy is considered far more democratic than a centralized
system, and it even better ensures plurality (instead of the uniformity approach as
applied during the New Order regime), in order to avoid the domination of power
by culture, religion, belief, or ideology. With autonomy, the regions are given
wider opportunity to develop their own policies in accordance with their needs. In
general, the autonomy imposed in Indonesia comprises two types; namely:
ordinary autonomy, and special autonomy. Those types will be discussed below.
8.2.1. Ordinary Autonomy
An ordinary autonomy can be interpreted as an obligation given to the
autonomous region to self-administer, and manage its own government affairs
and local people’s concerns according to the aspirations of its people, to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of governance in the context of public service
delivery, and development execution in compliance with the acts.21
Ordinary autonomy in the context of hierarchical relationships associated
with the vertical division of power can be defined as submission to free any local
government until the lower level, to control and manage fully the affairs of its own
area. It is either about the principles or how to run it, specifically the authority to
regulate and administer it. 22
____________
19Eko Sabar Prihatin, Laporan Hasil Penelitian Otonomi Daerah Dan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya
Alam [Research Report on Regional Autonomy and Management of Natural Resources] (Fakultas
Hukum Universitas Diponegoro 2009) 1.20Jimly Asshiddiqie (n7) 280.21See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 1.22Bagir Manan, Menyongsong Fajar Otonomi Daerah [Toward Dawn Regional Autonomy]
(Universitas Islam Indonesia 2001) 16.
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The division of local government units in ordinary autonomy is a logical
consequence of a unitary state. On the other hands, it led to drastic
consequences with the relationship of authority through coordination and
supervision, in addition to coaching and collaboration. The consequences of
vertical power distribution to local government is included the distribution of
region income. The amount of income or funds depend on the population in that
area.
Autonomy is essentially derived from the element of freedom, although it
is not completely a freedom. The autonomy is a subsystem, or a part of unitary
state. The definition of ordinary autonomy is not explicitly expressed in the Act of
the Local Government. However, the local government is not authorized to self-
govern any specific areas such as foreign policy, defence, security, justice,
national monetary and fiscal, and religion. Those areas are categorized into the
absolute authority of the central government.23
8.2.2. Special Autonomy
Furthermore, special autonomy is a special authority granted to a certain
region, to administer and manage its people’s concerns on its own initiative, as
long as conforming to the rights and aspirations of the people in the region.24 The
main point of difference between ordinary autonomy and special autonomy is in
the allocation of the specific budget each year. The special autonomy province
receives the budget annually. In other words, the special autonomy province will
receive more money than ordinary autonomy province.25
The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is composed of provinces.
The nation recognizes and respects the local government units that assume
special or specific characteristics as regulated by law. The term “local
government units” refers to the special provinces of Aceh and Yogyakarta.
According to the Act on Local Government the provinces owning special status
are granted with special autonomy.26
____________
23See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 10.24See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Article 1.25The special autonomy fund have clearly arranged in several regulations. See the Act No. 23 of
2014 on the Local Government, Article 281, 285, and 294.26Rusdianto (n14) 3.
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The regions have acted as legal community units. They are granted with
autonomy and have the authority to rule and administer the regions according to
the aspirations and interests of their people, as long as not contradicting the
nation’s legal order and the public interest. In order to provide a broader space
for the regions to organize and take care of their people’s concerns, the central
government should consider the local wisdoms in its policy making.
Similarly, the regions should also pay high regards to the national interest
in its issuance of the Perda, bylaws, or other types of legislation. Thus they will
be creating a harmony and synergy between the regions and the central
government. In other words, the central government should respect the special
conditions, local wisdom, local smartness, and distinctiveness of the regions in
running the government as a whole.27
In essence, this autonomy is granted by the central government to a legal
community unit with the authority to self-administer and manage its government
affairs. The implementation of which is carried out by the head of the legal
community unit, with the assistance of its executive functionaries, and the
parliament.
The government affairs delivered to the regions actually derive from the
governing power at the hands of the President. The implication of a unitary state
concept is that the ultimate responsibility of government lies at the hands of the
President. In order that the implementation of government affairs in the regions is
run in accordance with national policy, the President is obliged to provide
guidance and supervision to the regional administration.28
In sight of the provinces with special autonomy status, there arise so
many problems faced by the local government. Such problems derive not only
from the delegated authority implication, but also from the legislation in force. For
instance, the regions that have received special autonomy status are Aceh and
Papua. Both provinces are granted with the special autonomy as a result of
political conflict between the provinces and the central government.
____________
27See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Paragraph 5 on the explanation.28See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Paragraph 6 on the explanation.
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8.3. Special Autonomy in Aceh Province
The Aceh conflict lasted for nearly half a century, and this conflict denotes
a long history of injustice accumulation committed by the central government over
Aceh. From the history of Aceh, it can be learned that the conflict in Aceh is the
longest armed conflict that occurred in the history of the Republic of Indonesia.29
Specifically, for Aceh, the conflict termination process was achieved
through a negotiation mechanism with the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding in Helsinki-Finland in 2005, which is famously known as the MoU
Helsinki. It was followed-up with the enactment of the Act No.11 of 2006 on the
Governing of Aceh. The provision of the act is accommodating the agreement
points in the MoU.
The act has accommodated the provisions inspired by the MoU Helsinki
such as that Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, emblems
and hymn.30 Aceh will also have the authority over the living natural resources
surrounding Aceh’s sea territory.31 Thus, the main purpose of the implementation
of the act is prospering the Aceh people.
These indicators can be assessed through the natural resource revenue
sharing arrangement in Aceh; where the revenue is optimally used for the
prosperity of the Aceh people. The economy in Aceh is intended to improve
productivity and competitiveness in order to achieve the prosperity and welfare of
the people, as well as to uphold the values of Islam, justice, equity, people’s
participation, and efficiency within the framework of sustainable development.32
The economy related problems especially in an autonomous region are
usually on matters of revenue sharing both in terms of the revenue sharing fund
(RSF), and some other matters. The central government allocates the RSF on
Natural Resources deriving from the oil and gas sectors, in accordance with the
mandate of the Fiscal Act.33
____________
29Moh. Daud Yoesoef  (eds), Sejarah Lahirnya UUPA [The History of the Birth of the Act of
Governing of Aceh] (Fakultas Hukum Unsyiah 2009) 13.30See also the Article 1.1.5 of the MoU Helsinki. The Article furthermore have been accommodated
in the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, in article 246 – 248.31See also the Article 1.3.3 of the MoU Helsinki. The Article furthermore have been accommodated
in the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, in article 162 (5). See also Mirja Fauzul Hamdi,
Implementasi MoU Helsinki dalam Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh [The Implementation of the
MoU Helsinki in the Act of Governing Aceh] (Master thesis in University of Syiah Kuala, 2014) 7.32See the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 155.33See also the Act No.33 of 2004 on the Balance between the Central and Local Government.
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It is stated that oil revenue is to be shared with the proportion of 84.5% for
the Central Government and 15.5% for the Provincial Government. As for natural
gas, the sharing proportion shall be 69.5% and 30.5% respectively, for the
Central and Local Government. From this portion it seems the Central
Government is still dominant.
However, the RSF distribution as provided for in the Fiscal Act is clearly
considered to contradict with the provisions of the Aceh Governing Act, which
instructs that the distribution of the revenue sharing is to optimally enhance the
prosperity of the Aceh people.
This fact gives the impression that the special autonomy continues to hide
a potential conflict of regulations. On one hand, the central government has
implemented a special autonomy for the specific province; on the other hands,
the central government has still been reluctant to make clear the profit sharing
mechanism. Thus, the potential conflict regulation can easily happen in the
future.
8.4. Potential Conflict Between Central Government and Provincial Level
8.4.1. Decree of Sharing Natural Resources
The regulatory conflict has frequently happened in regard to the
distribution of natural resources. “Natural resources” means, all that exist in
nature and what human beings use to fulfil their lives. Natural resources can be
categorized into two types, namely, renewable and non-renewable natural
resources.
Renewable natural resources can be exploited continuously and will not
run out, such as soil and animals; whilst, non-renewable natural resources cannot
be exploited continuously and are exhaustible, such as coal and petroleum.34
All the wealth that is existent in the Earth both biotic and non-biotic, which
can contribute to the welfare of human beings, is defined as a natural resource.
Plants, animals, humans, and microbes are all natural resources; whilst other
non-biotic beings are non-biological natural resources. Exploitation of natural
resources must be followed by the maintenance and preservation of the
resource, due to its limited supply.
____________
34Valentinus Darsono, Pengantar Ilmu Lingkungan [Introduction to Environmental Science]
(Universitas Atma Jaya 1992) 21.
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Environment is a spatial unit that encompasses all things, forces, states,
living things (including human beings and their behaviour which affect nature),
the sustaining livelihood, human being’s wellbeing, and other living creatures.35
Natural resources mean environmental elements consisting of biological and non-
biological resources which shape the ecosystem unity as a whole.36
The implementation of fiscal balance policy is conducted through budget
allocation, which includes equalization fund to the regions. To that extend, the
equalization fund allocation is intended to help the regions fund all their
government affairs, that come together with the governing authority which has
been delegated to them. In addition to that, it is also aimed at reducing the gap of
funding source between the central and provincial government, as well as that
amongst other local governments. The fiscal balance constitutes the transfer of
funds from the national budget to the regions, such as the RSF, the GAF
(General Allocation Fund), and the SAF (Special Allocation Fund).37
The principles of the financial balance policy between central and local
governments are provided as follows:
(1) Fiscal balance between the Central and Local government is of the
Nation’s financial subsystem as a result of the delegation of tasks
between the Central and Local government.
(2) The distribution of financial resources by the Central to the Local
Government occurs in the framework of Decentralization that follows the
transfer of task from the Central to the Local government in light of the
stability and fiscal balance.
(3) Fiscal balance between the Central and Local government is a
comprehensive system with the intention to fund the implementation of
decentralization, de-concentration, and co-administration principles.38
The financial relationship between the central and local government can
be defined as a system that governs how an amount of fund is distributed
amongst various levels of government, as well as how to seek the sources of
funding to help the local government fund their public sector activities.39
____________
35See the Act No.32 of 2009 on the Protection and Environmental Management, Article 1 (1).36See the Act No.32 of 2009 on the Protection and Environmental Management, Article 1 (9).37Isti’anah, ‘Optimalisasi Peran Dana Bagi Hasil Dalam Pembangunan Daerah [Optimazing the
Role of the Fund Sharing in the Local Development],’ (2008) 3(1)  Jurnal Informasi, Perpajakan,
Akuntansi Dan Keuangan Publik, 45.38See the Act No.33 of 2004 on the Financial Balance Central Government and Local Government,
Article 2.39W. Riawan Tjandra, Hukum Keuangan Negara [State Finance Law], (Grasindo 2009) 105.
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Fiscal balance between the central and local government is a system of
government funding within the framework of a unitary state. It includes the
financial distribution between the central and local government. This policy is
assuring an inter-region equity in a proportional, democratic, fair and transparent
way. That is with regard to the potentials; conditions and needs of the regions in
line with obligations; delegated authority, and procedures for the implementation
of the authority; and most importantly financial management and supervision.
Budget allocation from the centre to the region, so called national-regional
fiscal balance, is often referred to as government transfer.40 Davey stated that
such revenue sharing system, or fiscal balance, is due to the central government
directly taking in the country's financial potentials and miscellaneous income
sources. That is why the nation delegates the task of taxing to the regions.
He also explains that if the central government has to take care of most of
the public spending, it should restraint from utilizing the tax income – in this case,
the entire revenue of the country for the sake of regional revenues – and transfer
most of the revenue to the local government.41 For that reason, it is necessary to
allocate a development fund to the local government, in the form of either the
general and special allocation fund, or the revenue sharing system.
As provided in the Fiscal Balance Act, the RSF is the fund that derives
from the APBN (national revenue and spending budget) and is allocated to the
regions, based on the amount in percentage, to fund the needs of the regions for
the implementation of decentralization.42 Subsequently, the act is also mentioning
the kinds of RS; including,43
(1) RSF that derives from taxing and natural resource.
(2) RSF that derives from taxing as mentioned in point (1) comprises,
a. Land and Construction Tax (PBB);
b. Levy for Land and Construction Right Acquisition (BPHTB); and
c. Income Tax (PPh) as in Articles 25 and 29 Domestic Private Individual
Tax Payer and PPh as in Article 21.
____________
40Kenneth Jackson Davey, Financing Regional Government: International Practices and Their
Relevance to the Third World (John Wiley & Sons 1983) 12.41Ibid.42See the Act No.33 of 2004 on the Financial Balance Central Government and Local Government,
Article 1 (20).43See the Act No.33 of 2004 on the Financial Balance Central Government and Local Government,
Article 11.
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(3) Revenue Sharing Fund that derives from natural resources as described
in article (1) is gained from the exploitation the following sectors:
a. forestry;
b. general mining;
c. fishing and fishery;
d. oil mining;
e. gas mining; and
f. geothermal mining;
The RSF is the fund that derives from the APBN (National Revenues and
Spending Budget). It is distributed to the regions in certain percentages to fund
the needs of the regions to implement the decentralization. The RSF is
distributed on the basis of the source of the fund. In the sense of the amount to
be distributed to a region depends on the amount to be received by the producing
region. Such principle applies to all elements of the RSF, except for one that
derives from fishery sector, which is to be distributed equally to all districts and
municipalities throughout the province.44
The RSF that derives from natural resources is extracted from the
elements below:
a. RSF over forest exploitation derives from Forest Resource Provision
(PSDH), Exploitation License Levy (IIUPH) and Reforestation Fund (DR);
b. RSF over General Mining derives from Land Rent (fixed contribution),
Exploration and Exploitation Levies (Royalty) and the Work Agreement
Contract for Coal Mining Work Business (PKP2B);
c. RSF over Fishery derives from Fishery Business Levy and Fishery Income
Levy;
d. RSF over Oil Mining;
e. RSF over Natural Gas Mining; and
f. RSF over geothermal mining;45
Regarding the sources of funds obtained by Aceh as a region with special
autonomy, these are determined based on its regional income. The regional
income derives from
____________
44Kenneth Jackson Davey (n 42) 46.45Ibid,. 47.
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a. Locally-Generated Revenue;
b. Fiscal Balance;
c. Special Autonomy Fund; and
d. Other legitimate incomes.46
Furthermore, the provision on the RSF over natural resources is regulated
specifically in the Act of Aceh Governing. In it is mentioned several types of
revenue sharing that can be obtained by Aceh as one of its regional incomes;
namely,
1) from forestry sector amounting to 80% (eighty percent);
2) from fishery sector amounting to 80% (eighty percent);
3) from general mining amounting to 80% (eighty percent);
4) from geothermal mining amounting to 80% (eighty percent);
5) from petroleum mining amounting to 15% (fifteen percent); and
6) from natural gas mining amounting to 30% (thirty percent).47
The example of the distribution of natural resources allocation out of RSF
is further stipulated in several ministry regulations. Those regulations have
sometimes collided with each other because the act, as a main resource of those
regulations, also has overlaps. For instance, the fiscal gap results from the
unsynchronized regulation between the Act of Fiscal Balance and its PP.48
The Act of Fiscal Balance states that the RSF is distributed to the related
regions, namely the producers (district/municipality) and other
districts/municipalities throughout the province. They are not associated with the
exploitation of oil and gas. In contrast, the PP asserts that regarding the
exploitation of oil and gas, the region associated with the mining site is entitled to
receiving a 10% of participating interest by the contractor. In this agreement,
Blora, as the host region of the mining site containing the oil and natural gas
resources, gets the participating interest.49
The fiscal balance issue between the central and local government, so far,
has still been regarded as extortion by the central against the local government.
____________
46See the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 179 (2).47See the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 181 (1.b).48See also the Act No. 33 of 2004 on the Central-Local Government Fiscal Balance. See also the
Government Regulation No. 55 of 2005 on the Fiscal Balance.49Titik Kurniawati, Wiwik Widayati, and Sulistyowati, ‘Kesenjangan Fiskal Dana Bagi Hasil Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Atas Eksploitasi Blok Cepu [The Fiscal Gap on the Sharing Fund on the Oil and Gas
Exploitation in Cepu Block],’ (2013) Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 10-11.
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The regions owning the natural resources have not been able to enjoy their
natural resource wealth to the fullest.
This fact of this paradigm has to be changed as soon as possible. The
significant changes have purposed to maintain the integrity of Indonesian as a
nation, creating social justice for all the people (regions) of Indonesia, rather than
the perceived justice by the ruling elites. The deceiving justice—prospering
certain groups of people—as well as the pseudo welfare, is commonly promised
by the irresponsible elites. This is attracting the people’s loyalty to the Unitary
State of the Republic of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the policy towards prospering the
people in the regions is merely utopia and artificial promises.
The efforts to manifest justice for all Indonesian people should be a
common goal of all elements of the nation. Feeling superior over other parties
should be eliminated. Providing wider and equal opportunities to all regions in
managing their own financial sources are an essential matter. The needs of each
region, mostly having natural resources, must be brought to light. Only after all
this, can a proper policy to create equal justice to all people be made.
The allocation of funds from the centre to the region should consider the
need of the regions for the source of funding, resulting from the potential natural
resources in the region. Thus, the central government no longer needs to deceive
and exploit certain regions, because the regions with their abundant natural
resources deserve the rewards in accordance with their respective revenues. In
the meantime, the regions which do not have adequate natural resources, can be
granted with subsidy allocated from the Revenue Sharing Fund that the central
government receives.
8.4.2. Decree of Land Issue
Land issue is very sensitive and closely related to justice, because land
supply is regarded rare, limited, and a basic need of every human being. It is not
easy to design a land policy perceived fair by all parties. A policy providing
greater ease to a small number of people may be justified, as long as it comes
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together with similar policies intended for another larger group. Thus, there is
always a policy that serves to correct or restore the balance.50
Essentially, a regional autonomy is granted to the people of a legal
community unit that is authorized to regulate and manage its own government
affairs. The grant is handed by the Central to the Local government. The
autonomy implementation is carried out by the administration head of the region,
with the assistance of the region’s administration functionaries, and the
Parliament. The government affairs delegated to the local government derives
from the governing power laying at the hands of the President. According to the
concept of a unitary state, the ultimate responsibility of the government is at the
hands of the President. In order that the execution of government affairs
transferred to the regions runs in line with the national policy, the President is
obliged to provide guidance and supervision over the regional administration.51
In light of the dynamic policy making, the central government issued a
number of implemented regulations52 or operational guidelines that confused the
local governments. The central government, apparently, is still trying to retain the
BPN (National Land Agencies) and its offices both in the province and
districts/municipalities as the vertical agencies.53 The BPN is in charge of the
implementation of the central government's duties in land matters across
national, regional and sectorial spheres. It also regulates that the BPN has 21
functions. The functions include ruling and determining over the land rights;
providing consultation; handling the general administrative services in land
matters; working on agrarian reform; and management for the special regions.54
Thus, the local government, on one hand, practically acts as a mere
spectator, because all authority in the administration of land belongs to the
business of the BPN. It is a legal vertical institution executing the governmental
____________
50Abdurrahman, Pengadaan Tanah Bagi Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Untuk Kepentingan Umum
[Land Acquisition for Implementation of Development for Public Interest], (Citra Aditya Bakti 1994)
11.51See the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local Government, Paragraph 6 on the explanation.52See also the President Decision No. 10 of 2001 on the Regional Autonomy on Land. These
regulations in terms of hierarchy are even contrary to the Act No. 23 of 2014 on the Local
Government.53See also the President Decision No. 10 of 2001 on the Regional Autonomy on Land. Furthermore,
the central government asserted its authority over the land sector by issuing the Presidential
Regulation No. 10 of 2006 on the National Land Agency.54See also the President Decision No. 10 of 2001 on the Regional Autonomy on Land, Article 2.
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tasks over land (agrarian) matters both in the centre and peripheries.55 On the
other hand, in conjunction with the local government authority in the land sector,
the central government has, moreover, issued the regulation arranging the
authority of the central government and the provincial government as an
autonomous region. However, these government regulations, particularly
regulating to land matters, do not function properly as a result of overlapping
rules and authority in the land sector.56
The land sector at this time is under the authority of the BPN, having a
regional agency in each province, and an office in the district/municipality. The
rights of control are owned by the central government, but must be working
together with the autonomous province regarding land acquisition.57 The land
administration affair is a mandatory authority of the district/municipality that is
regulated in several regulations.58
Therefore, the presence of authority transfer, from the central to
district/municipality government over land affairs, has actually laid down the
judicial argument, and logic, for the local government to have autonomy in the
land sector. In addition to that, it is subsequently reinforced with the issuance of
the PP, affirming the distribution of authority in land affairs between the centre
and regions.59
The determination and arrangement have included land use planning.
Furthermore, the control and legal acts over land and land registration has
always been administered by the central government. It is possible to delegate
authority to local government or autonomous regions, notwithstanding, the
delegation is carried out in the framework of de-concentration to the central
government officials in the regions.
The delegation of authority could also be given to local government as an
autonomous region, but it is only in the context of co-administration, instead of
____________
55This is referring to the Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2006 on the National Land Agency.56See also the Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 on the Authority of the Central Government
and the Provincial Government as an Autonomous Region. See also the Government Regulation
No. 38 of 2007 on the Coordination between the Central, Provincial and District/Municipality
Government.57See also the Act No. 5 of 1960 on the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian, Article 2 (4).58See also the Act No.32 of 2004 on the Local Government, Article 13 and 14 point (k). This act
later was amended with the Act No. 23 of 2014.59See also the Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007 on the Government Task Division among the
Government, Provincial Government, and the Government of Regency / City.
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decentralization or regional autonomy.60 With this point, the local government
does not fully control its own land.
The constraints faced by local government in the execution of its authority
in the land sector are; namely - firstly, the dis-synchronization of horizontal norms
amongst the Act of Agrarian, the Act of Local Government, as well as the Act of
Governing of Aceh.61
The Act of Agrarian affirms that land affairs are under the central
government administration that can only be co-administered to the region;62
conversely, the Act of Local Government asserts that land affairs constitute an
obligatory matter that has been decentralized to the regions.63 Contradiction,
unfortunately, have also happened in the vertical norms between the Act of Local
Government and the PP of BPN, later stated by Dewa as the emergency situation
in the context of implementation of Aceh’s land policy.64
The polemic over a number of regulations as the derivations to the Act of
Governing of Aceh remained unfinished, even until the end of the tenure of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, on 20
October, 2014. In fact, he seemed to postpone some of the crucial derivatives
regulations regarding Aceh’s special autonomy.
The polemic re-emerged upon the inauguration of Joko Widodo to be the
succeeding President of the Republic of Indonesia. Tjahjo Kumolo, as Home
Affairs Minister in the cabinet of Joko Widodo, refocused his attention on a
number of regulations pertaining to the Province of Aceh, whether a legal product
in the form of local regulations (bylaw), which is called Qanun in Aceh; or specific
law, concerning the derivatives regulations for the Act of Governing Aceh.65
____________
60Albert Morangki, ‘Tinjauan Terhadap Kewenangan Pemerintah Daerah Dalam Penyelenggaraan
Urusan Di Bidang Pertanahan [Overview Of Regional Authority in the Implementation of Land
Affairs in the Field]’ (2012) 10 (3) Jurnal Hukum Unsrat, 63. See also Musleh Herry, Kewenangan
Pemerintah Daerah Bidang Pertanahan Di Era Otonomi Daerah [The Authority of Local
Government in Land Aspect in the Local Autonomy Era], ‘(2011) 3(1) De Jure Jurnal Syariah &
Hukum 53.61See also the Act No. 5 of 1960 on the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian, Article 2 (4). See also
the Act No.32 of 2004 on the Local Government.62See also the Act No. 5 of 1960 on the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian, Article 2 (4).63See also the Act No.32 of 2004 on the Local Government.64Dewa Gumay, ‘Darurat Penyelesaian Konflik Agraria [Emergency Agrarian Conflict Resolution],’
accessed on 20 March 2015, <http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2015/03/11/darurat-penyelesaian-
konflik-agraria>65Ibid.
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One of derivatives regulations, which is not yet drafted, is the President
Decree on the BPN in Aceh. This issue on the authority delegation of land affairs
should have been completed during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Therefore, the basic problem of the people's livelihood that lies on land
ownership, has not completely been handled. Besides, the land issue is the
fundamental asset of the people's economy towards the fulfilment of their daily
needs.
Recently, the conflict over land has increasingly been emerging issues
either vertically or horizontally, both between the people and the government,
between the people and companies, and even among individuals in the
community itself. Such conflicts keep growing and escalating due to the slow
response of the authority to overcome them.
The injustice control of the land ownership policies is compounded by
numerous government rules. This appears to contradict the 1945 Constitution,
stating explicitly that the earth, water, and the wealth contained therein are fully
controlled by the state, and must be used for the optimum prosperity of the
people.66 The basic philosophy providing the guidance and directives mandate as
stipulated in the 1945 Constitution has been elaborated into the Act of Agrarian.67
It tolerates the qualities of nationalism, populism, and is based on the customary
law of Indonesia.
The main factor leading to wide spread emergence of agrarian conflicts is
the absence of systematic efforts made by the government to resolve these
conflicts, especially towards the fulfilment of justice and human rights. The MPR
Decree on the agrarian reform and natural resource management has assigned
the government to immediately resolve the land-born conflicts as well as improve
the structure of land ownership in Indonesia.68
After the tsunami and the Helsinki MoU signing, Aceh emerges like a
newly opened gold mine and becomes prone to seizure by some countries with
large capital to exploit the natural riches. The regions along the west, south, and
east coasts of Aceh are becoming eye-turners to some investors. The identified
____________
66See also the 1945 Constitution, Article 33.67See also the Act No. 5 of 1960 on the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian68See also the MPR Decree No. IX of 2001 on the Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource
Management.
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natural riches, such as iron ore, tin, gold, coal, and oil deposits, have been hot
discussion topics in Aceh and even in foreign countries.
Aceh's position as an attractive object has become a target to
entrepreneurs and investors from developed countries.69 This poses a threat and
challenge to the government and the people of Aceh in designing and bridging an
investment proposal, which will directly affect the lives, the socio-cultural order,
the political structure, the development policy direction in Aceh, as well as the
land tenure issues. As stated in the Act of Governing of Aceh that
(1) Every citizen of Indonesia in Aceh has the right over the land in
accordance with the laws and regulations.
(2) The Provincial and/or District/Municipality Government of Aceh has the
authority to regulate and manage the allocation, utilization and legal
relations with respect to land rights by recognizing, respecting and
protecting the rights, including the indigenous rights, of the people in
accordance with the norms, standards, and procedures that apply
nationally.
(3) The right over land as referred to in point (2) includes the authority of the
Aceh provincial and district/municipality government to provide the rights
of building site use and business site use in accordance with the applying
norms, standards, and procedures.
(4) The Aceh provincial and district/municipality government is obliged to
provide legal protection over communally granted lands, religious
treasures, and other property for sacred purposes.
(5) Further provisions regarding the procedure for granting the land rights as
referred to in point (1), point (2), and point (3) shall be regulated through a
bylaw that takes the legislation into account.70
The regulation concerning the right over land emphasized in the article
above mandates the government of Aceh to administer the land rights as further
stipulated in the regional regulation, so called Qanun, with regards to the existing
superior judicial norms and legislation.71 Furthermore, the Act of Governing of
Aceh also states that
(1) The Government of Aceh has the authority to grant building site use rights
and business site use rights for domestic and foreign investment in
accordance with the applying norms, standards, and procedures.
(2) Further provisions concerning the procedure for granting such rights as
referred to in paragraph (1) is regulated by the Aceh Qanun.72
____________
69Nicholas A. Phelps, Tim Bunnell, and Michelle Ann Miller. ‘Post-Disaster Economic Development
in Aceh: Neoliberalization and other Economic-Geographical Imaginaries,’ (2011) 42 (4) Geoforum,
418-426.70See the Act No. 11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 213.71The meaning of land rights is referred to all rights to land as provided in the Act No. 5 of 1960 on
the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian, Article 2 (4).72See the Act No. 11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 214.
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In conjunction with the land rights, the Government of Aceh should be
able to provide facilities to foreign investors by granting the business site use
rights and building site use rights in accordance with the regulation, legislation,
and the Aceh Qanun. For these consequences, the BPN has to be automatically
a part of the Aceh government working unit.73
This indicates that the assignment of the BPN as part of the Aceh
government working unit should be further regulated through the presidential
regulation. For all that the insertion of the BPN into a part of Aceh government
working unit should have happened by the beginning of 2008; conversely, the
presidential decree has just approved on 13 February 2015. The regulation only
changes the BPN to be the Badan Pertanahan Aceh (BPA), but the BPN does
not delegate its authorities with the BPA so far.74
8.4.3. Establishment of the Flag Bylaw
In the MoU Helsinki between the Indonesian government and the GAM
(Free Aceh Movement) that ended the Aceh conflict has provided for the
privileges for Aceh province through special autonomy. Along with the MoU, the
Government of Aceh has been legally allowed to have their own flag stood
together with the Indonesia flag, as well as emblems, and hymn.75 This allows the
Government of Aceh to determine and legislate upon the Flag and the Coat of
Aceh as the symbols of specificity and privilege of Aceh. The flag and coat of
arms depict the struggle and unity of the Aceh people.76
These privileges are then provided for in the Aceh Bylaw on the flag and
coat of arms. Those symbols are one of the symbols of the Aceh people’s unity,
that reflects the privilege and specificity of Aceh.77 The consideration for the
formulation of the bylaw is legally referred to in the Act of Governing of Aceh. It
states that the government of Aceh can determine and decide on its regional flag
and coat of arms as the symbols that reflect the specificity and peculiarity of
Aceh.
____________
73See the Act No. 11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, Article 253.74See also the President Decree No.23 of 2015 on the Transfering Office Of National Land Agency
To The Aceh Land Office Agency.75The MoU Helsinki states that Aceh has the right to use the regional symbols, including its own
flag, symbol, and hymn. See the MoU Helsinki, point 1.1.576Aguswandi and Judith Large, Rekonfigurasi Politik: Proses Perdamaian Aceh [Reconfiguring
Politics: Aceh Peace Process] (Conciliation Resource 2008) 9.77See also the Bylaw No. 3 of 2013 on the Aceh Local Flag and Coat of Arms, Article 1 (11)
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The flag here is meant as a symbol of privilege, not a symbol of
sovereignty, and shall not be treated as the flag of Aceh’s sovereignty.78 In other
words, it can be stated that Aceh, by the rule of law, has a legal justification to
determine and decide upon its regional flag and coat of arms.
The DPRA endorsed the Aceh flag and coat of arm on 22 March, 2013.79
However, the flag of Aceh province was not approved by the central government
because it resembles the flag of GAM. The same thing happened to its coat of
arms. According to the central government, the Qanun on Aceh flag and coat of
arms which have been put into the Aceh legislatorial gazette, as contradicted with
the PP on the Local Symbols.80 Despite obeying the central government, the
Government of Aceh and its parliament keep insisting on preserving the flag and
symbols.
Therefore, reactions have emerged both from the Ministry of Home Affairs
and the Government of Aceh. Firstly, is the reaction of rejection from the central
government. The issues on the flag and coat of arms subsequently received
numerous protests, especially from central government officials. They have
argued that the design of the flag and coat of arms exactly resemble those of the
GAM, which were previously known as the rebellion symbols.
Ethically, however, the use of emblems such as a flag and a coat of arms,
are not provided under the concept of the Unitary State of the Republic of
Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution and the Act of State Symbols has stated that
the flag of the Republic of Indonesia is the Red-and-White Flag, and the national
coat of arms is the Garuda Pancasila.81
In preventing the bylaw from being applied, later, the government
immediately issued the PP on the regional symbols. It states that the design of
the regional flag and coat of arms should not resemble, in terms of principle and
entirety, a banned organization or separatist-organization/
association/institution/movement in the Republic of Indonesia.82
The examples of the flag and logo design of a banned
organization/association/institution/separatist-movement as provided in the
____________
78See the Act No.11 of 2006 on the Governing Aceh, Article 246 point (2) and (3).79Hasbi Abdullah, ‘DPRA Sahkan Bendera Aceh [DPRA Authorize Aceh’s Flag], accessed 20
March 2015, < http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2013/03/23/dpra-sahkan-bendera-aceh>80See the Government Regulation No. 77 of 2007 on the Local Symbols, Article 6 (4), and Article 3.81See the Act No.24 of 2009 on the Flag, language, and the State Emblem and Anthem, Article 35.82See the Government Regulation No. 77 of 2007 on the Local Symbols, Article 6 (4), and Article 3.
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government regulation are - the Crescent Flag used by the separatist movement
in Aceh Province; the Buraq Bird logo and the Morning Star Flag, used by the
separatist movement in Papua Province; and the King's Thread Flag, used by the
separatist movement in Maluku Province. For this reason, Djoehermansyah
stated that discussion regarding Aceh’s flag must be cooling down for a while.83
The PP on the regional symbols is a tool for the central government to
deal with local government, especially in the issues of regional symbols. They
serve as the people’s social bond within the framework of the nation of Indonesia.
So, it has purposed to make them compatible with the values of Pancasila,
especially for the provinces of Aceh and Papua that have been granted special
autonomy status through the specific acts. This is in consideration to the
historical aspects of both provinces. They were previously in conflict with the
central government and had used identity such as flags and coats of arms in that
time. It is believed that their flags and other emblems have been recognized by
all the people in both regions.
Therefore, the legislation of the GAM’s flag and coat of arms to Aceh’s
regional flag and coat of arms are strongly disallowed (a breach). Two facts arise
here. Firstly, is the position of the bylaw being inferior to government regulation;
and, secondly, is that those symbols were used by the banned organisation.
On the behalf of central government, furthermore, the Ministry of Home
Affairs, Gamawan, stated that the bylaw directly violates the regulation superior
to it, that disapproves of the use of any separatist movement symbols as regional
symbols. Therefore, the central government seeks a resolution to this polemic,
rather than making it protracted, to avoid the emergence of anxiety amongst the
Aceh people.84
Moreover, he has insisted that the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia remains at its original inception with the argument to carry the spirit of
the MoU Helsinki as aspired in the peace agreement, the use of Flag and
____________
83Djoehermansyah Djohan, ‘Colling Down Bendera dan Lambang Aceh Sampai 14 Agustus [The
Colling Down on the Flag and Aceh Symbol until 14 August],’ accessed 20 March 2015,
<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/07/15/colling-down-bendera-dan-lambang-aceh-sampai-
14-agustus>84Gamawan Fauzi, ‘Mendagri: Qanun Belum Sah Bendera Aceh Tetap Dilarang Berkibar [Ministry:
Not Legitimate Aceh Qanun flag fluttering Remain Banned],’ accessed 20 March 2015,
<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/07/29/mendagri-qanun-belum-sah-bendera-aceh-tetap-
dilarang-berkibar>
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Emblems which essentially resemble GAM’s symbols should not be used.85 With
this consequence, the government of Aceh must follow the requirements of
provincial emblem and flag imposed by central government.
The requirements as provided by law, according to the Minister of Internal
Affairs, should not resemble those of a banned organization or separatist
movement. Owing to this fact, the Ministry of Home Affair on the behalf of the
President, has the authority to annul it. Therefore, the content of the bylaw
concerning the Aceh flag and coat of arms would be reviewed to make it agree
with the regulations product superior to it, because, as mentioned before, a bylaw
should not contradict any nationally applied regulations.
Lastly, is the reaction of local government resistance. In this context, the
Government of Aceh has not fully accepted the reasons argued by the Central
Government. With the signing of the MoU, GAM no longer bore the status as
separatist movement or a movement with a will to separate Aceh from the
Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, the use of emblem, logo, and hymn that were
used by GAM can no longer be legally regarded as part of the existence of a
separatist movement.
Thus, there emerge two arguments for the Aceh Bylaw on the regional
flag and coat of arms. The first argument is that the legislation of Aceh regional
flag and coat of arms is constitutionally valid, because of fully referring to the Act
of Governing of Aceh. This implies that Aceh government has the right to
determine its regional flag and coat of arms regardless of its contradiction to the
PP. In terms of the hierarchy of regulations, the Act of Governing of Aceh is
superior to the PP.
The second argument is in the light of legitimacy. The arguments about
the symbols used previously by GAM, are still a controversy. The flag and coat of
arms not originally belong to GAM. They have previously been used even long
before the existence of GAM. In the history documentation, the flag and the coat
of arms was used since the time of the Sultanates of Aceh. They led the fight
against the colonialism in Aceh.
____________
85Gamawan Fauzi, ‘Kemendagri Perpanjang Masa 'Negosiasi' Bendera Aceh [Ministry: the Ministry
Home Affair Renew 'Negotiation' Aceh’s Flag],’ accessed 20 March 2015, <
http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2014/04/17/kemendagri-perpanjang-masa-negoisasi-bendera-
aceh>
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The delegations of Aceh Government lobbying the bylaw have explained
that the attestation of the flag and coat of arms was to accommodate the
aspiration of the Aceh people, owing to the flag and the coat of arms representing
the symbols of struggle and unity of the Aceh people. Muzakkir asserted that the
legislation of the bylaw is not intended to revive GAM in Aceh.86 The bylaw
providing the flag and the coat of arms has denoted the symbols of privilege and
specificity of Aceh, not symbols of sovereignty or separatism.
The 1945 Constitution and its derivative acts have not provided for any
banning of a region from having its regional flag and coat of arms reflecting
specificity, peculiarity, and privilege as unifying symbols for the people in the
region, as long as, of course, the symbols do not stand in contest to the symbols
of the nation’s sovereignty.
This unnecessary controversy would not have happened, if all parties
recognized the special status entitled to Aceh since the signing of the MoU
Helsinki. Automatically, after signing the MoU, GAM had explicitly recognized the
status of Aceh as part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. As a
consequence, Aceh has the special characteristics distinguished from other
regions. Since then on, GAM and all its elements can no longer be viewed as part
of a separatist movements. Moreover, the Government of Indonesia has
announced a variety of special programs including the amnesty for the political
prisoners.
Likewise, the PP on the regional symbols will be understood differently,
when Aceh still bears the status as an in-conflict region having a separatist
movement, that carries weapons for the liberation of Aceh. To that end, the
provisions prohibiting the use of any flag, emblem, and hymn have resembled the
separatist group, which formerly organised a separatist movement. In fact, the
context of the PP is certainly applicable for the regions with special status that
still have unresolved armed and political conflict, such as Papua.
To defuse heated political conflict, the Central Government, through the
Ministry of the Home Affairs, offered a solution by allowing Aceh to participate in
the management and exploitation of oil and gas within the area of 200 miles
____________
86Muzakkir Manaf, ‘Bendera Bukan Untuk Memisahkan Diri [The flag is not for Self Separation],’
accessed 21 March 2015,
< http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2013/08/02/bendera-bukan-untuk-memisahkan-diri>
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offshore, on condition that Aceh would alter the characteristics and features of
the Aceh regional flag and emblems.87 Unlike the wish of the Indonesian
Government, however, the Government of Aceh still stands firm, not willing to
amend to its endorsed flag and emblems which resemble the GAM’s.
8.5. The ICC Involvement in Aceh Province
8.5.1. Solving Election Disputes at National and Provincial Level
The intensity of elections in Indonesia is very often. Thus, the election
dispute cases are the most favourite cases handled by ICC.88 The process of
adding provincial election into the ICC authority was shortly discussed in the
Chapter 6. The provincial elections, during 2008 until 2014, the ICC received 732
cases that need to be judged,89 included Aceh Province. The existences of local
political parties have furthermore escalated the intensity of the political conflict in
the election season. Thus, the roles of the ICC have been highly expected in
these circumstances.
One of the significant roles played by the ICC was in the Aceh Governor
Election in 2012. This election was won by Zaini, earning 55.75% voters; and in
the second position was Irwandi, earning 29.18% voters.90 However, the winner
was not fully accepted by Irwandi. He indicated that the election had been carried
out with fraud, violence, coercion, and terror against voters. Irwandi also claimed
that the voters living in remote areas had voted forcibly, in a threatening
situation.91 Thus, he was reluctant to sign the election minutes provided by the
____________
87Djohermansyah Djohan, ‘Pengelolaan Migas Hingga 200 Mil Laut Masih Nego [Oil and Gas
Management Up to 200 Nautical Miles Still Negotiable],’ accessed 20 March 2015, <
http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/09/09/djohermansyah-djohan-pengelolaan-migas-hingga-
200-mil-laut-masih-nego>88 In 2013 there were approximately 119 Provincial Elections that have mostly brought to the ICC.
Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Rekapitulasi Perkara Pengujian Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum [The
Recapitulation of the Election Disputes Cases]’, accessed 6 December 2014,
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPU>. See also Harus
Husein, Pemilu Indonesia, Fakta, Angka, Analisis, dan Studi Banding [Indonesian’s Election, Fact,
Figure, Analysis, and Comparative Studies], (Perludem 2013) 654.89Mahkamah Konstitusi, ‘Rekapitulasi Perkara Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah
dan Wakil Kepala Daerah [The Cases Recapitulation on the Provincial Election],’ accessed 5
August 2015 <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPUD>90Komisi Independen Pemilihan, ‘Inilah Hasil Rekapitulasi Pemilukada Gubernur Dan Wakil
Gubernur Aceh 2012 [This is the Recapitulation of Governor & Mayor Election in Aceh 2012],
accessed 17 August 2015, <http://kip-acehprov.go.id>91Kemendagri, ‘Selama Kampanye Kekerasan di Aceh Meningkat Tajam [During Campaign Period,
Violence Increase Sharply in Aceh],’ accessed 17 August 2015,
<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2012/04/04/selama-kampanye-kekerasan-di-aceh-meningkat-
tajam>
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Election Committee. Facing this uncertainty, the Election Committee suggested
Irwandi bring election dispute to the ICC, which has authorities on election
disputes.
Before the ICC’s judges, Irwandi claimed, and also had evidence, that the
2012 election had intimidation, terror, fraud, violence, coercion, and so forth.
Those violations came from the Aceh Party that supported Zaini as the governor
candidate. Therefore, the intimidations and terrors, by those calling themselves a
successful team and cadres or sympathizers of the Aceh Party, gave a bad
colour for democracy implementation in Aceh Province. Irwandi insisted that the
process of political transition cannot be achieved by means of physical violence
and armed forces. It would consequently take people away from the experience
of peaceful and tranquil democracy.92
Responding the Irwandi’s claim, the ICC judges examined the case in
detail. The ICC judges gave the representation from the Aceh Party a chance to
defend themselves. Razi, furthermore, speaking on behalf of the Aceh Party
stated that the Aceh Party institutionally never ordered violence and intimidation,
both at the central level, and at the level of the village. He also insisted to party
cadres for involvement democratically and smartly in the election, without using
such violence or intimidation.93
Therefore, based on the facts, and judges’ assessment during the
session, the ICC had the opinion that Irwandi’s arguments had no strong legal
evidence, proved by a strong legal opinion. Even if only some of these violations
could be proved by the applicant, it is only sporadic violations carried out, not
through governmental structures or the structure of the Aceh Party. So, if the
petition was proven, it unfortunately could not affect and change the ratings of
Irwandi’s voters.94
The ICC argued that violence, intimidation, terror and so forth are the
authorities of the police officer, because they could be categorized as crimes,
which are not part of the ICC’s authorities. With these consequences, the ICC
strongly rejected all of Irwandi’s claims and decided Zaini as the winner of Aceh’s
____________
92 ICC’s Judgment Number 22/PHPU.D-X/2012 on the Aceh Election.93Fachrul Razi, ‘Meski kecewa, Irwandi Yusuf hormati putusan MK [Although Dissapointed, Irwandi
Yusuf Respecting ICC Judgment], accessed 17 August 2015,
<http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/05/120504_pemilukadaaceh_putusanmk.sht
ml>94 ICC’s Judgment (n 93)
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Governor Election 2012.95 With this judgment, the ICC also created the new
doctrine, that the crimes during the election are not part of the ICC jurisdictions.
Thus, the crimes happening in the time of election cannot be a strong legal
opinion to nullify an election result.
8.5.2. Reviewing Acts
The ICC has also been involved in reviewing the Article 25696 of the Act
on the Governing of Aceh, relating to a personal candidate who wants to compete
in the governor or mayor election. With its judgment the ICC has allowed a
personal candidate to contest in the governor or mayor election – which was not
permitted before.
In spite of receiving appreciation from the Government of Aceh, the
judgment has created pre-election dispute between the central and provincial
level. The DPRA97 has strongly rejected the judgment, assuming it was invalid
because of contrasting with the Act of Governing of Aceh;98 as the ICC did not
ask the consideration from the DPRA.
In this context, the DPRA has adhered to the Act of Governing of Aceh,
that states: any planned amendments to this act must first undergo consultation
by and receive considerations from the DPRA.99 However, the term
‘considerations’ in the article, regarding Indonesian common legal term, does not
have a binding or a compulsory meaning. In other words, the ICC has a strong
constitutional power to decide its judgment although the DPRA has a different
opinion with the ICC. With these consequences, the DPRA has to fully obey and
implement the ICC judgment instead of arguing or even rejecting it.
Another controversial judgment made by the ICC that influences Aceh
specialties is the annulment of the Act on the Truth and Reconciliation
____________
95 Ibid.96The Article 256 stated that ’Provision that regulates individual candidate in the election of
Governor/vice governor, regent/vice regent, mayor/vice mayor as mentioned in Article 67 act (1)
character d, is applied and implemented only for the first election since the establishment of this
law.’ The article finally has been annulled by the ICC.97DPRA = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, is the Aceh Provincial Parliament that legislate bylaw
regarding the autonomy status.98Abdullah Saleh, ‘PA: Jangan Utak-atik UUPA [Do Not Permutate the Act of Governing of Aceh],’
accessed 16 March 2012, <http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2011/10/10/pa-jangan-utak-atik-uupa>,99See also the Act Numberv11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh, the Article 269 Clause 3 on the
implementing TRC in Aceh that must be based on the TRC Act instead of Aceh bylaw.
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Commission (TRC).100 On one hand, the TRC is a compulsory task that must be
implemented according to the Act of the Governing of Aceh. On the other hand,
the Act on the TRC, used as the legal backbone, has been invalidated by the
ICC, reasoning the TRC Act cannot fulfil the victims’ expectation, chiefly in the
process of restitution, compensation and so forth.
The judgment was very shocking, because the ICC has judged beyond
what the applicant asked for – they were asked only to review an article, instead
of all over the Act. The consequences of the judgment have not only resulted to
Aceh, but also affected Indonesia as a whole, chiefly, the healing process for
those human rights victims affected by the past authoritarian regime.
8.5.3. Determining Disputes Over the Authorities of State Institutions
The ICC has similarly played a significant role whilst determining disputes
between the Election Commission and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Such a
dispute happened in the Governor & Mayor Election in 2012. These state organs
strongly claimed to have a jurisdiction postponement of the election date. The
election had been postponed several times, mainly because of the differences in
interpretation of the Election Act. At first, the Election Commission set a vote date
on 14 November, 2011. Then, for reasons of unpreparedness, postponed again
to 24 December, 2011.
The Ministry strongly imposed that the election must be held on schedule
because the impact of postponement would significantly impact the governmental
system in Aceh province, such as the period of governor or mayor ending at a
specific date. For the election to be delayed again was unreasonable, simply
because the winning party (Aceh Party) does not apply for the election. The
postponement occurred and could no longer be tolerated. This violated the rights
of other candidates, such as personal candidate, or party representatives.101
Regarding the postponement the Election Commission has had a strong
opinion. The Commission stated that the election postponement had significant
impacted on a fair election. Thus, all candidates must be accommodated in the
____________
100See also the ICC’s Judgment Number 006/PUU-IV/2006 on the Annulment TRC Act in
Indonesia.101In the Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution stated that ‘Every person shall have the rights of
recognition, guarantees, protection and certainty before a just law, and of equal treatment before
the law.’
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election. Both the Ministry and the Election Commission had their own legal
reasoning; thus, the role of the ICC, as the final and binding judgment, is highly
required in such a circumstance. Therefore, considering the fact during the
session process, the ICC made the judgment that the final postponement was in
9 April, 2012.102 The judgment had finally ended the election disputes between
the Ministry and the Election Commission.
8.6. Conclusion
The implementation of special autonomy in certain provinces is intended
to allow the achievement of certain developmental aspects considered to be still
lacking by comparison to other regions. In addition, the historical approach
should be applied to these provinces. With the enactment of the Act of Governing
of Aceh as the follow-up to the Helsinki MoU, Aceh Province has gained a legal
basis with its specialties category for the implementation of its autonomy.
As for the privileges granted to Aceh resulting from the autonomy, there is
the shared gained from the natural resource revenue. This has the consequences
that Aceh is recognised as a region with rich natural resources. Through the Act
of Governing of Aceh is granted the right to administer, manage, and exploit its
natural resources intended for the optimum welfare, as well as prosperity, of the
Aceh people. However, the right to exploit its natural resources is apparently not
fully owned by Aceh, due to the presence of the natural resource revenue sharing
mechanism between the central government and the provinces have to wait for
other supported regulations.
Management of the land sector is also granted to Aceh as a region with
special autonomy. Aceh has the right to take part in deciding upon land rights and
to carry out explorations over land. In addition, the Act of Governing of Aceh has
vividly assigned the BPA in Aceh as one of the provincial administration organs,
instead of being a vertical institution as previously. The central government only
change the land institution name from BPN to BPA. But the BPA authorities are
still fully controlled by the central government.
____________
102ICC’s Judgement Number 1-SKLN-X-2012 on the Aceh Election For Governor and Mayor. See
also ICC’s Judgement Number 1-SKLN-2012 on the Interim Judgement of the Aceh Election For
Governor and Mayor.
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As one of the regions with special autonomy, Aceh is also granted
specificity in terms of regional identity through regional emblems and a flag. This
has been stipulated in the MoU Helsinki and further regulated in the Act of
Governing of Aceh. Aceh has received opposition against the local emblems and
flag since its publication of the flag design, because it is considered to bear
similarity to the flag used during the time of conflict. This has caused strong
rejection from the central government. Despite legislation in the form of the Flag
Bylaw being endorsed and declared legal for enactment, there has been no
instruction issued to the governmental institution in Aceh for the raising of the flag
bearing the picture of the crescent and star. If the Aceh Government has not yet
changed the flag and emblem, the central government remains committed to
banning the Flag Bylaw .
The establishment of the Act No.23 of 2014 on the Local Government has
automatically changed the legal norms regarding the local government.
Unfortunately, the implementations of derivative regulations, coming from the Act
of Local Government, have not been quickly responded to by the President.
Consequently, the old overlapped regulations are still being used because of
legal uncertainty.
It is the crucial point in the regulations clash between central and local
government. This is likewise one of the consequences of a unitary state. The
central government is dominantly supreme over any administrative division –
including the special autonomy province. As long as the central government does
not delegate some of its power, the local government has to be fully obedient to
central government.
The clash of regulations could be prevented, if Indonesian legal systems
adopted a single state judiciary organ focused on reviewing such regulations.
However, until now, in reviewing the regulations below the acts, the political
mechanism by the hand of the President remains in use. Reviewing regulations
through political mechanisms could potentially create another problem by central
government and local government having their own interpretation of a norm in a
regulation.
The interpretation can generate a conflict of regulation. Unfortunately, the
political mechanism does not have a tool to interpret a norm, only a tool to
implement a norm. Thus, a mechanism for handling a conflict of regulation,
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through a specific court such the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court, is
strongly recommended. Solving regulatory clash through judicial mechanism is
better than through a political approach.
Another problem in implementing autonomy in Indonesia is the logic of
local politics, which is not always the same as the logic of central government
politics. The logic of the local authority is still influenced by the logic of empire
and imperial power. It applies through political entities. Local politics have
pluralistic norms that recognized from ethnicity, cultural institutions, and local
wisdom based upon historical records. In Aceh the institution of the Wali
Nanggroe is one such clear example.
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION
9.1. Introduction
The constitution regulates the rights between the state and its citizen, and
in any nation, constitutional rights are a significant part of the legal process.
More and more countries adopt human rights legislation and international human
rights agreements.1 To protect those rights needs specific legal mechanisms,
through judicial mechanism as well as the parliament. Some countries unified the
mechanism to their supreme court or the parliament, whilst others separated it to
a specific court such as constitutional court. One such mechanism for protecting
constitutional rights is judicial review—the judicial authority to decide the
constitutionality of activities taken by any organ of government. Judicial review
can be defined as part of constitutional interpretation, concerned with reasoning
standards and methods by which courts use the power of judicial review.
In Kelsen’s view, the state branch doing judicial review is the
constitutional court. It is the essential mechanism for protecting citizens' rights,
verifying the constitutionality of acts and decrees coming from member states,
and maintaining the equilibrium between the higher and the lower government
system. The relations between the centre and the local, furthermore, need to be
demarcated.
Impressed by the success of Austria and other European countries, after
amending its constitution in 2003 Indonesia established its constitutional court.
The ICC has placed the Constitution of 1945 as the supreme law to be
implemented with high consistency. The ICC holds court in an open way by
summoning parties for judicial hearing, and encouraging people and the
community to be involved in following how a constitution provision should be
interpreted. The parties involved in the ICC are also allowed to air their thoughts
regarding law interpretation, although in the end the decision belongs to the ICC
judges.
The positive reform of the ICC has encouraged the development of
governance administrative law theories.2 In the past, such law only focused on
____________
1Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 5.2Taufi Qurrohman Syahuri, ‘Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Perselisihan Hasil
Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Berdasarkan Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 2003
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the political activities within the institutions of parliament and the Presidential
administration, addressing issues of governmental institutions, the relationship
between them and human rights. After the reform, the current issues of the
constitution start to touch wider aspects, involving more parties not restricted to
the legal experts.
The ICC does not always generate positive impacts, creating a long
debate around the absolute authority to interpret the 1945 Constitution. The
arbitrary interpretation of the constitution indicates that the ICC becomes equally
supreme to the 1945 Constitution itself. In some cases, there has been little
difference between the position of the constitution and that of the ICC, for both
have come to unification. This indicates that the ICC is not fully the guardian of
the 1945 Constitution, because the guardian and the guarded have become one
unity. In the meantime, according to the principle of constitutional supremacy
from Kelsen, the guardian is supposed to submit to, and is placed below the
guarded because the highest norms are in the constitution.3
The ICC’s judgments must represent legal considerations and arguments.
The norms in the provisions of the constitution should be interpreted and
executed in the form of law and in any other forms, according to authorities and
obligation granted to the ICC.4 It is necessary to view the role of constitutional
courts against other countries’ experiences and how they deal with some crucial
points of interpretation of the constitution.
9.2. Lessons for Indonesia From Other Countries’ Experiences of
Reviewing Law
The instruments of reviewing law over court process have two major
categorizations, namely, through the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.
Positioning the Supreme Court as the single highest court is the American model
of judicial review, applied over two hundred years ago since the Madison vs
Marbury case. The American model places the Supreme Court as safeguarding
the supremacy of the constitution. It leads to a dispersed and decentralized
____________
[Constitutional Court Judgment on the Dispute Election of the Counted Vote based on the Act
Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court], (2009) 2 (1) Jurnal Konstitusi 14.3Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (The Lawbook Exchange 1945) 123-129.4See also Martin H. Redish, and Matthew B. Arnould, ‘Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a Controlled Activism Alternative,’ (2012) 64 Florida Law
Review 1485.
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mechanism amongst courts in the States and the Federal Supreme Court. This
model has spread around the world, including Indonesia, improved to fit the
Indonesian legal system. During the ICC era since 2003 the Supreme Court
authorities have been reduced. It only has power to review the rules under the
acts.
The second classification is establishing Constitutional Court, known as
Kelsenian model. That model has developed in Indonesia, and also in South
Africa. The South African Constitutional Court not only evaluates the act against
the constitution, but also can review the regular cases appealed from ordinary
court passed by the Supreme Court.
In Indonesia both the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court still
function respectively in reviewing law, a dualism subjected to significant critics.
This modification has moved away from the basic principle of the Kelsenian
model, making the constitutional court the single court to review all kinds
regulations. Another modification is using external sources (international
covenant) in making judgment, derived from the South Africa Constitutional Court
and is known as extra-systemic evidence.
9.3. Constitutional Practices in the ASEAN
As an important member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Indonesia has significantly affected practices, most importantly after
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The ASEAN has not had a legal binding
effect, and so is vulnerable to breaking by members, being thus a voluntary
charter.
The countries in the ASEAN region have energetic constitutional
movements, respecting the spirit of democracy and constitutional practice, and
have frequently amended their constitution. Considering the implementation of
the constitution, three models of constitutional practice have emerged in the
ASEAN: The Westminster Model, the Socialist Model, and the Mixed Model.
The Westminster Model constitutional practice is the model in former
British colonies of Southeast Asia; namely, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei
Darussalam. Their legal constructions are therefore based on English common
law, with law made up of acts and case law. Indeed, in implementing their
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governmental systems, those countries have adopted the Westminster Model in
the political arrangements, although some of them vary with their own values.
The ASEAN countries under the Socialist Model include Vietnam, and
Laos, characterized by one-party rule within a military system. The Mixed Model
draws upon different country experiences transferred to their own country. Such
countries are Indonesia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and The Philippines.
9.4. The ICC’s Ultra Petita
The Ultra Petita cases occurring in the ICC create a challenge to
Indonesian law reform. Ultra Petita involves the judges expanding their
jurisdictions regulated by several acts, including – prosecuting themselves,
granting more than what is claimed, interfering in others court’s jurisdiction, and
intervening in other state organ’s jurisdiction. In other words, the ICC judgment is
no longer based on the original intent of the constitution as the supreme law
source. When an applicant asks the ICC to review a clause or an article in the
act, the ICC frequently goes much further, not only invaliding a clause or an
article but also invaliding the whole act.
Ultra Petita can be categorized into several categories; namely, 1.
intervening in legislation jurisdiction; 2. judging itself; 3. reviewing President
Decree; 4. inconsistency of the type of ICC’s judgments; 5. invaliding all over act;
6. incorrect judgement code; 7. intervening in Supreme Court authority; 8. judging
based on other countries experiences; 9. judging based on scholar theory; and
10. adding jurisdiction, particularly handling provincial and district elections, as
well as governor/mayor elections.
As a consequence of Ultra Petita, the DPR has not redrafted the act
affected after Ultra Petita. For instance, the Electrical Power Act invalidated in
2004 and the Truth and Reconciliation Act invalidated in 2006, have not yet been
redrafted until May 2016 by the DPR. They have assured that if those acts are
redrafted, the ICC has still power to annul or invalidate it again.
For the Supreme Court, ICC judgements have appeared on voluntarily
judgments, which only have power to be obeyed voluntarily or can be ignored. In
this case, the Supreme Court has seemingly classified the judgments as soft
judgments, which are not able to be implemented as soon as possible after the
judgment is declared by the judges.
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The Ultra Petita has been triggered by the judges’ approach to judicial
interpretation, an undisclosed recruitment process, and political interference.
There is no strong supervision over the ICC judges, as the role of supervision
body was easily annulled by the ICC. The independence of the judges elected by
parliament and president has been called into doubt. Because the judges are
screened politically through the parliament and the president. Thus, the elected
process are vulnerable to bargaining with political interest.
In spite of having qualified judges, the representing judge from parliament
and the president may lack experience in the judiciary process, with some lacking
any judicial experiences at all. Before entering the ICC, moreover, they have not
been trained in handling cases. The background of these judges is mostly
political, academic, and professional. The political interference in judge
recruitment cannot be denied. Akil Mukhtar came from the Golkar Party, and was
re-elected dominantly by his former party. Akil has betrayed people trust with his
involvement in the bribery case of the local elections.
The Ultra Petita has arisen in other country’s constitutional courts, but not
as extremely as in Indonesia. In the Germany case, the court is not too bold in
expanding its jurisdiction, whilst South Korea is brave enough to expand its
jurisdiction, because regulation has allowed it. Indonesia’s ICC does not have a
tool, such as South Korea, to expand its jurisdiction, but in practice the ICC has
regularly made its own means to expand its jurisdiction.
9.5. The Future Format for the ICC in Law Reform
The existence of the ICC has played a significant role in Indonesian law
reform. After a decade of experience, the ICC should return to its basic role of
guardian of the 1945 Constitution. Thus, the ICC should adhere closely to the
principle of black-letter law (the law what is simply the law), based upon on what
is stated in the constitution and supporting acts, rather than expanding or
interpreting more widely. This could prevent Ultra Petita in the years to come, and
also return to the constitutional court role as negative rather than positive
legislator.
The ICC judgment is final and binding, which has permanent legal force.
However, in some cases, the ICC judgment has sometimes evolved gradually
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into a new form, which is neither clearly mentioned in the constitution nor in the
ICC Act.
ICC judgments can be divided in two types, namely, soft judgments and
hard judgments. Soft judgment can be defined as the judgment which may not be
implemented as soon as possible after the judgment is declared by the judges.
Such judgments have often occurred in the case of judicial review. For instance,
the Act of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Act of Electrical Power, not
replaced up until 2015. Hard judgment can be defined as a judgment which has
to be implemented as soon as possible after being declared by the judges. In
general, these judgments have often happened in the case of general election,
presidential election, and dispute amongst state organs.
9.6. The Prevention of Regulation Clash in Local Government
The autonomy policy has created the possibility of regulation conflict
between central and local government, if countries do not have a judiciary
mechanism, instead a political approach. So, the central government is
positioned supreme over any administrative division including the special
autonomy province. As long as the central government does not transfer some of
its power, the local government must be fully obedient to central government.
Such clash of regulations could be stopped if Indonesian legal systems
implemented a judiciary organ for reviewing local regulations. Until now in
reviewing the regulations, the political mechanism is followed by the ministry
acting on behalf of the president. This mechanism can potentially produce
another problem by both parties have their own interpretation.
An additional problem in implementing autonomy in Indonesia is the
reasoning of local politics differing from that of central government. Local
authority is still influenced by the previous empire and imperial supremacy,
applied to the present through local entities.
Unfortunately, the political instrument does not have a device to interpret
a norm only a tool to implement a norm. Enhancing a judicial mechanism, for
resolution of conflict regulation, through a specific court such the Supreme Court
or the Constitutional Court, is highly recommended.
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9.7. Proposal for Next Fifth Amendment
The first and main change that must be made regarding the ICC is the
amendment of the 1945 Constitution through the fifth amendment. The position of
the ICC is regulated in Chapter IX on the Judicial Power, in the Article 24C,
comparing one article and clauses. The articles are too little if compared with the
significant role of the ICC in the law reform. The Austrian Constitutional Court has
6 articles and 18 clauses.
The position of the ICC and its jurisdictions in the Indonesian legal system
is unshakeable after the fourth amendment of the Constitution. So, for future
recommendation requires a fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution that
prohibiting Ultra Petita. This prohibition would strongly control the ICC, in order
not to intervene in other state organs’ jurisdictions, particularly legislative,
judicative and executive.
In reviewing and judging cases, the ICC must return its judgement to the
original intent of the constitution, because the constitution has been legislated
with the specific purposes accepted by the DPR. As stated by Clinton, a
constitution is based on the social, political, and economic situation at that time.5
It means that there are specific agreements in every constitution, as guidance for
the constitutional court’s judges.
Secondly, centralizing the judicial review of regulations under the ICC
jurisdictions, instead of spreading this throughout several states organ. As stated
in the constitution, the ICC has jurisdiction to review an act against the
constitution, whereas the Supreme Court can review a regulation against an act,
such as president decree, ministry decree, local bylaw, and so forth.6
From those divisions the jurisdiction clash between ICC and Supreme
Court has occurred, chiefly in handling the conflict of regulations. In avoiding
future conflict of regulation and divergent constitutional interpretation, the
jurisdiction of reviewing all acts and regulations should be transferred under the
jurisdictions of the ICC, leaving the Supreme Court to concentrate on handling
personal cases, particularly private cases, criminal cases, and so forth – instead
of regulation cases.
____________
5Kenneth Clinton, Modern Constitutions (Oxford University Press 1951)6See also Article 24 C (1) and Article 24 A (1), the Constitution of 1945.
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Thirdly, creating the mechanism of asking for constitutional opinion.
Citizens can ask for the ICC opinion regarding the rights of citizens, officially
violated by regulations or government officers, which are not clearly covered in
the regulations. This instrument can also serve minorities, equality before law,
and other vulnerable groups in a state. Thus the citizen can seek justice with
binding effect from the Supreme Court, and ask for the constitutionality of an act.
Fourthly, adding more judges. Nine judges are not enough to handle the
load of cases registered in the ICC, when more years may be taken to decide a
case. Next, a clear statement in the constitution regarding which elections are
handled by the ICC. If all elections, such as district, provincial, mayor and
governor election have to be judged by the ICC, it creates a serious problem. The
ICC should only decide the national level elections, and share other elections
with other state institutions such as administration court, or other related courts.
Finally, the supervising state organ. Currently the supervising state organ
was abolished by ICC judgment, making the ICC’s judges vulnerable to abuse of
power. Accordingly, the MPR has to amend the Chapter of Judicial Power in the
1945 Constitution. The main points which should be stated clearly in the chapter
are (1) stating clearly that judges including ICC judges and Supreme Court
judges are subject to supervision by the Judicial Commission; (2) redesigning the
relationship of checks and balances between the ICC, the Supreme Court, and
the Judicial Commission.7
9.8. Concluding Remarks
The fundamental idea of forming the ICC in Indonesia is that the judges
must be involved in the development of democracy as well as in law reform. The
ICC has made significant achievements in the annulment of the old-fashioned
Criminal Act inherited by Dutch Colonial regime, such as the articles about
publicly insulting the President or Vice-President, expressing hostility, incitement,
hatred, or humiliation in public against the government. In protecting natural
resources, ICC has similarly made a crucial improvement by reviewing the Act of
Mineral Mining and Coal, and the Act of Electrical Power.
____________
7Titik Triwulan Tutik, Pengawasan Hakim Konstitusi Dalam Sistem Pengawasan Menurut Undang-
Undang Dasar Negara RI 1945 [Supervising Constitutional Judges in the Supervising Mechanism
According to the Constitution 1945],’ (2012) 12 (2) Jurnal Dinamika Hukum 295-309.
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For such tasks the judges must be well prepared. The judge coming from
academia will tend to be more philosophical; governmental officials will be more
sensitive to policy considerations; former politicians will have insights into what is
feasible in the existing political climate; and judges will bring their expertise in
more technical ordinary law.
The nine ICC judges have been stimulating the kind of discourse caused
by the ICC. The caseloads have not accorded with the capacity of judges, most
importantly at election time, with judges making hasty judgment without deep
consideration. So, the judge can differ from the majority of the members of the
assembly—which is commonly called a dissenting opinion—and debate remains
whether the dissent needs to be attached within a judgment or elsewhere. The
age limitation of 47-years-old has insufficient justification. The number of judges
has extended the judgement process up to 7 until 12 months, a priority scale
potentially abusing the citizen rights in receiving constitutional certainty. The ICC
also has a serious problem regarding its final-binding judgment. Some judgments
may call to be implemented immediately; others need further adjustment and
subsequently may be disobeyed by other state organs.
The future ICC jurisdictions have been examined. Should they further
expand or be reduced? Sometimes, the ICC has positioned itself as positive
legislator rather than its basic idea as negative legislator, and occupied a role as
the shadow of parliament. Although the constitutional court is the judiciary
institution, its decision and its role may usurp the parliament role as the positive
legislator, where the judges have assumed that they are securing the
constitutional rights of citizens. Being a positive legislator is not essentially
prohibited, as long as the 1945 Constitution has been amended. If not, the ICC
has to return to his basic role as the negative legislator. The Austrian
Constitutional Court amended its constitution to allow the court in some cases to
be a positive legislator.
Another serious task concerns election disputes. Handling provincial and
district elections has opened the ICC to many critics. With the limited number of
judges, the ICC decides election cases in 14 days, a very short time. The session
only has three chances, and then hearing a judgement. A quality judgement and
judicial fairness are almost impossible to achieve, creating potential for the abuse
of power.
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The ICC should have a supervising instrument. The current instrument is
self-supervising mechanism that has a crucial weakness, designed by an act
which is vulnerable to be annulled by the ICC. Thus, locating the supervising
instrument in the 1945 Constitution is essential.
The judge monitoring instrument should involve two supervising bodies,
internal and external. An independent agency, supervising judges’ behaviour and
interference from other institutions, will be essential to uphold the honour, dignity
and maintain the behaviour of judges. The Akil’s case contains other lessons to
learn for the ICC, to rebuild their honourable reputation in the years to come.
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Indonesian’s Acts and Regulations
1. Acts
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia
Act Number 4 of 1978 on the Supreme Advisory Council
Act Number 11 of 2006 on the Governing of Aceh
Act Number 12 of 2008 on the Local Government.
Act Number 12 of 2008 on the Second Amendment of the Act Number 32 of 2004
on the Local Government
Act Number 12 of 2011 on the Forming of the Legislation
Act Number 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.
Act Number 15 of 2011 on the General Election
Act Number 2 of 2008 on the Political Parties
Act Number 2 of 2011 on the Amendment of the Act Number 2 of 2008
Act Number 1 of 1974 on the Marriage
Act Number 22 of 2004 amended by the Act Number 48 of 2009 on the Judicial
Commission.
Act Number 23 of 2014 on the Local Government
Act Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia
Act Number 24 of 2009 on the Flag, language, and the State Emblem and
Anthem
Act Number 28 of 2009 on the Provincial Regulation on Tax and Retribution
Act Number 29 of 2004 on General Practitioner
Act Number 32 of 2004 on the Local Government,
Act Number 32 of 2009 on the Protection and Environmental Management
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Act Number 33 of 2004 on the Financial Balance Central Government and Local
Government
Act Number 4 of 1998 on the Bankruptcy
Act Number 4 of 2004 amended by the Act Number 48 of 2009 on the Judicial
Power
Act Number 4 of 2014 on the Second Amendment of the Act Number 24 of 2003
on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia
Act Number 5 of 1960 on the Basic Regulations on the Agrarian
Act Number 5 of 2004 on the amendment for the Act Number 14 of 1985 on the
Supreme Court
Act Number 11/PNPS of 1963 on the Eradication of Subversive Activities
2. Regulations
Bylaw Number 3 of 2013 on the Aceh Local Flag and Coat of Arms
Bylaw Number 7 of 2006 on the Governor and Mayor Election in Aceh Province.
Decree of Ministry of Home Affairs Number1 of 2014 on the Forming of Local
Regulations
Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia
Number III/MPR/1978 on the Position and Working Relationship Governance
Institutions with Highest State/ or from High State Institutions
Government Decree Number 9 of 1946 on Giving Military Rank to the Members
of the Supreme Court of the Army
Government Decree Number 13 of 2002 on the Appointment of Civil Servants on
the Structural Positions.
Government Regulation Number 25 of 2000 on the Authority of the Central
Government and the Provincial Government as an Autonomous Region.
Government Regulation Number 38 of 2007 on the Coordination between the
Central, Provincial and District/Municipality Government.
Government Regulation Number 38 of 2007 on the Government Task Division
among the Government, Provincial Government, and the Government of
Regency / City
Government Regulation Number 55 of 2005 on the Fiscal Balance
The Government Regulation Number 77 of 2007 on the Local Symbols
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Government Regulation Number 79 of 2005 on Guideline for Supervision and
Control of Local Government
Joint Decision of the Supreme Court Chairman and the Judicial Commission
Chairman of the the Republic of Indonesia Number047/KMA/SKB/IV/2009 &
Number02/SKB/P.KY/IV/2009 on the Ethical Code and the Guidance of Judge
Behaviour
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (MoU Helsinki)
MPR Decree Number III of 1978 on the Status and Relationships of Work
Procedures of the highest state institution with / or Inter State Agency
MPR Decree Number III of 2000 on the Sources Law Hierarchy
MPR Decree Number IX of 2001 on the Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource
Management.
MPRS Decree Number XXV of 1966 on Dissolution of the Communist Party of
Indonesia, Statement for the Forbidden Organizations around the Territory of the
Republic of Indonesia for the Indonesian Communist Party and banning for each
activity to Develop or to Spread Ideology or teachings of Communism/ Marxism-
Leninism
President Decision Number 10 of 2001 on the Regional Autonomy on Land
Presidential Regulation Number 10 of 2006 on the National Land Agency
Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 1 of 2004 on the Judicial Review
Authority
Religion Court Judgement Number 46/Pdt.P/2008/PA.Tgrs
Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 1999 on the Right to Substantive Review
amended with the Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2004 on the Right to
Substantive Review
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1. Judgments
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 on
the Electrical Power
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 002/PUU-I/2003 on the
Privatization of Oil and Gas
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 on the
Judicial Commission
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 01/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Juvenile Justice
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 011/PUU-I/2003 on the Act
of Election
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 011-017/PUU-I/2003 on the
Former Member Communist Party
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 on
the Insulting President and Vice-President
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 on
the Insulting President and Vice-President
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 016 /PUU-IV /2006 on the
Corruption Eradication Commission
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 039/PHPU.C1-II/2009 on the
Election Disputes
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 05/PUU-IV/2006 on Judicial
Commission
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 072- 073/PUU-II/2004 on the
Act of Local Government
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 10/PUU-VI/2008 on the
Domicile Requirement for Candidates of DPD
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 100/PUU-X/2012 on the
Employment Act
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 102/PUU-VII/2009 on the
Presidential Election
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Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 65/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Criminal Procedure
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 108/PHPU.D-IX/2011 on the
Aceh Governor Election
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgment Number 22/PHPU.D-X/2012 on the
Aceh Governor Election
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 2-3/PUU-V/2007 on the
Narcotics
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 30/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Mineral and Coal Mining
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 32/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Mineral and Coal Mining
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 35/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Non-Party Candidate for the Governor/Mayor Election.
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 36/PUU-X/2012 on the Oil
and Gas
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 4/PUU-V/2007 on the
General Practitioner
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 46/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Case of Children Outside of Marriage
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 5/PUU-V/2007 on the
Individual Candidate in Local elections and Deputy Head of Region
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 6/PUU-V/2007 on the
Criminal Offense Expressed Feelings of Hostility, Hatred, or Humiliation in Public
against the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 7/PUU-VII/2009 on the
Crime of Incitement.
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 77/PUU-IX/2011, on the
State Receivables Affairs Committee
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 97/PUU-XI/2013 on the
Provincial Election.
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 on the
Judicial Commission
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Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 10/PUU-X/2012 on the
Supervision Commission on Judicial Court Judge and Constitutional Court
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 102/PUU-VII/2009 Election
Voter Rights.
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 11/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Election Supervisory Committee
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 on the
Simultaneously Election
Indonesian Constitutional Court Judgments Number 25/PUU-VIII/2010 on the
Mineral and Coal Mining
2. Regulations
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 02/PMK/2003 on the Code of
Conduct and Ethics of Indonesian Constitutional Court Judges
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 03/PMK /2003 on the Rules
of the Constitutional Court trial
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 04/PMK/2004 on Guidelines
for the Proceedings in the Trial Results of Election
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 05/PMK/2004 on Procedures
of filing Objection to the determination of the General Election Results for
President and Vice President in 2004
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 06/PMK/2005 on Guidelines
for Testing Proceedings in the Legal Case
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 06/PMK/2005
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 08/PMK/2006 on Guidelines
Proceedings in Dispute of Authority of Constitutional State Institutions
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 09/PMK/2006 on the
Application of the Ethical Code and to Conduct Declaration of Constitutional
Justice
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 1 of 2014 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results of the Members of the Board of
Parliament, Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional Parliament
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 11/PMK/2006 on Guidelines
for the Constitutional Court judicial Administration
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Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 12 of 2008 on Political
Parties Proceedings Procedure
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 14 of 2008 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of the Election Results of the Members of the Board of
Parliament, Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional Board of
Parliament
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 15 of 2008 Guidelines
Proceedings in Dispute of the Election Results of Regional Head
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 16 of 2009 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results of members of the Parliament,
Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional Parliament
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 17 of 2009 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results of the President and Vice President
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 18 of 2009 on Guidelines for
Electronic Application Submission (Electronic Filing) and Distance Court Hearing
(Video Conference)
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 19 of 2009 on the Rules of
Trial
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 2 of 2012 on the
Constitutional Court Trial
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 21 of 2009 on Guidelines for
the hearing of the House of Representatives in deciding opinion regarding
alleged violations by the President and / or Vice President
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 3 of 2013 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results Members of the Board of Parliament,
Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional Parliament Council
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 3 of 2013 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results Members of the Board of Parliament,
Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional Parliament Council
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 3 of 2014 on the Amendment
of Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 1 of 2014 on Guidelines
for Proceedings in Dispute of Election Results Members of Parliament, the
Regional Representative Council, and the Local Parliament
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 4 of 2014 on Guidelines for
Proceedings in Dispute Election of President and Vice President
Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 6 of 2005 on the Procedural
Guidance in Judicial Review
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Indonesian Constitutional Court Regulation Number 8 of 2006 on Guidelines for
the Proceedings in the constitutional State Institutions Dispute
Constitutions of Various Countries
1987 Constitution of Republic of Philippine
Austrian Federal Constitution
Constitution of the Italian Republic
Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia
Constitution of the Kingdom of the Thailand
Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic
Constitution of the Republic of Korea
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Federal Constitution of Malaysia
